Narrative:

We made a normal takeoff and climb except we made provisions for the inoperative autothrottle system which was placarded by maintenance under MEL. Flap retraction was normal; until the copilot; who was the pilot flying; noticed a slight roll even with the autopilot engaged; as well as the 'le asym;' discrete light and accompanying EICAS message. I told the copilot to keep the speed down which at that time was about 240 KTS.I told departure that we needed to return and declared an emergency. I told the first officer to continue to fly and talk to ATC while I ran the QRH procedure with the relief pilot. We entered a hold at 10;000 ft and started to dump fuel after advising ATC. In the hold we configured the aircraft for landing following QRH procedures.at one point the copilot allowed the aircraft speed to deteriorate into stick shaker. He quickly recovered. Once we were ready for the approach we stopped dumping fuel and were vectored to a visual approach to runway 27R. I took control of the aircraft and also allowed the aircraft speed to slow into stick shaker; forgetting that the auto-throttle system was inoperative. Again we quickly recovered airspeed and continued the approach.an over weight landing was made with a soft touchdown. Maximum reverse was used to slow with minimum manual braking. After exiting the runway we were examined by crash fire rescue equipment officials and given the all clear to taxi to a hardstand. Later the co-pilot told me that while we were running the QRH procedure; he had forgotten about the inoperative autothrottle and allowed the airspeed to increase beyond the flap limit for our configuration. I made a subsequent logbook entry stating the overspeed.although the le asymmetry procedure went well and the crew coordination during the emergency event was excellent; airspeed control was a problem. The workload was very high for all crew members and the added complication of the inoperative auto-throttle made it even more difficult. Being as basic aircraft control is paramount; more attention should have been paid to speed control and more attentive crosschecking by the other crew members should have been briefed due to the abnormal throttle situation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When faced with a LE ASSYM EICAS warning shortly after takeoff the transatlantic bound flight crew of a B767-300ER found their tasks seriously compounded by: A. Having been dispatched with the autothrottles MEL'd inoperative; B. Multiple fuel dump system anomalies precluding their ability to dump fuel to minimize exposure to high landing speeds and resulting braking hazards; C. A narrow speed window between exceeding the flap limit speed at the high end due to their heavy weight and the stick shaker for their flap configuration at the low end; the proximity to which proved an issue when having to manually control thrust due to the deferred autothrottles.

Narrative: We made a normal takeoff and climb except we made provisions for the inoperative autothrottle system which was placarded by Maintenance under MEL. Flap retraction was normal; until the copilot; who was the pilot flying; noticed a slight roll even with the autopilot engaged; as well as the 'LE ASYM;' discrete light and accompanying EICAS message. I told the copilot to keep the speed down which at that time was about 240 KTS.I told Departure that we needed to return and declared an emergency. I told the First Officer to continue to fly and talk to ATC while I ran the QRH procedure with the relief pilot. We entered a hold at 10;000 FT and started to dump fuel after advising ATC. In the hold we configured the aircraft for landing following QRH procedures.At one point the copilot allowed the aircraft speed to deteriorate into stick shaker. He quickly recovered. Once we were ready for the approach we stopped dumping fuel and were vectored to a visual approach to Runway 27R. I took control of the aircraft and also allowed the aircraft speed to slow into stick shaker; forgetting that the auto-throttle system was inoperative. Again we quickly recovered airspeed and continued the approach.An over weight landing was made with a soft touchdown. Maximum reverse was used to slow with minimum manual braking. After exiting the runway we were examined by CFR officials and given the all clear to taxi to a hardstand. Later the co-pilot told me that while we were running the QRH procedure; he had forgotten about the inoperative autothrottle and allowed the airspeed to increase beyond the flap limit for our configuration. I made a subsequent logbook entry stating the overspeed.Although the LE Asymmetry procedure went well and the crew coordination during the emergency event was excellent; airspeed control was a problem. The workload was very high for all crew members and the added complication of the inoperative auto-throttle made it even more difficult. Being as basic aircraft control is paramount; more attention should have been paid to speed control and more attentive crosschecking by the other crew members should have been briefed due to the abnormal throttle situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.