Narrative:

This was my first flight with a new captain. The flight proceeded normally with standard callouts, checklist usage, etc. The only unusual aspect was the autoplt, which didn't seem to want to track a heading. The captain was flying, and compensated by making corrections using the manual roll control knob. On arrival at portland, we were given vectors to join the localizer, told to descend to and maintain 4000 ft until established, reduce speed to 170 KTS and we were cleared for the ILS. I entered the altitude in the alerter, read back the restrs and clearance, and obtained concurrence from the captain. He deployed the spoilers to slow us, and I proceeded with the checklist. I heard the altitude alerter chime and saw that we were below 4000 ft and descending. I called 'altitude,' and got no response. Airspeed was still slowing. I called for airspeed and altitude, with no response. We reached 3500 ft, were still slowing (150 KIAS, no flaps, spoilers deployed, gear up) and descent rate slowed 1500 FPM down. I put my hand on the thrust levers, grabbed the control column to back it up, and yelled 'altitude! Climb, climb, climb!' I pushed the power to takeoff power, and attempted to retract the spoilers. The captain held his thumb over the switch, preventing me from retracting the spoilers. He retarded the power to flight idle, and continued trimming up. I again pushed the power up and yelled 'airspeed! You're slow! Climb, climb, climb!' finally, the captain responded 'ok, you don't need to yell,' and he stopped trying to pull the thrust levers to idle. He began a climb. He called for flaps 8 degrees, and then stated that he had no GS. I looked, and saw that his GS indicators were both flagged. Mine was not. I told him I had tuned and idented, and was still getting a good identify on both sides. I informed him I had a GS indication on my side. He said he would just descend using the localizer, and to back him up. He told me to put the next altitude in the alerter and to guide him on the GS. I told him the next altitude was decision ht, with no step-down fixes. I told the captain that I had a weak indication. I said we were now full deflection, and should execute a missed approach. We were then above the GS, fully deflected, and he was attempting to correct with an excessive rate of descent. I told the captain again we were fully deflected, that I had a weak GS, and that he could fly it off my side. It was evident he was not going missed. I recommended the missed, then recommended he fly my indication. I also suggested I could continue the approach from my side, as the GS began coming in from below again. At this point we began to break out and proceeded visually to a landing. On the ground, the captain blamed his inoperative GS indicators for his reason on going low, stating he didn't know we were supposed to maintain 4000 ft until established. I asked him where he planned to go since we weren't established, were only just getting the localizer alive, and he had no GS indication and the altitude alerter clearly was set for 4000 ft. He said he figured I would direct him in getting down. I told him that's how people get killed, and that we should have executed a missed approach. We had ample fuel to go missed, and I told him that as he had elected not to brief the approach, we should have gone missed and briefed a localizer-only approach rather than trying to make it up as he went. (His briefing on the approach, when I called for it at the start of the approach checklist, had been 'well, I guess it's the ILS, and they'll probably give us vectors.') especially in the case of a new crew flying together, but as a matter of general practice, a full briefing should always be conducted. It wasn't. It was a failing on the part of the PIC to perform it, and a failing on my part to insist. I failed to catch the rapid deceleration and altitude loss because I diverted my attention to the checklist. A good pilot keeps an active scan and doesn't get side-tracked by fixation, checklist, etc. I failed to do that. An industry-standard procedure during an approach is the 2-CALL rule. If the PNF makes a call twice with no response, the PNF is to assume incapacitation and take control. While I didpush the power up, guard the yoke, and attempt to retract the spoilers, I should have been more aggressive in doing so, and more assertive. I should have clearly stated what I was doing and why, as I did it. I should have initiated and executed a missed approach. I failed to do that. Instead, I allowed a captain who was clearly behind the airplane to continue without knowing the cause, the captain's personality or abilities. IMC on an approach is not a good time to find out. Yelling commands and taking control is a very extreme measure. It doesn't become necessary often in one's career -- it's a rarity. In this case, I did not act decisively enough or quickly enough, but I certainly will in the future. I flew the leg home, the approach, and landed without incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LJ24 CAPT, ON APCH TO PDX, LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, DEVIATING FROM NORMAL PROCS, RELYING ON HIS FO TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY GUIDANCE TO COMPLETE THE APCH.

Narrative: THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT WITH A NEW CAPT. THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH STANDARD CALLOUTS, CHKLIST USAGE, ETC. THE ONLY UNUSUAL ASPECT WAS THE AUTOPLT, WHICH DIDN'T SEEM TO WANT TO TRACK A HDG. THE CAPT WAS FLYING, AND COMPENSATED BY MAKING CORRECTIONS USING THE MANUAL ROLL CTL KNOB. ON ARR AT PORTLAND, WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO JOIN THE LOC, TOLD TO DSND TO AND MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, REDUCE SPD TO 170 KTS AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS. I ENTERED THE ALT IN THE ALERTER, READ BACK THE RESTRS AND CLRNC, AND OBTAINED CONCURRENCE FROM THE CAPT. HE DEPLOYED THE SPOILERS TO SLOW US, AND I PROCEEDED WITH THE CHKLIST. I HEARD THE ALT ALERTER CHIME AND SAW THAT WE WERE BELOW 4000 FT AND DSNDING. I CALLED 'ALT,' AND GOT NO RESPONSE. AIRSPD WAS STILL SLOWING. I CALLED FOR AIRSPD AND ALT, WITH NO RESPONSE. WE REACHED 3500 FT, WERE STILL SLOWING (150 KIAS, NO FLAPS, SPOILERS DEPLOYED, GEAR UP) AND DSCNT RATE SLOWED 1500 FPM DOWN. I PUT MY HAND ON THE THRUST LEVERS, GRABBED THE CTL COLUMN TO BACK IT UP, AND YELLED 'ALT! CLB, CLB, CLB!' I PUSHED THE PWR TO TKOF PWR, AND ATTEMPTED TO RETRACT THE SPOILERS. THE CAPT HELD HIS THUMB OVER THE SWITCH, PREVENTING ME FROM RETRACTING THE SPOILERS. HE RETARDED THE PWR TO FLT IDLE, AND CONTINUED TRIMMING UP. I AGAIN PUSHED THE PWR UP AND YELLED 'AIRSPD! YOU'RE SLOW! CLB, CLB, CLB!' FINALLY, THE CAPT RESPONDED 'OK, YOU DON'T NEED TO YELL,' AND HE STOPPED TRYING TO PULL THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE. HE BEGAN A CLB. HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 8 DEGS, AND THEN STATED THAT HE HAD NO GS. I LOOKED, AND SAW THAT HIS GS INDICATORS WERE BOTH FLAGGED. MINE WAS NOT. I TOLD HIM I HAD TUNED AND IDENTED, AND WAS STILL GETTING A GOOD IDENT ON BOTH SIDES. I INFORMED HIM I HAD A GS INDICATION ON MY SIDE. HE SAID HE WOULD JUST DSND USING THE LOC, AND TO BACK HIM UP. HE TOLD ME TO PUT THE NEXT ALT IN THE ALERTER AND TO GUIDE HIM ON THE GS. I TOLD HIM THE NEXT ALT WAS DECISION HT, WITH NO STEP-DOWN FIXES. I TOLD THE CAPT THAT I HAD A WEAK INDICATION. I SAID WE WERE NOW FULL DEFLECTION, AND SHOULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. WE WERE THEN ABOVE THE GS, FULLY DEFLECTED, AND HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO CORRECT WITH AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF DSCNT. I TOLD THE CAPT AGAIN WE WERE FULLY DEFLECTED, THAT I HAD A WEAK GS, AND THAT HE COULD FLY IT OFF MY SIDE. IT WAS EVIDENT HE WAS NOT GOING MISSED. I RECOMMENDED THE MISSED, THEN RECOMMENDED HE FLY MY INDICATION. I ALSO SUGGESTED I COULD CONTINUE THE APCH FROM MY SIDE, AS THE GS BEGAN COMING IN FROM BELOW AGAIN. AT THIS POINT WE BEGAN TO BREAK OUT AND PROCEEDED VISUALLY TO A LNDG. ON THE GND, THE CAPT BLAMED HIS INOP GS INDICATORS FOR HIS REASON ON GOING LOW, STATING HE DIDN'T KNOW WE WERE SUPPOSED TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED. I ASKED HIM WHERE HE PLANNED TO GO SINCE WE WEREN'T ESTABLISHED, WERE ONLY JUST GETTING THE LOC ALIVE, AND HE HAD NO GS INDICATION AND THE ALT ALERTER CLRLY WAS SET FOR 4000 FT. HE SAID HE FIGURED I WOULD DIRECT HIM IN GETTING DOWN. I TOLD HIM THAT'S HOW PEOPLE GET KILLED, AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. WE HAD AMPLE FUEL TO GO MISSED, AND I TOLD HIM THAT AS HE HAD ELECTED NOT TO BRIEF THE APCH, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE MISSED AND BRIEFED A LOC-ONLY APCH RATHER THAN TRYING TO MAKE IT UP AS HE WENT. (HIS BRIEFING ON THE APCH, WHEN I CALLED FOR IT AT THE START OF THE APCH CHKLIST, HAD BEEN 'WELL, I GUESS IT'S THE ILS, AND THEY'LL PROBABLY GIVE US VECTORS.') ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF A NEW CREW FLYING TOGETHER, BUT AS A MATTER OF GENERAL PRACTICE, A FULL BRIEFING SHOULD ALWAYS BE CONDUCTED. IT WASN'T. IT WAS A FAILING ON THE PART OF THE PIC TO PERFORM IT, AND A FAILING ON MY PART TO INSIST. I FAILED TO CATCH THE RAPID DECELERATION AND ALT LOSS BECAUSE I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO THE CHKLIST. A GOOD PLT KEEPS AN ACTIVE SCAN AND DOESN'T GET SIDE-TRACKED BY FIXATION, CHKLIST, ETC. I FAILED TO DO THAT. AN INDUSTRY-STANDARD PROC DURING AN APCH IS THE 2-CALL RULE. IF THE PNF MAKES A CALL TWICE WITH NO RESPONSE, THE PNF IS TO ASSUME INCAPACITATION AND TAKE CTL. WHILE I DIDPUSH THE PWR UP, GUARD THE YOKE, AND ATTEMPT TO RETRACT THE SPOILERS, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN DOING SO, AND MORE ASSERTIVE. I SHOULD HAVE CLRLY STATED WHAT I WAS DOING AND WHY, AS I DID IT. I SHOULD HAVE INITIATED AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. I FAILED TO DO THAT. INSTEAD, I ALLOWED A CAPT WHO WAS CLRLY BEHIND THE AIRPLANE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT KNOWING THE CAUSE, THE CAPT'S PERSONALITY OR ABILITIES. IMC ON AN APCH IS NOT A GOOD TIME TO FIND OUT. YELLING COMMANDS AND TAKING CTL IS A VERY EXTREME MEASURE. IT DOESN'T BECOME NECESSARY OFTEN IN ONE'S CAREER -- IT'S A RARITY. IN THIS CASE, I DID NOT ACT DECISIVELY ENOUGH OR QUICKLY ENOUGH, BUT I CERTAINLY WILL IN THE FUTURE. I FLEW THE LEG HOME, THE APCH, AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.