Narrative:

On previous leg; the aircraft had multiple nuisance anti-skid fail alerts while taxiing prior to takeoff. Alert only came on when setting the parking brake in line for takeoff. We complied with the QRH. After running the anti-skid test; it passed the test and we moved to the MEL. Because the test passed; we concluded that we had a good system; decided to not use the parking brake while taxiing for takeoff; thus avoiding the re-occurrence of the alert. Our interpretation of the MEL was that if the alert remained; being a flagged item; we would turn back to the gate for maintenance action. After the successful completion of the anti-skid test; and not setting the parking brake; we had no further alerts that leg of the flight. It was written up by the captain in deferral log; and shown closed in the maintenance log upon arrival for the leg back to the departure airport. There was no incidence with the anti-skid on start up through takeoff on the leg return leg. Upon approach; while performing the before landing checklist; a level 2 anti-skid right fail was annunciated. We were at about 1;500 ft AGL just inside final approach fix. The captain; also the pilot flying; elected to execute a go-around. The release had us planned for 15;673 [pounds of] fuel at touchdown. We were 2;000 pounds heavy on cargo which increased our fuel burn by 200 pounds. We had about a; 18 minute delay with approach due to being stuck behind an airbus for most of the route. Added up; we were right at 15;000 pounds at the time of the go-around; if not slightly below. Once safely on the climb to 3;000 ft; runway heading; as assigned by tower; we contacted approach for vectors to our next landing. We were assigned 09 and turned downwind. We then ran the QRH for the anti-skid right fail with steel brakes. This time the alert did not remain extinguished. We decided to perform the recommended 50/ext landing. Following the QRH procedure completion; we were turned to a base leg for the ILS to visual runway 09. While configuring the aircraft for landing; we noticed that the fuel was 12;400 pounds at around 500 ft AGL. After landing on runway 09; we rolled out the full length; used full reverse thrust (never above approximately 85% N1) and the captain did not use the brakes until the turn off at the end. Clear of the runway; we turned the anti-skid off as per the QRH. We then taxied to our spot and parked. The captain documented the anti-skid right fail in the maintenance log. My concern is that we were planned to land with a nominal amount of fuel; without delays. Not factored into that calculation was the 18 minute en route/arrival delay nor the go-around for a maintenance issue. We touched down at about 1;000 pounds above emergency fuel; thanks to a helpful approach control; and timely reactions of the crew. Had runway 09 not been available; we may have had a compounded incident with maintenance issues and emergency fuel issues. A more thorough inspection of the anti-skid system may have discovered the reason for the multiple alerts we encountered in flight and on the ground. Then again; it may not have. Anticipating this alert; given the multiple occurrences on the previous leg; and possibly getting the gear down earlier; could have given us more time to quickly run the QRH while level on extended final.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC-10 ANTI-SKID R FAIL alerted during taxi out; but extinguished and did not re-occur until the final leg upon landing gear extension. A go around was executed; the QRH complied with; and a normal landing followed.

Narrative: On previous leg; the aircraft had multiple nuisance ANTI-SKID FAIL alerts while taxiing prior to takeoff. Alert only came on when setting the parking brake in line for takeoff. We complied with the QRH. After running the Anti-Skid Test; it passed the test and we moved to the MEL. Because the test passed; we concluded that we had a good system; decided to not use the parking brake while taxiing for takeoff; thus avoiding the re-occurrence of the alert. Our interpretation of the MEL was that if the alert remained; being a flagged item; we would turn back to the gate for maintenance action. After the successful completion of the Anti-Skid Test; and not setting the parking brake; we had no further alerts that leg of the flight. It was written up by the Captain in deferral log; and shown closed in the maintenance log upon arrival for the leg back to the departure airport. There was no incidence with the anti-skid on start up through takeoff on the leg return leg. Upon approach; while performing the before landing checklist; a level 2 ANTI-SKID R FAIL was annunciated. We were at about 1;500 FT AGL just inside final approach fix. The Captain; also the pilot flying; elected to execute a go-around. The release had us planned for 15;673 [LBS of] fuel at touchdown. We were 2;000 LBS heavy on cargo which increased our fuel burn by 200 LBS. We had about a; 18 minute delay with approach due to being stuck behind an Airbus for most of the route. Added up; we were right at 15;000 LBS at the time of the go-around; if not slightly below. Once safely on the climb to 3;000 FT; runway heading; as assigned by Tower; we contacted Approach for vectors to our next landing. We were assigned 09 and turned downwind. We then ran the QRH for the ANTI-SKID R FAIL with steel brakes. This time the alert did not remain extinguished. We decided to perform the recommended 50/EXT landing. Following the QRH procedure completion; we were turned to a base leg for the ILS to visual Runway 09. While configuring the aircraft for landing; we noticed that the fuel was 12;400 LBS at around 500 FT AGL. After landing on Runway 09; we rolled out the full length; used full reverse thrust (never above approximately 85% N1) and the Captain did not use the brakes until the turn off at the end. Clear of the runway; we turned the anti-skid off as per the QRH. We then taxied to our spot and parked. The Captain documented the ANTI-SKID R FAIL in the maintenance log. My concern is that we were planned to land with a nominal amount of fuel; without delays. Not factored into that calculation was the 18 minute en route/arrival delay nor the go-around for a maintenance issue. We touched down at about 1;000 LBS above emergency fuel; thanks to a helpful Approach Control; and timely reactions of the crew. Had Runway 09 not been available; we may have had a compounded incident with maintenance issues and emergency fuel issues. A more thorough inspection of the Anti-Skid System may have discovered the reason for the multiple alerts we encountered in flight and on the ground. Then again; it may not have. Anticipating this alert; given the multiple occurrences on the previous leg; and possibly getting the gear down earlier; could have given us more time to quickly run the QRH while level on extended final.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.