Narrative:

During our initial climb after takeoff on runway xxr; an aircraft on the ground advised the tower that we had a 'left engine surge' during our takeoff roll abeam. The tower asked us if we had heard the report; and repeated the information to us. I had heard the report but did not realize it was our aircraft until ATC queried us. All cockpit indications had been normal to this point. We did have a significant crosswind for the takeoff. We were busy with the takeoff profile and flap retraction; and the usual departure communications at this international airport with numerous heading and altitude changes. At about the time we began the engine surge procedure; the flight attendants called the cockpit to report a vibration in the cabin. Throttle response and engine indications were still normal. We continued the climb and then did notice a subtle humming sound. Then amber 'right engine eec mode EICAS' message illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure as we reached our initial cruise altitude of FL300. I initiated a satcom call to dispatch; who brought maintenance control on to the call. I told them that we thought it best to return to departure airport; with the engines operating in the alternate eec mode; unless they had any input. About that time; the call disconnected. I re-initiated the call; and they agreed the best plan would be to return to the field; but then the call disconnected again. We advised control that we needed to return due to a mechanical problem; but that we were not declaring an emergency. We obtained vectors back toward the airport and were told to expect holding; and were issued a descent clearance. About this time we noticed 'right engine fire lp 2' status message. I made an announcement to the passengers explaining our return. We received additional calls from the cabin crew indicating that the vibration was getting worse; though we still did not sense anything more than a humming noise. The right engine vibration indication had increased to about 4.9; with a spike to 8.0. Some of the other engine indications went blank on both EICAS and the standby engine indicator; although throttle response seemed normal. Then the right engine oil quantity began decreasing steadily and reached zero. Oil pressure decreased below red line and the 'right engine oil press' light illuminated. We accomplished the 'engine fire or engine severe damage or separation' QRH procedure. We declared an emergency to control; and advised dispatch via ACARS. We were passing through FL250 and were 73 miles from the airport. We decided that our departure airport was the nearest suitable airport given the distance to descend and the need for a long runway. The thrust reverser on the operating engine had been deferred inoperative. I decided to land 12;000 pounds overweight rather than dump fuel to expedite our arrival; given the unusual series of malfunctions and the ground report of a malfunction on the left engine; our only operative engine. At least one attempt to reach dispatch via ACARS 'call me' was unsuccessful. Dispatch did acknowledge our '7700' message. We forgot to actually set the transponder to 7700; however. I advised the lead flight attendant that we expected a normal landing with a higher speed; and that there was no need to prepare for an evacuation. Once the FMC had been programmed; landing performance reviewed; I made a passenger announcement advising the passengers we expected a normal landing; and then took control of the aircraft for the approach and landing. Approximately 15 minutes prior to landing; control asked us to confirm that we were single engine. We requested that fire equipment meet the aircraft. We made an uneventful flaps 20 landing on runway xxl; cleared the runway and stopped on the taxiway. As expected after an overweight; high speed landing; our brake temperatures were climbing and the 'brake temperature' light illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure. Fire crews were advised and ably handled the situation. We advised thelead flight attendant to be ready for a possible evacuation after a small fire broke out on the aft right brake of the main gear. The fire crews promptly extinguished it; so no evacuation was necessary. After 1 hour of brake cooling; we were towed to the gate. I debriefed the entire crew; contacted the duty chief pilot; the base assistant chief pilot; and maintenance. All maintenance log entries were accomplished through communications with maintenance control and local station maintenance. The single highlight of the whole series of events was a great crew that worked together well on both sides of the flight deck door. That gave us the most favorable outcome possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 engine surge was observed by ground personnel during takeoff; but because no abnormal engine or EICAS alerts were present the flight continued. At 30;000 FT engine vibration; engine fire; and loss of oil alerts caused the crew to shut the engine down; declare an emergency; and return to the departure airport.

Narrative: During our initial climb after takeoff on Runway XXR; an aircraft on the ground advised the Tower that we had a 'left engine surge' during our takeoff roll abeam. The Tower asked us if we had heard the report; and repeated the information to us. I had heard the report but did not realize it was our aircraft until ATC queried us. All cockpit indications had been normal to this point. We did have a significant crosswind for the takeoff. We were busy with the takeoff profile and flap retraction; and the usual departure communications at this international airport with numerous heading and altitude changes. At about the time we began the engine surge procedure; the flight attendants called the cockpit to report a vibration in the cabin. Throttle response and engine indications were still normal. We continued the climb and then did notice a subtle humming sound. Then amber 'R ENG EEC MODE EICAS' message illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure as we reached our initial cruise altitude of FL300. I initiated a SATCOM call to Dispatch; who brought Maintenance Control on to the call. I told them that we thought it best to return to departure airport; with the engines operating in the alternate EEC mode; unless they had any input. About that time; the call disconnected. I re-initiated the call; and they agreed the best plan would be to return to the field; but then the call disconnected again. We advised Control that we needed to return due to a mechanical problem; but that we were not declaring an emergency. We obtained vectors back toward the airport and were told to expect holding; and were issued a descent clearance. About this time we noticed 'R ENG FIRE LP 2' status message. I made an announcement to the passengers explaining our return. We received additional calls from the cabin crew indicating that the vibration was getting worse; though we still did not sense anything more than a humming noise. The right engine vibration indication had increased to about 4.9; with a spike to 8.0. Some of the other engine indications went blank on both EICAS and the standby engine indicator; although throttle response seemed normal. Then the right engine oil quantity began decreasing steadily and reached zero. Oil pressure decreased below red line and the 'R ENG OIL PRESS' light illuminated. We accomplished the 'Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation' QRH procedure. We declared an emergency to Control; and advised Dispatch via ACARS. We were passing through FL250 and were 73 miles from the airport. We decided that our departure airport was the nearest suitable airport given the distance to descend and the need for a long runway. The thrust reverser on the operating engine had been deferred inoperative. I decided to land 12;000 LBS overweight rather than dump fuel to expedite our arrival; given the unusual series of malfunctions and the ground report of a malfunction on the left engine; our only operative engine. At least one attempt to reach Dispatch via ACARS 'Call me' was unsuccessful. Dispatch did acknowledge our '7700' message. We forgot to actually set the transponder to 7700; however. I advised the Lead Flight Attendant that we expected a normal landing with a higher speed; and that there was no need to prepare for an evacuation. Once the FMC had been programmed; landing performance reviewed; I made a passenger announcement advising the passengers we expected a normal landing; and then took control of the aircraft for the approach and landing. Approximately 15 minutes prior to landing; Control asked us to confirm that we were single engine. We requested that fire equipment meet the aircraft. We made an uneventful flaps 20 landing on Runway XXL; cleared the runway and stopped on the taxiway. As expected after an overweight; high speed landing; our brake temperatures were climbing and the 'BRAKE TEMP' light illuminated. We accomplished the QRH procedure. Fire crews were advised and ably handled the situation. We advised thelead flight attendant to be ready for a possible evacuation after a small fire broke out on the aft right brake of the main gear. The fire crews promptly extinguished it; so no evacuation was necessary. After 1 hour of brake cooling; we were towed to the gate. I debriefed the entire crew; contacted the Duty Chief Pilot; the Base Assistant Chief Pilot; and Maintenance. All maintenance log entries were accomplished through communications with Maintenance Control and Local Station Maintenance. The single highlight of the whole series of events was a great crew that worked together well on both sides of the flight deck door. That gave us the most favorable outcome possible.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.