Narrative:

During this shift we had been changing landing configurations and subsequently changing operating positions. Ord had significant weather passing over the airport which was impacting our departures (departure fix stop; departure fix miles in trail; destination route swaps; etc.). I had been working south local control on plan X (landing runway's 4R and 10); I was getting wind reports of a tailwind on runway 4R arrivals (wind 180 at 10 KTS) and departures were turning down runway 32L. Management made the decision to change the landing configuration to plan B (landing runway's 14R and 22R; departing runway's 28; 22L and 14L). I had set up my present position to work runway 22L; but then the supervisor told me I'd be getting the runway 28 departures and the runway 14R arrivals. I immediately noticed my d-brite settings had changed and I could not see the runway 14R arrivals; as it turned out my position was slaved to the third local controller; instead of continuing to work at this position during the configuration change I decided to move to a location where I could have a better view of my landing runway; runway 14R (position 008). I had relocated to position 008 from position 012; and I was actively maneuvering aircraft and calling a sequence for departures which included crossing my departure runway numerous times and also re-taxiing aircraft to runway 22L for departure while I was looking over my shoulder at runway 14R and working my arrivals. I had already cleared air carrier X (MD80) to land when air carrier Y (heavy) reported over the final approach fix for runway 14R; I saw that air carrier Y was faster than air carrier X and I had asked air carrier Y to slow to final approach speed and that traffic was an MD80 on a 1.5 mile final. I was coordinating departure fixes with third local control and I had shipped one departure to departure control with a subsequent departure waiting on runway 28. I could clearly see both aircraft lined up for runway 14R as air carrier X was landing; I still felt I could prevent a go-around scenario. I had cleared my runway 28 aircraft for departure; then I immediately went back to air carrier X during his roll out and asked the pilot if he was able to make the high speed turn off and continue on the adjacent taxiway; I told air carrier X that traffic was 'very short final.' air carrier X responded that he could make the turn off at the high speed taxiway; I then informed the arrival air carrier Y that the MD80 is clearing up field and reiterated that he was cleared to land. The supervisor asked if I was going around; and I responded that air carrier X said he could clear the runway. At this point it appeared that air carrier X had slowed more than expected and that the MD80 was not completely clear of the runway when air carrier Y was still in the flare; at this point I felt it was unsafe to send air carrier Y heavy around; had I done so it is in my best judgement that air carrier Y would've done a touch and go at best; or would've ignored my instructions altogether. The amass did not go into alarm. Recommendation; this may very well be my second report in three weeks; again I would ask that with the new ord control tower cab equipment and position re-design that a recommendation be made to ord management to have a period of time set aside for fpl/cpc controllers to become familiar with the position relocation and redesign. After being relieved from position I was truly exhausted; I had discussed the situation with the front line manager and stated I should not continue to work so hard to make the tight arrivals work; instead I should be sending the arrivals around when they first come on frequency like everyone else (new cpcs). I was told this is not what management wants; however I should've attempted to send the air carrier Y around. It is this pressure to 'work things out' that puts controllers like myself in this 'short final' go-around scenario.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORD Controller described an unsafe condition event when electing not to send an arrival around on very short final with departure traffic beginning a takeoff role. Reporter referenced unfamiliarity with the new Tower equipment layout contributed to the occurrence.

Narrative: During this shift we had been changing landing configurations and subsequently changing operating positions. ORD had significant weather passing over the airport which was impacting our departures (departure fix stop; departure fix miles in trail; destination route SWAPs; etc.). I had been working South Local Control on Plan X (landing Runway's 4R and 10); I was getting wind reports of a tailwind on Runway 4R arrivals (wind 180 at 10 KTS) and departures were turning down Runway 32L. Management made the decision to change the landing configuration to Plan B (landing Runway's 14R and 22R; departing Runway's 28; 22L and 14L). I had set up my present position to work Runway 22L; but then the Supervisor told me I'd be getting the Runway 28 departures and the Runway 14R arrivals. I immediately noticed my D-Brite settings had changed and I could not see the Runway 14R arrivals; as it turned out my position was slaved to the Third Local Controller; instead of continuing to work at this position during the configuration change I decided to move to a location where I could have a better view of my landing runway; Runway 14R (position 008). I had relocated to position 008 from position 012; and I was actively maneuvering aircraft and calling a sequence for departures which included crossing my departure runway numerous times and also re-taxiing aircraft to Runway 22L for departure while I was looking over my shoulder at Runway 14R and working my arrivals. I had already cleared Air Carrier X (MD80) to land when Air Carrier Y (Heavy) reported over the final approach fix for Runway 14R; I saw that Air Carrier Y was faster than Air Carrier X and I had asked Air Carrier Y to slow to final approach speed and that traffic was an MD80 on a 1.5 mile final. I was coordinating departure fixes with Third Local Control and I had shipped one departure to Departure Control with a subsequent departure waiting on Runway 28. I could clearly see both aircraft lined up for Runway 14R as Air Carrier X was landing; I still felt I could prevent a go-around scenario. I had cleared my Runway 28 aircraft for departure; then I immediately went back to Air Carrier X during his roll out and asked the pilot if he was able to make the high speed turn off and continue on the adjacent taxiway; I told Air Carrier X that traffic was 'very short final.' Air Carrier X responded that he could make the turn off at the high speed taxiway; I then informed the arrival Air Carrier Y that the MD80 is clearing up field and reiterated that he was cleared to land. The Supervisor asked if I was going around; and I responded that Air Carrier X said he could clear the runway. At this point it appeared that Air Carrier X had slowed more than expected and that the MD80 was not completely clear of the runway when Air Carrier Y was still in the flare; at this point I felt it was unsafe to send Air Carrier Y Heavy around; had I done so it is in my best judgement that Air Carrier Y would've done a touch and go at best; or would've ignored my instructions altogether. The AMASS did not go into alarm. Recommendation; this may very well be my second report in three weeks; again I would ask that with the new ORD control tower cab equipment and position re-design that a recommendation be made to ORD Management to have a period of time set aside for FPL/CPC controllers to become familiar with the position relocation and redesign. After being relieved from position I was truly exhausted; I had discussed the situation with the Front Line Manager and stated I should not continue to work so hard to make the tight arrivals work; instead I should be sending the arrivals around when they first come on frequency like everyone else (new CPCs). I was told this is not what Management wants; however I should've attempted to send the Air Carrier Y around. It is this pressure to 'work things out' that puts controllers like myself in this 'short final' go-around scenario.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.