Narrative:

I was flying pilot. On initial climb out at about 400 AGL; the captain announced that he had lost his attitude display (on the pfd). At the same time I lost my flight director and the autothrust failed. The captain told me to continue flying while he did the ECAM. The ecams that displayed were: navigation adr 1 fault; navigation GPWS fault; and autothrust failure. I tried cycling my flight director on and off but it did not return. I tried to engage the autopilot two and autothrust but neither one worked. The captain was confused by the adr 1 ECAM and kept switching air data switch to first officer on 3 instead of captain on 3. Once we got the switch in the correct position; he regained his display. We advised departure and later center that we were not rvsm capable; did not have RNAV capability; and may have to return. I advocated a return; but because we were over landing weight by about 7;000 pounds at that point; the captain elected to continue for the time being. We noticed that adiru 1 [air data IRU GPS] was in the off position. This was very strange since neither one of us had touched it. The captain contacted dispatch and asked to phone conference with maintenance control. Meanwhile; I flew and handled VHF 1. The call got cut off; and he had to reconnect. Dispatch ran the fuel burn for FL270 and found that we had adequate fuel for the flight to continue to destination. The decision was made to continue. The captain looked up the ECAM in the airbus flight manual. It took him about ten minutes (and later me five minutes) to find the procedure in the book. We could not see any reason why the flight directors; autopilots; and autothrust did not work. He called the flight attendants and advised them that we were at a lower altitude and that they may get a few questions from passengers. After he returned; he cycled his flight director off. When his flight director was cycled to the on position; the flight directors; the autopilot; and autothrust systems were restored. Nowhere in the flight manual (that we could find) does it say to do this; and nowhere in the navigation adr 1 fault does it say you could lose flight directors; autopilots; or autothrust. I had been hand flying for about 40 minutes when the autopilot was finally engaged. We discussed the sequence of events during the initial climb out. The captain mentioned that just after rotation he repositioned his sun visor. I remember working with another captain a few months back that told me that he accidentally shut off adiru 1 by bumping it while adjusting his sun visor. Since the system was working fine on taxi out and the timing matched; that seemed the only logical explanation for what had happened. We continued without incident. On a side note; I was an airbus pilot instructor for nine years. There have been a few occasions where I have had to reference the new flight manual for ecams and other non-normal procedures. Although the new flight manual format for non-normal and emergencies probably works very well for the boeing fleets (especially the 737); for the airbus this new format is not as intuitive. It would have taken me 30 seconds to find what I needed in the old manual (without even looking in the index). With the new format it took me five minutes! Had this happened to a less experience crew; there is no doubt in my mind that given more extenuating circumstance that this could have resulted in a major incident!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer experiences autothrust and flight director failure shortly after takeoff while the Captain's attitude display disappears and the autopilot will not engage. It is discovered later that the rotary switch that controls ADIRU 1 is in the off position. Once the Captain's ADR switching is placed on ADR 3 and the flight directors are cycled; all systems become operational minus ADIRU 1.

Narrative: I was flying pilot. On initial climb out at about 400 AGL; the Captain announced that he had lost his attitude display (on the PFD). At the same time I lost my flight director and the autothrust failed. The Captain told me to continue flying while he did the ECAM. The ECAMs that displayed were: NAV ADR 1 fault; NAV GPWS fault; and Autothrust Failure. I tried cycling my flight director on and off but it did not return. I tried to engage the autopilot two and autothrust but neither one worked. The Captain was confused by the ADR 1 ECAM and kept switching AIR Data Switch to First Officer on 3 instead of Captain on 3. Once we got the switch in the correct position; he regained his display. We advised Departure and later Center that we were not RVSM capable; did not have RNAV capability; and may have to return. I advocated a return; but because we were over landing weight by about 7;000 LBS at that point; the Captain elected to continue for the time being. We noticed that ADIRU 1 [Air Data IRU GPS] was in the off position. This was very strange since neither one of us had touched it. The Captain contacted Dispatch and asked to phone conference with Maintenance Control. Meanwhile; I flew and handled VHF 1. The call got cut off; and he had to reconnect. Dispatch ran the fuel burn for FL270 and found that we had adequate fuel for the flight to continue to destination. The decision was made to continue. The Captain looked up the ECAM in the Airbus Flight Manual. It took him about ten minutes (and later me five minutes) to find the procedure in the book. We could not see any reason why the flight directors; autopilots; and autothrust did not work. He called the flight attendants and advised them that we were at a lower altitude and that they may get a few questions from passengers. After he returned; he cycled his flight director off. When his flight director was cycled to the on position; the flight directors; the autopilot; and autothrust systems were restored. Nowhere in the flight manual (that we could find) does it say to do this; and nowhere in the NAV ADR 1 fault does it say you could lose flight directors; autopilots; or autothrust. I had been hand flying for about 40 minutes when the autopilot was finally engaged. We discussed the sequence of events during the initial climb out. The Captain mentioned that just after rotation he repositioned his sun visor. I remember working with another Captain a few months back that told me that he accidentally shut off ADIRU 1 by bumping it while adjusting his sun visor. Since the system was working fine on taxi out and the timing matched; that seemed the only logical explanation for what had happened. We continued without incident. On a side note; I was an Airbus pilot instructor for nine years. There have been a few occasions where I have had to reference the new flight manual for ECAMs and other non-normal procedures. Although the new flight manual format for non-normal and emergencies probably works very well for the Boeing fleets (especially the 737); for the Airbus this new format is not as intuitive. It would have taken me 30 seconds to find what I needed in the old manual (without even looking in the index). With the new format it took me five minutes! Had this happened to a less experience crew; there is no doubt in my mind that given more extenuating circumstance that this could have resulted in a major incident!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.