Narrative:

We arrived uneventfully at the ramp approximately 20 minutes early. Ground control had cleared us from the taxiway to our gate. The first officer and I both noted that no station personnel were on the ramp to direct us in. I lined up with the initial line-up line for the gate; stopped and set the brakes. The first officer twice called to notify station personnel that we were on the ramp. No responses were received. When the 'engine cool' alert illuminated; I directed the first officer to shut down the right engine; which he did. While sitting in the alley way; short of the gate; and with the brakes set; I made the following announcement: 'we are not yet at the jetway. Please remain in your seat with the seat belts fastened until we are at a complete stop at the gate and the seat belt sign is turned off.' after a three to four minute wait; the marshaller's appeared on the scene. I slightly applied power and we eased forward at approximately four to five knots; straight ahead; per the marshaller directions. When we got to the point for making the 90 degree right turn for final line up to the gate; the marshaller gave me the appropriate signal to turn right. I applied full right rudder; and started to turn the tiller wheel to full right deflection. After only 10-20 degrees of turn; I noted an audible 'snap' below the tiller wheel and the nose wheel appeared to center up again; and I was unable to obtain any response from the tiller wheel.....it felt 'mushy'. I remarked something to the effect that; 'it won't turn'. I had not yet applied full brakes. As we were still slightly moving forward; and the terminal complex was 50-60 ft ahead of us; the first officer thinking we had lost hydraulics applied the brakes. We immediately stopped. I set the parking brake. We assessed that there was a failure of the nose steering system. We notified the marshaller's that our steering was inoperative; and that we needed to be towed to the gate. While awaiting the tug for tow; we started the APU. During this short time frame; the lead flight attendant notified us that the L2 flight attendant had fallen down when the brakes were applied. We were towed to the gate; and deplaned all passengers uneventfully. The L2 flight attendant told me that when the plane suddenly stopped; that she fell forward over the barricade strap; and impacted her right shoulder on either a seat; or the deck. (I did not ask her if she had prematurely unstrapped prior to our arriving at the gate.) she indicated that she has extreme sensitivity in her right shoulder area. I told her and the lead flight attendant that it would be best for emt's to come and examine her before she worked the next flight. I told the gate agent to called medical personnel for the flight attendant. I debriefed the oncoming front end crew of the maintenance issue; and the potential flight attendant injury issue. My first officer and I departed the gate area for the hotel and scheduled layover. 1) even though I had not clearly and completely explained to my first officer that I had a steering problem; and not a hydraulic nor brake problem.....he; with very little time to fully assess the situation; noted us not turning and the terminal complex getting bigger in our windshield. He immediately took corrective action by applying the brakes. We did not have the luxury of having bonus time to discuss the quick developing extremis situation. Even though I was gradually coming on the brakes to stop us; he correctly took the action to avert what he perceived to be a critical situation. 2) unless the L2 seat belt and harness completely failed; they should have sufficiently restrained the occupant in her seat; and thereby precluding a possible injury being sustained. I had also; just three to four minutes prior; made the cautionary announcement/instruction to all cabin passengers/personnel to remain seated and keep their seat belts fastened until we were at the gate and the seat belt sign was turnedoff. I do not know if any flight attendants or passengers had prematurely released their belts and harnesses prior to the incident and prior to our arriving at the gate (seat belt sign turned 'off').

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B717 Captain experienced nose wheel steering failure during a 90 degree turn into the gate but did communicate effectively to the First Officer what had occurred. The First Officer applied full brakes causing an abrupt stop and injury to a flight attendant.

Narrative: We arrived uneventfully at the ramp approximately 20 minutes early. Ground Control had cleared us from the taxiway to our gate. The First Officer and I both noted that no station personnel were on the ramp to direct us in. I lined up with the initial line-up line for the gate; stopped and set the brakes. The First Officer twice called to notify station personnel that we were on the ramp. No responses were received. When the 'engine cool' alert illuminated; I directed the First Officer to shut down the right engine; which he did. While sitting in the alley way; short of the gate; and with the brakes set; I made the following announcement: 'We are not yet at the jetway. Please remain in your seat with the seat belts fastened until we are at a complete stop at the gate and the seat belt sign is turned off.' After a three to four minute wait; the marshaller's appeared on the scene. I slightly applied power and we eased forward at approximately four to five knots; straight ahead; per the marshaller directions. When we got to the point for making the 90 degree right turn for final line up to the gate; the marshaller gave me the appropriate signal to turn right. I applied full right rudder; and started to turn the tiller wheel to full right deflection. After only 10-20 degrees of turn; I noted an audible 'snap' below the tiller wheel and the nose wheel appeared to center up again; and I was unable to obtain any response from the tiller wheel.....it felt 'mushy'. I remarked something to the effect that; 'It won't turn'. I had not yet applied full brakes. As we were still slightly moving forward; and the terminal complex was 50-60 FT ahead of us; the First Officer thinking we had lost hydraulics applied the brakes. We immediately stopped. I set the parking brake. We assessed that there was a failure of the nose steering system. We notified the marshaller's that our steering was inoperative; and that we needed to be towed to the gate. While awaiting the tug for tow; we started the APU. During this short time frame; the Lead Flight Attendant notified us that the L2 Flight Attendant had fallen down when the brakes were applied. We were towed to the gate; and deplaned all passengers uneventfully. the L2 Flight Attendant told me that when the plane suddenly stopped; that she fell forward over the barricade strap; and impacted her right shoulder on either a seat; or the deck. (I did not ask her if she had prematurely unstrapped prior to our arriving at the gate.) She indicated that she has extreme sensitivity in her right shoulder area. I told her and the Lead Flight Attendant that it would be best for EMT's to come and examine her before she worked the next flight. I told the gate agent to called medical personnel for the flight attendant. I debriefed the oncoming front end crew of the maintenance issue; and the potential flight attendant injury issue. My First Officer and I departed the gate area for the hotel and scheduled layover. 1) Even though I had not clearly and completely explained to my First Officer that I had a steering problem; and not a hydraulic nor brake problem.....he; with very little time to fully assess the situation; noted us not turning and the terminal complex getting bigger in our windshield. He immediately took corrective action by applying the brakes. We did not have the luxury of having bonus time to discuss the quick developing extremis situation. Even though I was gradually coming on the brakes to stop us; he correctly took the action to avert what he perceived to be a critical situation. 2) Unless the L2 seat belt and harness completely failed; they should have sufficiently restrained the occupant in her seat; and thereby precluding a possible injury being sustained. I had also; just three to four minutes prior; made the cautionary announcement/instruction to all cabin passengers/personnel to remain seated and keep their seat belts fastened UNTIL we were at the gate and the seat belt sign was turnedoff. I do not know if any flight attendants or passengers had prematurely released their belts and harnesses prior to the incident and prior to our arriving at the gate (seat belt sign turned 'off').

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.