Narrative:

We were on the clipr 3 arrival to dca; mxe transition. While level at FL200 we set; confirmed and activated trish at 12;000 ft and balance at 250 KTS and 10;000 ft in the FMS as published in the arrival. The pilot flying briefed and the pilot not flying confirmed the top of descent point using the FMS and VNAV. Subsequently we were cleared direct to clipr; to cross clipr at 12;000 ft. The pilot flying set 12;000 ft in the altitude window confirmed with the pilot not flying and activated VNAV. Both pilots monitored the descent along the computed VNAV path.immediately after an ATC frequency change the new controller asked if we were going to make the crossing restriction of clipr at 12;000 ft. I replied that we were but then noticed that we were only a few miles from clipr and that we would be several thousand feet high. I informed the controller that we would not make the crossing restriction and we were re-cleared to cross balance at 12;000 ft. Although both pilots were monitoring the descent along the computed VNAV path; after missing the crossing restriction we determined that upon being cleared direct to clipr; the FMS restriction of trish at 12;000 ft was deleted and the VNAV path was re-computed to comply with the restriction of crossing balance at 10;000 ft; thus causing us to be high over clipr.factors contributing to the failure to trap this error include: 1.) corporate culture and societal values: the value of enhancing shareholder value through cost savings by programming FMS vertical navigation systems and training pilots to delay descents as long as possible in order to save money by saving fuel; thus enhancing shareholder value. 2.) fatigue. Through normal industry standard practice; two days prior the crew reported for work [early in the morning]; worked for over twelve hours and flew five flights. One day prior the crew reported for work [in the early morning] and was scheduled to fly five flights and work for ten hours and twenty four minutes and actually worked for over eleven hours. 3.) a confirmation and monitoring error by both pilots: although both pilots confirmed; activated and monitored the descent and were prepared to intervene; we were monitoring the wrong VNAV path of balance at 10;000 ft instead of clipr at 12;000 ft. 4.) high workload: the descent and crossing restriction were given while the aircraft was at FL200. The descent/approach checklist was performed passing through FL180 thus distracting both pilots during a relatively short descent phase.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Previously cleared and programmed to descend via the CLIPR RNAV STAR to DCA the flight crew of an ERJ-190 was re-cleared direct to and to cross CLIPR at 12;000 FT vice TRISH at 12;000 FT as charted. They failed to reprogram the crossing restriction and a deviation ensued.

Narrative: We were on the CLIPR 3 Arrival to DCA; MXE transition. While level at FL200 we set; confirmed and activated TRISH at 12;000 FT and BAL at 250 KTS and 10;000 FT in the FMS as published in the arrival. The pilot flying briefed and the pilot not flying confirmed the top of descent point using the FMS and VNAV. Subsequently we were cleared direct to CLIPR; to cross CLIPR at 12;000 FT. The pilot flying set 12;000 FT in the altitude window confirmed with the pilot not flying and activated VNAV. Both pilots monitored the descent along the computed VNAV path.Immediately after an ATC frequency change the new Controller asked if we were going to make the crossing restriction of CLIPR at 12;000 FT. I replied that we were but then noticed that we were only a few miles from CLIPR and that we would be several thousand feet high. I informed the Controller that we would not make the crossing restriction and we were re-cleared to cross BAL at 12;000 FT. Although both pilots were monitoring the descent along the computed VNAV path; after missing the crossing restriction we determined that upon being cleared direct to CLIPR; the FMS restriction of TRISH at 12;000 FT was deleted and the VNAV path was re-computed to comply with the restriction of crossing BAL at 10;000 FT; thus causing us to be high over CLIPR.Factors contributing to the failure to trap this error include: 1.) Corporate culture and societal values: The value of enhancing shareholder value through cost savings by programming FMS vertical navigation systems and training pilots to delay descents as long as possible in order to save money by saving fuel; thus enhancing shareholder value. 2.) Fatigue. Through normal industry standard practice; two days prior the crew reported for work [early in the morning]; worked for over twelve hours and flew five flights. One day prior the crew reported for work [in the early morning] and was scheduled to fly five flights and work for ten hours and twenty four minutes and actually worked for over eleven hours. 3.) A confirmation and monitoring error by both pilots: Although both pilots confirmed; activated and monitored the descent and were prepared to intervene; we were monitoring the wrong VNAV path of BAL at 10;000 FT instead of CLIPR at 12;000 FT. 4.) High workload: The descent and crossing restriction were given while the aircraft was at FL200. The Descent/Approach Checklist was performed passing through FL180 thus distracting both pilots during a relatively short descent phase.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.