Narrative:

Day two; leg two with very familiar captain. Good crew rest; briefs; and all pre-departure items normal. Passing 13;000 ft at approximately 290 KTS with autothrottles/autopilot; LNAV; and VNAV; aircraft experienced three bangs/pops with noticeable associated yaws. Captain (PF) disengaged autothrottles/autopilot and established level flight. First officer (pm) noted more noise from number 2 which sounded like metal in a blender. Number 2 had pegged out egt with complete red dial; but other engine indications were similar to number 1. Captain and first officer agreed to apply memory items for engine limit. Autothrottles were already disengaged so captain guarded number 1 and first officer reduced/closed number 2. Engine still had thrust with no aircraft vibrations; but crew agreed indications from the bangs and metal noise were not normal; and decided to shut the engine down. Captain guarded number 1 and first officer cut off number 2. First officer declared emergency and requested vectors for immediate landing while captain continued flying. ATC did a nice job giving a base turn and pilot discretion descent to runway and giving time to get souls on board and fuel. First officer ran clean up checklists while coordinating with ATC while captain let flight attendants know we had the engine secured and were returning so they should secure the cabin. Crew had completed engine limit/surge/stall memory items and since engine was shut down ran the engine failure/shutdown checklist. After completing that; we ran the one engine inoperative landing checklist. Crew noted the landing would not be overweight and calculated landing speeds to use flap 15 speeds and programmed FMC. ATC changed runway's so first officer setup FMC and navaids appropriately while captain got plane down on profile. ATC switched to unified tower frequency with fire chief monitoring; which was helpful to coordinate their inspection of the aircraft after an uneventful southeast landing with autobrake 2. While captain coordinated with fire chief; first officer briefed passengers and flight attendants about engine problem and safe landing; why the fire trucks were inspecting; and finally that all was well so we were returning to the gate. First officer called operations to coordinate gate and csr for transfers while captain coordinated with ATC for taxi since cleared by fire chief. Passengers seemed fine; flight attendant supervisor; captain and assistant chief pilot checked with flight attendants to make sure they were okay (which they determined they were) and returned to their base. Maintenance notified crew number 2 engine turbine blades were toast. In hindsight knowing the extent of the damage; we might have followed the engine fire/severe damage/separation checklist; but other than the three pops/bangs we did not have excessive aircraft vibrations and other engine indicators were about the same other than high egt; which went in limits once the throttle was closed. This would have resulted in pulling the fire handle; and maximizing southeast GA thrust as opposed to our path; which we determined we did not need it given our light weight in the one engine inoperative checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew experiences an engine failure during climb out indicated by banging and high EGT. The engine is shut down and the flight returns to the departure airport.

Narrative: Day two; leg two with very familiar Captain. Good crew rest; briefs; and all pre-departure items normal. Passing 13;000 FT at approximately 290 KTS with autothrottles/autopilot; LNAV; and VNAV; aircraft experienced three bangs/pops with noticeable associated yaws. Captain (PF) disengaged autothrottles/autopilot and established level flight. First Officer (PM) noted more noise from Number 2 which sounded like metal in a blender. Number 2 had pegged out EGT with complete red dial; but other engine indications were similar to Number 1. Captain and First Officer agreed to apply memory items for engine limit. Autothrottles were already disengaged so Captain guarded Number 1 and First Officer reduced/closed Number 2. Engine still had thrust with no aircraft vibrations; but crew agreed indications from the bangs and metal noise were not normal; and decided to shut the engine down. Captain guarded Number 1 and First Officer cut off Number 2. First Officer declared emergency and requested vectors for immediate landing while Captain continued flying. ATC did a nice job giving a base turn and pilot discretion descent to runway and giving time to get souls on board and fuel. First Officer ran clean up checklists while coordinating with ATC while Captain let flight attendants know we had the engine secured and were returning so they should secure the cabin. Crew had completed Engine Limit/Surge/Stall memory items and since engine was shut down ran the Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist. After completing that; we ran the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist. Crew noted the landing would not be overweight and calculated landing speeds to use flap 15 speeds and programmed FMC. ATC changed runway's so First Officer setup FMC and navaids appropriately while Captain got plane down on profile. ATC switched to unified Tower frequency with Fire Chief monitoring; which was helpful to coordinate their inspection of the aircraft after an uneventful southeast landing with autobrake 2. While Captain coordinated with Fire Chief; First Officer briefed passengers and flight attendants about engine problem and safe landing; why the fire trucks were inspecting; and finally that all was well so we were returning to the gate. First Officer called Operations to coordinate gate and CSR for transfers while Captain coordinated with ATC for taxi since cleared by Fire Chief. Passengers seemed fine; Flight Attendant Supervisor; Captain and Assistant Chief Pilot checked with flight attendants to make sure they were okay (which they determined they were) and returned to their Base. Maintenance notified Crew Number 2 engine turbine blades were toast. In hindsight knowing the extent of the damage; we might have followed the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation Checklist; but other than the three pops/bangs we did not have excessive aircraft vibrations and other engine indicators were about the same other than high EGT; which went in limits once the throttle was closed. This would have resulted in pulling the fire handle; and maximizing SE GA thrust as opposed to our path; which we determined we did not need it given our light weight in the One Engine Inoperative Checklist.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.