Narrative:

Excessively high speed (310 KTS indicated) at 8000'. Cleared for the ILS 06 approach at teterboro, circle to land 01. Flew through the localizer to the east, came back toward it, broke right for circle to 01. Made missed approach, climbed to 2900', circled airport to the left, came in below the VASI, and landed 01. Factors: except for sink and airspeed on short final the captain does not want callouts in the cockpit. Captain cannot hear well nor see well (especially instrument panel distances at night). No approach briefing was used other than to say 'VFR.' the assigned instrument approach was accepted but never discussed. Airspeed control was nonexistent. The 250 KT below 10000' is never observed. Captain did not react to the localizer needle until after it had deflected to the other side. At this point the approach was still being flown at 220 KTS with the airplane clean. The overshoot was quite large due to our speed as well. When approach called him on it (we were now headed toward ewr) he made a visibility turn toward the airport lights and instructed me to specifically tell them that we were 'locked onto the localizer' (we had a full scale deflection). We now proceeded toward the airport off the localizer, hot on airspeed and high on altitude. Approach called again and told us to start a descent. We never stabilized at circling altitude or any other altitude for that matter. As we broke right for the circle to 01, he realized that we were too high, hot and close, so he fully configured the airplane. Still unable to make the runway, he decided to go around. We then proceeded to circle fully configured. We were already above circling altitude, and we climbed above the first missed approach altitude, then above pattern altitude, then above the final missed approach altitude, and on up to about 2900'. In spite of the prohibition, I called 'altitude.' this was ignored and the climb continued until tower told us to descend and reminded us verbally what the altitude was supposed to be. In addition to the altitude diversion going on, he also completely ignored the specified missed approach procedure headings and courses. He now circled around the northwest side of the airport which is specifically prohibited, and charted as 'not authority/authorized.' finally, after being too high all this time, we turned left base to final and dragged in well below the VASI. Additional factors: normal and professional cockpit procedures and callouts are not used. The aircraft is operated as a 'one man show.' detailed knowledge of legal approach parameters and procedures seem to be missing. Left seat intentions are not known by anyone other than the captain. Right seat input is neither solicited, allowed or acknowledged. The flight department does no simulator in instrument training. The copilot has a natural fear of unemployment and has prioritized food on the table at too high a level for this particular type of operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CPR LTT SPEED DEVIATION NON ADHERENCE TO PUBLISHED PROC AND UNSTABILIZED APCH LNDG AT TEB.

Narrative: EXCESSIVELY HIGH SPD (310 KTS INDICATED) AT 8000'. CLRED FOR THE ILS 06 APCH AT TETERBORO, CIRCLE TO LAND 01. FLEW THROUGH THE LOC TO THE E, CAME BACK TOWARD IT, BROKE RIGHT FOR CIRCLE TO 01. MADE MISSED APCH, CLBED TO 2900', CIRCLED ARPT TO THE LEFT, CAME IN BELOW THE VASI, AND LANDED 01. FACTORS: EXCEPT FOR SINK AND AIRSPD ON SHORT FINAL THE CAPT DOES NOT WANT CALLOUTS IN THE COCKPIT. CAPT CANNOT HEAR WELL NOR SEE WELL (ESPECIALLY INSTRUMENT PANEL DISTANCES AT NIGHT). NO APCH BRIEFING WAS USED OTHER THAN TO SAY 'VFR.' THE ASSIGNED INSTRUMENT APCH WAS ACCEPTED BUT NEVER DISCUSSED. AIRSPD CONTROL WAS NONEXISTENT. THE 250 KT BELOW 10000' IS NEVER OBSERVED. CAPT DID NOT REACT TO THE LOC NEEDLE UNTIL AFTER IT HAD DEFLECTED TO THE OTHER SIDE. AT THIS POINT THE APCH WAS STILL BEING FLOWN AT 220 KTS WITH THE AIRPLANE CLEAN. THE OVERSHOOT WAS QUITE LARGE DUE TO OUR SPD AS WELL. WHEN APCH CALLED HIM ON IT (WE WERE NOW HEADED TOWARD EWR) HE MADE A VIS TURN TOWARD THE ARPT LIGHTS AND INSTRUCTED ME TO SPECIFICALLY TELL THEM THAT WE WERE 'LOCKED ONTO THE LOC' (WE HAD A FULL SCALE DEFLECTION). WE NOW PROCEEDED TOWARD THE ARPT OFF THE LOC, HOT ON AIRSPD AND HIGH ON ALT. APCH CALLED AGAIN AND TOLD US TO START A DSCNT. WE NEVER STABILIZED AT CIRCLING ALT OR ANY OTHER ALT FOR THAT MATTER. AS WE BROKE RIGHT FOR THE CIRCLE TO 01, HE REALIZED THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH, HOT AND CLOSE, SO HE FULLY CONFIGURED THE AIRPLANE. STILL UNABLE TO MAKE THE RWY, HE DECIDED TO GO AROUND. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO CIRCLE FULLY CONFIGURED. WE WERE ALREADY ABOVE CIRCLING ALT, AND WE CLBED ABOVE THE FIRST MISSED APCH ALT, THEN ABOVE PATTERN ALT, THEN ABOVE THE FINAL MISSED APCH ALT, AND ON UP TO ABOUT 2900'. IN SPITE OF THE PROHIBITION, I CALLED 'ALT.' THIS WAS IGNORED AND THE CLB CONTINUED UNTIL TWR TOLD US TO DSND AND REMINDED US VERBALLY WHAT THE ALT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE. IN ADDITION TO THE ALT DIVERSION GOING ON, HE ALSO COMPLETELY IGNORED THE SPECIFIED MISSED APCH PROC HDGS AND COURSES. HE NOW CIRCLED AROUND THE NW SIDE OF THE ARPT WHICH IS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED, AND CHARTED AS 'NOT AUTH.' FINALLY, AFTER BEING TOO HIGH ALL THIS TIME, WE TURNED LEFT BASE TO FINAL AND DRAGGED IN WELL BELOW THE VASI. ADDITIONAL FACTORS: NORMAL AND PROFESSIONAL COCKPIT PROCS AND CALLOUTS ARE NOT USED. THE ACFT IS OPERATED AS A 'ONE MAN SHOW.' DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF LEGAL APCH PARAMETERS AND PROCS SEEM TO BE MISSING. LEFT SEAT INTENTIONS ARE NOT KNOWN BY ANYONE OTHER THAN THE CAPT. RIGHT SEAT INPUT IS NEITHER SOLICITED, ALLOWED OR ACKNOWLEDGED. THE FLT DEPT DOES NO SIMULATOR IN INSTRUMENT TRNING. THE COPLT HAS A NATURAL FEAR OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND HAS PRIORITIZED FOOD ON THE TABLE AT TOO HIGH A LEVEL FOR THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF OPERATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.