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Attributes | |
ACN | 1045303 |
Time | |
Date | 201210 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ATL.Airport |
State Reference | GA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Citation I/SP (C501) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Ground Conflict Critical |
Narrative:
Working local control-2; I observed local control-1 prompting a C501 for an expeditious time on the runway. An A320 was tight on final behind the C501. The C501 was a north turn off the runway and would not have high speeds available to make the turn. He touched down and stopped hard; I observed him slow to almost a complete stop just past taxiway B5; the second reverse high speed. Local control-1 instructed the C501 to turn around and taxi back on the high speed B5. As the C501 was approaching the runway edge line; the A320 was over the approach lights and I told local control-1 this is not going to work. The asde alerted a few seconds later and local control-1 tried to send the A320 around right as his mains were touching down. The A320 appeared to pass within a few feet of the C501 as he taxied on the reverse high speed. In the dark it was not easily identifiable if the C501 had all parts of the aircraft clear of the runway. A80 needs to realize GA jets do not have high speed turn offs and extra space shall be given to accommodate for that. Atl has created a culture making controllers feel that go-arounds are a penalty and should be avoided at all cost. I feel a timely go-around would have prevented this entire incident but fear of explaining go around caused less experienced controllers not to act of first instincts and try to make something work that never had a chance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ATL Controller described a probable ground conflict event when traffic was permitted to land; uncertain that the previous landing was in fact totally clear of the runway; the reporter critical of the 'make it work' philosophy that reportedly exists in the Tower.
Narrative: Working Local Control-2; I observed Local Control-1 prompting a C501 for an expeditious time on the runway. An A320 was tight on final behind the C501. The C501 was a north turn off the runway and would not have high speeds available to make the turn. He touched down and stopped hard; I observed him slow to almost a complete stop just past Taxiway B5; the second reverse high speed. Local Control-1 instructed the C501 to turn around and taxi back on the high speed B5. As the C501 was approaching the runway edge line; the A320 was over the approach lights and I told Local Control-1 this is not going to work. The ASDE alerted a few seconds later and Local Control-1 tried to send the A320 around right as his mains were touching down. The A320 appeared to pass within a few feet of the C501 as he taxied on the reverse high speed. In the dark it was not easily identifiable if the C501 had all parts of the aircraft clear of the runway. A80 needs to realize GA jets do not have high speed turn offs and extra space shall be given to accommodate for that. ATL has created a culture making controllers feel that go-arounds are a penalty and should be avoided at all cost. I feel a timely go-around would have prevented this entire incident but fear of explaining go around caused less experienced controllers not to act of first instincts and try to make something work that never had a chance.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.