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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 104752 |
Time | |
Date | 198902 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : x51 |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | observation : observer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 104752 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 20 flight time total : 400 flight time type : 12 |
ASRS Report | 103960 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
While observing a pilot friend practicing touch and go's in his 'new' vintage aircraft, I was along for the ride as a high time small aircraft pilot, but not officially instructing as my friend is an ex-military medium time retractable pilot. I was asked to observe and critique his technique. After some 9 touch and go's, my friend seemed very confident and efficient with his cockpit flow patterns, dropping gear and flaps sequentially at predetermined reference points around the pattern. On the tenth landing the approach felt normal--flaps were deployed, speed was perfect, however the T/D led to an abrupt stop as the gear was up on landing. No horns, lights, etc were ever observed by either of us, although the aircraft is equipped with a big red light located on the pilots left instrument panel. Additionally, the landing gear is equipped with visibility indicators for position. Obviously, neither of us observed the position of these indicators on this landing, although we had discussed the use of these and the lights on previous lndgs. There were 2 contributing factors to this incident. One, my pilot friend had the sole set of headsets on and was constantly communicating with the unicom and other aircraft during the practice lndgs. This made it difficult for me to discuss the flight and his procedures west/O interruption, and led me to often keep silent and not critique him at times as there was some confusion on his part often when I made comments. (There was no speaker system, only his headsets.) second was the pilot's unfamiliarity with the aircraft. He has flown the aircraft to miami from chicago, and has 2 other flts in that particular aircraft after the ferry flight. The light, both gear position and gear warning are positioned left of the pilot's yoke and lower than scan level, and were difficult to see with the angle of the sun and brightness. I have no doubt that an audible gear warning horn would have prevented this incident, as it would have alerted the pilot or myself of the situation. I highly recommend that all retractable gear aircraft be equipped with audible gear unsafe warning indications as well as lights to prevent similar incidents. Supplemental information from acn 103860: gear was extended on downwind. Either gear down lever did not lock in the down position or inadvertent retraction on short final.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: TOUCH AND GO LNDG PRACTICE. TENTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO PUT THE GEAR DOWN. ACFT DAMAGE, NO INJURIES.
Narrative: WHILE OBSERVING A PLT FRIEND PRACTICING TOUCH AND GO'S IN HIS 'NEW' VINTAGE ACFT, I WAS ALONG FOR THE RIDE AS A HIGH TIME SMA PLT, BUT NOT OFFICIALLY INSTRUCTING AS MY FRIEND IS AN EX-MIL MEDIUM TIME RETRACTABLE PLT. I WAS ASKED TO OBSERVE AND CRITIQUE HIS TECHNIQUE. AFTER SOME 9 TOUCH AND GO'S, MY FRIEND SEEMED VERY CONFIDENT AND EFFICIENT WITH HIS COCKPIT FLOW PATTERNS, DROPPING GEAR AND FLAPS SEQUENTIALLY AT PREDETERMINED REF POINTS AROUND THE PATTERN. ON THE TENTH LNDG THE APCH FELT NORMAL--FLAPS WERE DEPLOYED, SPD WAS PERFECT, HOWEVER THE T/D LED TO AN ABRUPT STOP AS THE GEAR WAS UP ON LNDG. NO HORNS, LIGHTS, ETC WERE EVER OBSERVED BY EITHER OF US, ALTHOUGH THE ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A BIG RED LIGHT LOCATED ON THE PLTS LEFT INSTRUMENT PANEL. ADDITIONALLY, THE LNDG GEAR IS EQUIPPED WITH VIS INDICATORS FOR POS. OBVIOUSLY, NEITHER OF US OBSERVED THE POS OF THESE INDICATORS ON THIS LNDG, ALTHOUGH WE HAD DISCUSSED THE USE OF THESE AND THE LIGHTS ON PREVIOUS LNDGS. THERE WERE 2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. ONE, MY PLT FRIEND HAD THE SOLE SET OF HEADSETS ON AND WAS CONSTANTLY COMMUNICATING WITH THE UNICOM AND OTHER ACFT DURING THE PRACTICE LNDGS. THIS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO DISCUSS THE FLT AND HIS PROCS W/O INTERRUPTION, AND LED ME TO OFTEN KEEP SILENT AND NOT CRITIQUE HIM AT TIMES AS THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ON HIS PART OFTEN WHEN I MADE COMMENTS. (THERE WAS NO SPEAKER SYS, ONLY HIS HEADSETS.) SECOND WAS THE PLT'S UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE ACFT. HE HAS FLOWN THE ACFT TO MIAMI FROM CHICAGO, AND HAS 2 OTHER FLTS IN THAT PARTICULAR ACFT AFTER THE FERRY FLT. THE LIGHT, BOTH GEAR POS AND GEAR WARNING ARE POSITIONED LEFT OF THE PLT'S YOKE AND LOWER THAN SCAN LEVEL, AND WERE DIFFICULT TO SEE WITH THE ANGLE OF THE SUN AND BRIGHTNESS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT AN AUDIBLE GEAR WARNING HORN WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT, AS IT WOULD HAVE ALERTED THE PLT OR MYSELF OF THE SITUATION. I HIGHLY RECOMMEND THAT ALL RETRACTABLE GEAR ACFT BE EQUIPPED WITH AUDIBLE GEAR UNSAFE WARNING INDICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHTS TO PREVENT SIMILAR INCIDENTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 103860: GEAR WAS EXTENDED ON DOWNWIND. EITHER GEAR DOWN LEVER DID NOT LOCK IN THE DOWN POS OR INADVERTENT RETRACTION ON SHORT FINAL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.