Narrative:

Departed a foreign airport; while in cruise flight ECAM hydraulic Y engine 2 pump low pressure followed by a hydraulic Y rsvr low level. [We] complied with ECAM as well as QRH/supplemental follow up. Contacted maintenance control and confirmed copied otc and received input suggesting return to base. After discussing options with first officer and company we agreed return to base was best option. As we entered us airspace and considering potential further degradation in hydraulic systems I decided to declare an emergency with ATC and have emergency services on standby. ([We were] alerted to any potential post landing hazards due to multiple hydraulic system ecams impacting landing distances and potential for multiple failures). Applied increased landing performance requirements due to one thrust reverser inoperative. I selected flaps full and autobrakes med and directed ATC the longest runway was required. Briefed flight attendants on aircraft condition and that we declared an emergency as a precautionary measure; that landing was anticipated to be normal and time return to base was 50 minutes. ATC offered an en route airport as an available field for landing. I declined due to airport services/emergency equipment/known resources/etc. In favor of our departure airport. I based this decision on experience; input from multiple resources (CRM). During approach I asked for an lower altitude in order to burn more fuel and get below maximum landing weight and an extended downwind due to flaps were going to operate slower (degraded condition). Landing was uneventful and flight and ground personnel did an excellent job. Landing was uneventful. Post flight inspection discovered a broken seal in the Y hydraulic system ptu unit resulting in multiple hydraulic system failures. One degradation in human factors was due to fatigue due to disrupted sleep in the foreign airport hotel. The celebration was due to 'day of dead' celebration that included fireworks and high school students running the halls of the hotel as well as unsolicited phone calls in the middle of the night. I probably should have called in fatigued in our first domestic destination. It is difficult to identify (predetermine fatigue factors) therefore I would suggest a sleep pattern interruption scale/graph as a measuring tool forecasting fatigue during a given duty day when sleep pattern has been interrupted.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 ECAM alerted Hydraulic Y Engine 2 PUMP LOW PRESSURE followed by a Hydraulic Y RSVR low level so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where a failed Y Hydraulic PTU seal was found.

Narrative: Departed a foreign airport; while in cruise flight ECAM HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LOW PRESSURE followed by a HYD Y RSVR LOW LEVEL. [We] complied with ECAM as well as QRH/Supplemental follow up. Contacted Maintenance Control and confirmed copied OTC and received input suggesting return to base. After discussing options with First Officer and company we agreed return to base was best option. As we entered US Airspace and considering potential further degradation in hydraulic systems I decided to declare an emergency with ATC and have emergency services on standby. ([We were] alerted to any potential post landing hazards due to multiple hydraulic system ECAMS impacting landing distances and potential for multiple failures). Applied increased landing performance requirements due to one thrust reverser inoperative. I selected Flaps FULL and autobrakes MED and directed ATC the longest runway was required. Briefed flight attendants on aircraft condition and that we declared an emergency as a precautionary measure; that landing was anticipated to be normal and time return to base was 50 minutes. ATC offered an en route airport as an available field for landing. I declined due to airport services/emergency equipment/known resources/etc. in favor of our departure airport. I based this decision on experience; input from multiple resources (CRM). During approach I asked for an lower altitude in order to burn more fuel and get below maximum landing weight and an extended downwind due to Flaps were going to operate slower (degraded condition). Landing was uneventful and flight and ground personnel did an excellent job. Landing was uneventful. Post flight inspection discovered a broken seal in the Y Hydraulic System PTU unit resulting in multiple Hydraulic System failures. One degradation in human factors was due to fatigue due to disrupted sleep in the foreign airport hotel. The celebration was due to 'Day of Dead' celebration that included fireworks and high school students running the halls of the hotel as well as unsolicited phone calls in the middle of the night. I probably should have called in fatigued in our first domestic destination. It is difficult to identify (predetermine fatigue factors) therefore I would suggest a sleep pattern interruption scale/graph as a measuring tool forecasting fatigue during a given duty day when sleep pattern has been interrupted.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.