Narrative:

Event: entry into a control zone and air traffic area west/O appropriate clearance and landing at an airport with an operating control tower in IMC west/O appropriate clearance. As captain of flight from mci to topeka, kc center advised us to expect the NDB runway 13 at foe. We requested the ILS to runway 31, due to the current conditions at foe. This appeared to confuse the controller. He then proceeded to vector us on a downwind, base and a turn to intercept the ILS, at which time our clearance was, 'turn right heading 280 degrees, maintain 3000' until established on the approach, cleared for the ILS runway 31 at topeka. You are 4 mi southeast of ripley.' we turned and intercepted the approach, at which time I realized that we had not informed the passenger to fasten seat belts and stow carry-on items. I informed my first officer that I would be off the center for a few seconds. Upon returning to center frequency we were just crossing the LOM. I called for the gear down before landing checklist. I noted the first officer keying the microphone 7 times to bring the runway lights to full intensity. The runway was spotted at about 500' AGL. We continued and landed, at which time I informed the first officer to cancel our IFR. When he called the center the controller responded with a surprise voice to contact forbes tower. When we called the tower they were not even aware that we were inbound. Following shutdown I contacted the tower by phone, and after lengthy discussion we determined that the original problem began with a breakdown of communication with center. They were combining sectors and making a crew change at the same time we were approaching the LOM. Secondly, my attention being distracted to the passenger at a critical phase of flight and not monitoring my first officer's ATC. Procedures for not attempting to contact tower, or even making a call over the marker inbound. I had assumed it had been done. Being unfamiliar with the area and lack of coordination between the first officer and myself and between our aircraft and center were contributing factors as well as the shortness of the flight, which is scheduled for 15 mins. In the future I intend to be more aggressive in asserting myself when there is any doubt or uncertainty about my first officer's performance. Another factor that was distracting is that the first officer is very soft spoken and was very hard to hear what he was saying. I should have had him speak louder so that I could hear the communications between us and center.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT LANDED ON RWY WITHOUT ATC AUTHORIZATION.

Narrative: EVENT: ENTRY INTO A CTL ZONE AND ATA W/O APPROPRIATE CLRNC AND LNDG AT AN ARPT WITH AN OPERATING CTL TWR IN IMC W/O APPROPRIATE CLRNC. AS CAPT OF FLT FROM MCI TO TOPEKA, KC CENTER ADVISED US TO EXPECT THE NDB RWY 13 AT FOE. WE REQUESTED THE ILS TO RWY 31, DUE TO THE CURRENT CONDITIONS AT FOE. THIS APPEARED TO CONFUSE THE CTLR. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO VECTOR US ON A DOWNWIND, BASE AND A TURN TO INTERCEPT THE ILS, AT WHICH TIME OUR CLRNC WAS, 'TURN RIGHT HDG 280 DEGS, MAINTAIN 3000' UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 31 AT TOPEKA. YOU ARE 4 MI SE OF RIPLEY.' WE TURNED AND INTERCEPTED THE APCH, AT WHICH TIME I REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT INFORMED THE PAX TO FASTEN SEAT BELTS AND STOW CARRY-ON ITEMS. I INFORMED MY F/O THAT I WOULD BE OFF THE CENTER FOR A FEW SECS. UPON RETURNING TO CENTER FREQ WE WERE JUST XING THE LOM. I CALLED FOR THE GEAR DOWN BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. I NOTED THE F/O KEYING THE MIC 7 TIMES TO BRING THE RWY LIGHTS TO FULL INTENSITY. THE RWY WAS SPOTTED AT ABOUT 500' AGL. WE CONTINUED AND LANDED, AT WHICH TIME I INFORMED THE F/O TO CANCEL OUR IFR. WHEN HE CALLED THE CENTER THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH A SURPRISE VOICE TO CONTACT FORBES TWR. WHEN WE CALLED THE TWR THEY WERE NOT EVEN AWARE THAT WE WERE INBOUND. FOLLOWING SHUTDOWN I CONTACTED THE TWR BY PHONE, AND AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION WE DETERMINED THAT THE ORIGINAL PROB BEGAN WITH A BREAKDOWN OF COM WITH CENTER. THEY WERE COMBINING SECTORS AND MAKING A CREW CHANGE AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE APCHING THE LOM. SECONDLY, MY ATTN BEING DISTRACTED TO THE PAX AT A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT AND NOT MONITORING MY F/O'S ATC. PROCS FOR NOT ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT TWR, OR EVEN MAKING A CALL OVER THE MARKER INBND. I HAD ASSUMED IT HAD BEEN DONE. BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA AND LACK OF COORD BTWN THE F/O AND MYSELF AND BTWN OUR ACFT AND CENTER WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AS WELL AS THE SHORTNESS OF THE FLT, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR 15 MINS. IN THE FUTURE I INTEND TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN ASSERTING MYSELF WHEN THERE IS ANY DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT MY F/O'S PERFORMANCE. ANOTHER FACTOR THAT WAS DISTRACTING IS THAT THE F/O IS VERY SOFT SPOKEN AND WAS VERY HARD TO HEAR WHAT HE WAS SAYING. I SHOULD HAVE HAD HIM SPEAK LOUDER SO THAT I COULD HEAR THE COMS BTWN US AND CENTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.