37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1042645 |
Time | |
Date | 201210 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | CMH.Airport |
State Reference | OH |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Dispatcher |
Qualification | Dispatch Dispatcher |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR |
Narrative:
I released a flight with 1CH anti skid inoperative. In an apparent lapse of concentration I missed the NOTAM shortening the runways at cmh. The remaining distance made the runway too short to meet regulatory requirements. Neither I nor the captain caught this error; the crew did contact me in range to cmh and said they were having trouble getting landing numbers. I thought they were having a communication problem and gave them the numbers off the copy stored with the flight paperwork that showed 5;344 ft for the landing distance required. Runway 10R-28L had been reduced to 7;000 ft and 28R to 8;000 ft. It was not until a co-worker pointed out the runway NOTAM to me that I became aware of the error; by that time the aircraft was airborne on the way back. There is no excuse for missing a critical NOTAM like this. I will need to redouble my effort to spend a little more time to make sure that I am truly reading and comprehending the materials I look at not only notams; but also weather and mels. I do not believe anything will be gained by additional training as I fully understand the limitations. I do think something would be gained if; when runways are notamed out for long periods of time while under construction; the full length option was removed from the available selections. By doing this we would be adding additional level of redundancy. I also believe that crews should be running a landing prediction before departing so that when they sign a release they have looked at the whole flight and not just the departure. I do not know if the crews' procedures require this but it could also help stop events at a much earlier stage in the chain of failures that make up these events.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ200 Dispatcher learns after the fact that he has dispatched an aircraft with an anti skid MEL to an airport with a shortened runway due to construction. The NOTAM was somehow missed or not correlated with the MEL. The aircraft was able to land and takeoff without issue; even though the runway length did not meet requirements for this MEL.
Narrative: I released a flight with 1CH ANTI SKID inoperative. In an apparent lapse of concentration I missed the NOTAM shortening the runways at CMH. The remaining distance made the runway too short to meet regulatory requirements. Neither I nor the Captain caught this error; the crew did contact me in range to CMH and said they were having trouble getting landing numbers. I thought they were having a communication problem and gave them the numbers off the copy stored with the flight paperwork that showed 5;344 FT for the landing distance required. Runway 10R-28L had been reduced to 7;000 FT and 28R to 8;000 FT. It was not until a co-worker pointed out the runway NOTAM to me that I became aware of the error; by that time the aircraft was airborne on the way back. There is no excuse for missing a critical NOTAM like this. I will need to redouble my effort to spend a little more time to make sure that I am truly reading and comprehending the materials I look at not only NOTAMs; but also weather and MELs. I do not believe anything will be gained by additional training as I fully understand the limitations. I do think something would be gained if; when runways are NOTAMed out for long periods of time while under construction; the full length option was removed from the available selections. By doing this we would be adding additional level of redundancy. I also believe that crews should be running a landing prediction before departing so that when they sign a release they have looked at the whole flight and not just the departure. I do not know if the crews' procedures require this but it could also help stop events at a much earlier stage in the chain of failures that make up these events.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.