Narrative:

We were being vectored and were descending on the right downwind to runway 16R and were given an altitude of 7;000 ft to descend to. The assigned altitude (7000) was set in the altitude preselect by my captain-qualified co-pilot/company chief pilot and was automatically armed for capture. It was a clear night and we reported the runway in sight. Shortly thereafter we were given a 90 degree turn to the base leg and cleared for the approach. This heading would put us just outside the final approach fix. The autopilot was engaged and I was using heading mode while still descending. Because I was unfamiliar with the airport and terrain my intent was to join the final outside the final approach fix and allow the autopilot to capture the glideslope intercept altitude. I would then capture the glideslope and track it down like a normal ILS. While looking outside at the runway it appeared that we were getting extremely low as I was turning base to final. There were no lights below us; it was just dark black. I disengaged the autopilot; added power and leveled the aircraft until we were on the glideslope. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. After recognition of the condition we did get the automated 'glideslope' warning. We did not reach the parameters to get a 'terrain' warning. There was no altitude alert from ATC. I discovered that prior to the autopilot capturing 7;000 ft my copilot had changed the preselector to 5;000 ft. The airport elevation was 5;431 ft and the touchdown zone elevation was 5;323 ft. There was no communication from him about the change to the altitude preselector. In our operation the non-flying pilot controls the altitude preselector but is supposed to call changes to the flying pilot who should verbally acknowledge the change. This did not happen in this case. The altitude selected should be that assigned by ATC or called for by the pilot flying.we normally fly on the east coast at elevations near sea level. This was a factor in the delayed recognition of the low altitude condition on my part. Subconsciously 7;000 or even 5;000 ft didn't ring a bell as being low to me. I am a former airline pilot and most of my training and operations involved extensive CRM. My copilot/chief pilot/immediate supervisor has strictly a general aviation background and appears to have never had much CRM training and practice. These different backgrounds sometimes conflict. He is not receptive of debriefing after a flight and examining what went wrong and how to prevent such occurrences in the future. He would become hostile at such suggestions. He will not accept input or procedural suggestions but rather dictates his technique. We fly as a crew but train individually so as not to ground the airplane during training.I did not maintain proper situational awareness with regard to my altitude and relied on automation to capture an altitude that I thought was set. The pilot not flying exercised poor CRM and failed to follow normal procedures by changing the altitude preselector to an altitude that was below field elevation and did not communicate the change to the pilot flying. This was a collins proline 21 equipped airplane and both pilots attend [recurrent training] yearly but not as a crew. It would be helpful in today's era of advanced avionics to have some sort of warning when the altitude preselector is set below the elevation of the airport or touchdown zone that is selected from the database or below the elevation/radar altimeter altitude. This was ultimately a failure/breakdown/lack of CRM. This is a systemic problem within this two man flight department.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE20 Captain reported a CFTT incident on approach to a high elevation airport when cockpit procedures and situational awareness broke down.

Narrative: We were being vectored and were descending on the right downwind to runway 16R and were given an altitude of 7;000 FT to descend to. The assigned altitude (7000) was set in the altitude preselect by my Captain-qualified co-pilot/company chief pilot and was automatically armed for capture. It was a clear night and we reported the runway in sight. Shortly thereafter we were given a 90 degree turn to the base leg and cleared for the approach. This heading would put us just outside the final approach fix. The autopilot was engaged and I was using heading mode while still descending. Because I was unfamiliar with the airport and terrain my intent was to join the final outside the final approach fix and allow the autopilot to capture the glideslope intercept altitude. I would then capture the glideslope and track it down like a normal ILS. While looking outside at the runway it appeared that we were getting extremely low as I was turning base to final. There were no lights below us; it was just dark black. I disengaged the autopilot; added power and leveled the aircraft until we were on the glideslope. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. After recognition of the condition we did get the automated 'glideslope' warning. We did not reach the parameters to get a 'terrain' warning. There was no altitude alert from ATC. I discovered that prior to the autopilot capturing 7;000 FT my copilot had changed the preselector to 5;000 FT. The airport elevation was 5;431 FT and the touchdown zone elevation was 5;323 FT. There was no communication from him about the change to the altitude preselector. In our operation the non-flying pilot controls the altitude preselector but is supposed to call changes to the flying pilot who should verbally acknowledge the change. This did not happen in this case. The altitude selected should be that assigned by ATC or called for by the pilot flying.We normally fly on the East Coast at elevations near sea level. This was a factor in the delayed recognition of the low altitude condition on my part. Subconsciously 7;000 or even 5;000 FT didn't ring a bell as being low to me. I am a former airline pilot and most of my training and operations involved extensive CRM. My copilot/Chief Pilot/immediate supervisor has strictly a general aviation background and appears to have never had much CRM training and practice. These different backgrounds sometimes conflict. He is not receptive of debriefing after a flight and examining what went wrong and how to prevent such occurrences in the future. He would become hostile at such suggestions. He will not accept input or procedural suggestions but rather dictates his technique. We fly as a crew but train individually so as not to ground the airplane during training.I did not maintain proper situational awareness with regard to my altitude and relied on automation to capture an altitude that I thought was set. The pilot not flying exercised poor CRM and failed to follow normal procedures by changing the altitude preselector to an altitude that was below field elevation and did not communicate the change to the pilot flying. This was a Collins Proline 21 equipped airplane and both pilots attend [recurrent training] yearly but not as a crew. It would be helpful in today's era of advanced avionics to have some sort of warning when the altitude preselector is set below the elevation of the airport or touchdown zone that is selected from the database or below the elevation/radar altimeter altitude. This was ultimately a failure/breakdown/lack of CRM. This is a systemic problem within this two man flight department.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.