Narrative:

I was working LC3 during full triple departures. My runway was runway 27R. My heading was a RNAV heading called slaww. I launched an air carrier X 'RNAV to slaww; runway 27R cleared for take off.' air carrier X read back their clearance correctly. Approximately 0.5 miles off the departure end; air carrier X started turning left. Slaww is a straight out heading; I believe 272 degrees. I noticed this; and asked air carrier X 'verify you are flying to slaww; straight out?' they said affirmative; and started turning right immediately towards slaww. During this time; there was air carrier Y airborne off of runway 28. I yelled out to LC5; and said air carrier X is correcting and turning right. LC5 had my aircraft in sight. If I hadn't caught this when I did; this could have been a catastrophe. Later after speaking with the pilot from air carrier X; they had reported a malfunction in their FMS. The only thing I can recommend is this: pilots have to realize; when they fly out of atlanta; there is always someone to your left and right; airborne as well. Turning to a heading that is not assigned can lead to people dying. If there was truly a problem with their FMS; the pilot should have taken corrective action immediately. As far as airspace configuration is concerned: if we had more exaggerated headings; this kind of thing would not occur. But; right now on a westbound operation; two of our headings are only separated by 12 or 13 degrees; from different runways. This makes the window of opportunity to catch a pilot deviation very small. When you depart from three different runways; in my opinion; the headings should be much farther apart. This is not the first time I have caught an aircraft turning the wrong way during trip departures. In fact it is the third. Each time if corrective action was not immediately taken; a mid air collision was likely to occur. What is it going to take to make an operation safe in the FAA? Can we change our headings to make it safer?

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATL Controller described a near serious conflict event when departure traffic failed to comply with the issued route; the Controller suggesting more exaggerated turns to affect separation more quickly and be more easily identified by ATC.

Narrative: I was working LC3 during full triple departures. My runway was Runway 27R. My heading was a RNAV heading called SLAWW. I launched an Air Carrier X 'RNAV to SLAWW; Runway 27R cleared for take off.' Air Carrier X read back their clearance correctly. Approximately 0.5 miles off the departure end; Air Carrier X started turning left. SLAWW is a straight out heading; I believe 272 degrees. I noticed this; and asked Air Carrier X 'verify you are flying to SLAWW; straight out?' They said affirmative; and started turning right immediately towards SLAWW. During this time; there was Air Carrier Y airborne off of Runway 28. I yelled out to LC5; and said Air Carrier X is correcting and turning right. LC5 had my aircraft in sight. If I hadn't caught this when I did; this could have been a catastrophe. Later after speaking with the pilot from Air Carrier X; they had reported a malfunction in their FMS. The only thing I can recommend is this: Pilots have to realize; when they fly out of Atlanta; there is always someone to your left and right; airborne as well. Turning to a heading that is not assigned can lead to people dying. If there was truly a problem with their FMS; the pilot should have taken corrective action immediately. As far as airspace configuration is concerned: If we had more exaggerated headings; this kind of thing would not occur. But; right now on a westbound operation; two of our headings are only separated by 12 or 13 degrees; from different runways. This makes the window of opportunity to catch a pilot deviation very small. When you depart from three different runways; in my opinion; the headings should be much farther apart. This is not the first time I have caught an aircraft turning the wrong way during trip departures. In fact it is the third. Each time if corrective action was not immediately taken; a mid air collision was likely to occur. What is it going to take to make an operation safe in the FAA? Can we change our headings to make it safer?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.