Narrative:

I reported at before sunrise. The weather at the time was a mixture of rain and slush. The crew was escorted to the aircraft utilizing a side door that let to the ramp area and we walked approximately 500 ft exposed to the elements. No umbrellas were available or offered. We completed our checks and the flight was boarded on time. After we pushed back ATC informed us that our destination had gone into a metering program and we were issued a wheels up time an hour and twenty minutes later. We discussed it with the station and decided to keep the passengers onboard. Also; there was the possibility that we may need to be deiced so we also waited on that. Approximately 25 minutes later ATC advised our wheels up time was moved forward and the wait would only be about another 20 minutes. At this time the precipitation had stopped and; after inspecting the aircraft; we decided that we didn't need to be deiced. About 10 minutes later ATC called us again and informed that the wheels up time was extended again and now it was 20 minutes longer than the original time. Again we discussed it and asked the flight attendant how the passengers were doing and decided to wait. Finally; about 1:40 after pushback; we departed. During the flight our MEL'd tiller mounted ptt switch began to activate blocking the frequency. I had to continuously tap on it to prevent it from happening; this was very distracting and nerve racking. After arriving to destination I called maintenance and waited over an hour for the switch to be fixed. We left the gate for our next leg and again were given a delay for departure but not too bad; only about 25 minutes. Upon arrival on this leg we were informed of another ground delay. This time about one hour. On taxi out for the next leg we were given another 45 minutes delay. After completing that flight we were about 25 minutes into the next leg when the first officer pointed to his windshield and there was a large amount of smoke coming from the top of the windshield. There was an electrical burning smell. We proceeded to do the emergency drill; then declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport about 35 miles away. Upon arrival contract maintenance was called and they determined that wires going to the right windshield heat had burned. Repairs were made and we were asked to run the engines for 10 minutes to make sure it was working properly. After the run-up both mechanics left and didn't return for about an hour and a half. We were not informed of what was going on so I made about three calls to flight control whose final response was to just wait until the mechanics return to MEL the windshield heat. I expressed my concerns to the flight control supervisor about getting tired as we had had a very demanding day and something needed to happen soon before we were exposed to more stress. He was very cooperative and understanding. Finally some three and a half hours after arrival we departed to roa. Upon our arrival in roa I felt very exhausted and called scheduling with my concern. I basically told them that I had had a rough day and that I will have to see how I feel in the morning. That night I had troubled going to sleep and when I woke up I felt very exhausted even after taking a shower to see if I felt any better I decided to call in fatigued. I didn't feel safe to operate an aircraft in the condition I was in so called scheduling and told her I was calling in fatigued.we need to implement a serious fatigue program; where everybody involved is properly trained to recognize the events that can lead to fatigue. There were many factors that contributed to this event and nobody recognized them. The tools to recognize the event were there. 1: report time 2: weather at time of report 3: MEL ptt on tiller malfunctioning (distraction; most captains use this switch as primary) 4: three ATC delays; two of them lengthy 5: maintenance delay (repair ptt) 6: the emergency pilots fear the most--fire or smoke in aircraft 7: high level of stress to deal with such an emergency 8: aftermath; anxiety; uncertain of what is planned for the flight crew. 9: another lengthy maintenance delay (helped maintenance with problem. Ran engines) 10: had to fly same airplane again on an unplanned route. 11: were then give a different route than the filed. 12: scheduling didn't have any idea of what had happened. Neither dispatch nor scheduling communicated with us to further assess our status and appeared to not be properly trained to deal with these situations. This lack of awareness was further demonstrated when they called my union representative to inform him that they would be investigating why I called in sick! (I had called in fatigued; not sick!) I then took a flight to my home to be with my loved ones during a time of high stress. Such a response from the company demonstrates complete disregard for actual events and is a way to intimidate pilots that call in fatigued. The safety and the well being of the pilots should have been his concern. I am a senior pilot with over 25;000 hours on the dash-8 and that's why I was able to immediately recognize this emergency and safely brought this aircraft in. I have a big concern with the way this event was handled and the people involved should be investigated to verify that the proper procedures were followed. We are highly penalized if we call in fatigued and if they try to intimidate a senior captain just imagine what they will do with a junior one. It is dangerous. I hope that this event helps us understand fatigue better and what leads to it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Dash 8 Captain provided a lengthy description of a long and physically debilitating day on the job which he believed rendered him unfit to fly the next day due to fatigue. He expanded his comments to address attempts by his managers to intimidate him into not doing so.

Narrative: I reported at before sunrise. The weather at the time was a mixture of rain and slush. The crew was escorted to the aircraft utilizing a side door that let to the ramp area and we walked approximately 500 FT exposed to the elements. No umbrellas were available or offered. We completed our checks and the flight was boarded on time. After we pushed back ATC informed us that our destination had gone into a metering program and we were issued a wheels up time an hour and twenty minutes later. We discussed it with the station and decided to keep the passengers onboard. Also; there was the possibility that we may need to be deiced so we also waited on that. Approximately 25 minutes later ATC advised our wheels up time was moved forward and the wait would only be about another 20 minutes. At this time the precipitation had stopped and; after inspecting the aircraft; we decided that we didn't need to be deiced. About 10 minutes later ATC called us again and informed that the wheels up time was extended again and now it was 20 minutes longer than the original time. Again we discussed it and asked the Flight Attendant how the passengers were doing and decided to wait. Finally; about 1:40 after pushback; we departed. During the flight our MEL'd tiller mounted PTT Switch began to activate blocking the frequency. I had to continuously tap on it to prevent it from happening; this was very distracting and nerve racking. After arriving to destination I called Maintenance and waited over an hour for the switch to be fixed. We left the gate for our next leg and again were given a delay for departure but not too bad; only about 25 minutes. Upon arrival on this leg we were informed of another ground delay. This time about one hour. On taxi out for the next leg we were given another 45 minutes delay. After completing that flight we were about 25 minutes into the next leg when the First Officer pointed to his windshield and there was a large amount of smoke coming from the top of the windshield. There was an electrical burning smell. We proceeded to do the emergency drill; then declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport about 35 miles away. Upon arrival Contract Maintenance was called and they determined that wires going to the right windshield heat had burned. Repairs were made and we were asked to run the engines for 10 minutes to make sure it was working properly. After the run-up both mechanics left and didn't return for about an hour and a half. We were not informed of what was going on so I made about three calls to flight control whose final response was to just wait until the mechanics return to MEL the windshield heat. I expressed my concerns to the Flight Control Supervisor about getting tired as we had had a very demanding day and something needed to happen soon before we were exposed to more stress. He was very cooperative and understanding. Finally some three and a half hours after arrival we departed to ROA. Upon our arrival in ROA I felt very exhausted and called scheduling with my concern. I basically told them that I had had a rough day and that I will have to see how I feel in the morning. That night I had troubled going to sleep and when I woke up I felt very exhausted even after taking a shower to see if I felt any better I decided to call in fatigued. I didn't feel safe to operate an aircraft in the condition I was in so called scheduling and told her I was calling in fatigued.We need to implement a serious fatigue program; where everybody involved is properly trained to recognize the events that can lead to fatigue. There were many factors that contributed to this event and nobody recognized them. The tools to recognize the event were there. 1: Report time 2: Weather at time of report 3: MEL PTT on tiller malfunctioning (distraction; most captains use this switch as primary) 4: Three ATC delays; two of them lengthy 5: Maintenance delay (repair PTT) 6: The emergency pilots fear the most--fire or smoke in aircraft 7: High level of stress to deal with such an emergency 8: Aftermath; anxiety; uncertain of what is planned for the flight crew. 9: Another lengthy maintenance delay (helped Maintenance with problem. Ran engines) 10: Had to fly same airplane again on an unplanned route. 11: Were then give a different route than the filed. 12: Scheduling didn't have any idea of what had happened. Neither Dispatch nor Scheduling communicated with us to further assess our status and appeared to not be properly trained to deal with these situations. This lack of awareness was further demonstrated when they called my union representative to inform him that they would be investigating why I called in sick! (I had called in fatigued; not sick!) I then took a flight to my home to be with my loved ones during a time of high stress. Such a response from the Company demonstrates complete disregard for actual events and is a way to intimidate pilots that call in fatigued. The safety and the well being of the pilots should have been his concern. I am a senior pilot with over 25;000 hours on the Dash-8 and that's why I was able to immediately recognize this emergency and safely brought this aircraft in. I have a big concern with the way this event was handled and the people involved should be investigated to verify that the proper procedures were followed. We are highly penalized if we call in fatigued and if they try to intimidate a senior Captain just imagine what they will do with a junior one. It is dangerous. I hope that this event helps us understand fatigue better and what leads to it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.