Narrative:

August 2012; I; mechanic X and aircraft maintenance technician (amt) Y were selected to go to ZZZ1 to work on an erj-135 aircraft that reported the spoilers were deployed during taxi out at 9 KTS along with a clunking noise. We were told by management that contract maintenance troubleshot the problem and found the # 1 wheel hub cap drive clips broken and that they wanted us to go there; replace the damaged hub cap and do a taxi check. We pulled all the maintenance manuals (M/M); including the fault isolation manual (fim) for the reported fault; and all the parts and tools as well. We arrived to ZZZ1 late afternoon and when we got to the aircraft we checked the aircraft logbook and found that there was a PIREP for the spoiler problem but no documentation for the maintenance performed by the contractor. We removed the # 1 wheel hub cap to verify its condition and; in fact; the drive clips were broken.then we used fim 27-63-00 for 'spoiler opening intermittent during taxi' and went straight to block-4 where it tells you to inspect the hub cap and then to block-11 that tells you to replace it in accordance with aircraft maintenance manual (amm) task 32-41-03 in which one of the follow-on task is to do the functional check of the main brake system; task 32-41-00. During the functional check; we found the brake pressure on the left inboard brake to be 140 psi; 20 psi more than what it is supposed to be as stated on page-511; item (i); step-1 of the referenced task. When we notified the maintenance control coordinator about this issue; he started questioning why we were troubleshooting the brakes if we were there to replace the hub cap and do a taxi check? We explained that it was part of the amm instructions to do the functional check of the brakes. After approximately five minutes; we received a call from the line maintenance group; a mr. X; asking the same questions as the maintenance control coordinator. We explained again what we were doing and that we suspected it was a bad brake control unit or brake control valve. Line maintenance told us to get with maintenance control to start moving parts to ZZZ1. We received the parts later that evening and started replacing the brake control unit. We ran the tests after the removal and replacement (rar) and all the tests were satisfactory. We also did a taxi check and no spoiler deployment or clunking noise were noticed. We called the aircraft A-1 to maintenance control after midnight. Later; we departed from ZZZ1 on the same aircraft and as soon as we got to ZZZ; we were asked by line maintenance group mr. X; in an intimidating way; why did we replace a brake control unit for a spoiler problem. We explained to him once again that those test were part of the amm and this time with all the manuals on hand and he kept saying that we were sent there to change a hub cap and do a taxi check and that he didn't understand why we were troubleshooting the brakes system. We felt harassed and pushed to take shortcuts from the amm in order to have the aircraft back in service. We believe that this kind of pressure and harassment can lead to a mistake that can compromise the safety of our aircraft; employees and customers. There was a miscommunication between the maintenance control coordinator and the contractor regarding the procedures required by our procedures manual (pm) when a contractor is doing maintenance on an aircraft. Failure to follow these procedures can lead to an undocumented maintenance situation where an aircraft can be dispatched with an unfinished job. Also there was a flight going out of ZZZ1 that was going to be cancelled and apparently the line maintenance group and the maintenance control coordinator wanted the aircraft fixed real fast no matter what. The maintenance control coordinator needs to follow the procedures established in our procedures manual (pm) when contract maintenance is required to perform work on our aircraft. And management needs to be more aware of the seriousness of the work we are performing on aircraft and that the manufacturer's manuals need to be followed every time we do maintenance. Taking shortcuts should not be an option for the amt's nor for the management.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMT) report about the harassment they were subjected to by their Maintenance Management for following Maintenance Manual (M/M) procedures on a Field Trip. They were troubleshooting a pilot report that spoilers had deployed during taxi-out on an EMB-135 aircraft.

Narrative: August 2012; I; Mechanic X and Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) Y were selected to go to ZZZ1 to work on an ERJ-135 aircraft that reported the spoilers were deployed during taxi out at 9 KTS along with a clunking noise. We were told by Management that Contract Maintenance troubleshot the problem and found the # 1 wheel hub cap drive clips broken and that they wanted us to go there; replace the damaged hub cap and do a taxi check. We pulled all the Maintenance Manuals (M/M); including the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) for the reported fault; and all the parts and tools as well. We arrived to ZZZ1 late afternoon and when we got to the aircraft we checked the aircraft logbook and found that there was a PIREP for the spoiler problem but no documentation for the maintenance performed by the contractor. We removed the # 1 wheel hub cap to verify its condition and; in fact; the drive clips were broken.Then we used FIM 27-63-00 for 'Spoiler Opening Intermittent During Taxi' and went straight to Block-4 where it tells you to inspect the hub cap and then to Block-11 that tells you to replace it in accordance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Task 32-41-03 in which one of the follow-on task is to do the Functional Check of the Main Brake System; Task 32-41-00. During the Functional Check; we found the brake pressure on the left inboard brake to be 140 PSI; 20 PSI more than what it is supposed to be as stated on Page-511; item (i); Step-1 of the referenced task. When we notified the Maintenance Control Coordinator about this issue; he started questioning why we were troubleshooting the brakes if we were there to replace the hub cap and do a taxi check? We explained that it was part of the AMM instructions to do the Functional Check of the brakes. After approximately five minutes; we received a call from the Line Maintenance Group; a Mr. X; asking the same questions as the Maintenance Control Coordinator. We explained again what we were doing and that we suspected it was a bad brake control unit or brake control valve. Line Maintenance told us to get with Maintenance Control to start moving parts to ZZZ1. We received the parts later that evening and started replacing the brake control unit. We ran the tests after the Removal and Replacement (RAR) and all the tests were satisfactory. We also did a taxi check and no spoiler deployment or clunking noise were noticed. We called the aircraft A-1 to Maintenance Control after midnight. Later; we departed from ZZZ1 on the same aircraft and as soon as we got to ZZZ; we were asked by Line Maintenance Group Mr. X; in an intimidating way; why did we replace a brake control unit for a spoiler problem. We explained to him once again that those test were part of the AMM and this time with all the manuals on hand and he kept saying that we were sent there to change a hub cap and do a taxi check and that he didn't understand why we were troubleshooting the brakes system. We felt harassed and pushed to take shortcuts from the AMM in order to have the aircraft back in service. We believe that this kind of pressure and harassment can lead to a mistake that can compromise the safety of our aircraft; employees and customers. There was a miscommunication between the Maintenance Control Coordinator and the Contractor regarding the procedures required by our Procedures Manual (PM) when a Contractor is doing maintenance on an aircraft. Failure to follow these procedures can lead to an undocumented maintenance situation where an aircraft can be dispatched with an unfinished job. Also there was a flight going out of ZZZ1 that was going to be cancelled and apparently the Line Maintenance Group and the Maintenance Control Coordinator wanted the aircraft fixed real fast no matter what. The Maintenance Control Coordinator needs to follow the procedures established in our Procedures Manual (PM) when Contract Maintenance is required to perform work on our aircraft. And Management needs to be more aware of the seriousness of the work we are performing on aircraft and that the Manufacturer's Manuals need to be followed every time we do maintenance. Taking shortcuts should not be an option for the AMT's nor for the Management.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.