Narrative:

We took a 35 min delay. The reasons for the delay were the captain's hdi indicated a 90 degree left bank and the #2 fuel gauge was inoperative. We also had a problem with an emergency exit light. The emergency exit light problem was readily corrected and the captain's gyro was replaced. Then the fueler came on board and reported an error of pumping on an additional 6000 pounds of fuel into the #2 tank as measured by the drip stick. This would not affect the maximum takeoff weight nor the maximum landing weight 9N as a result the fuel slip was corrected to show a stick reading of 21' which corresponded to 18412 pounds of fuel in the #2 tank. The #2 tank had measured 12469# of fuel by a drip stick reading of 14.8' prior to fueling. Tanks 1 and 3 indicated 6700 pounds each prior to fueling. This was increased to 11926 pounds in each tank after fueling. Confused? The bottom line was that all of this added up to 41612 pounds total after fueling. The fueler was worried about the additional 6000 pounds and twice stated that the #2 fuel gauge was inoperative and to ignore it and that he had twice stuck the #2 fuel tank and both times came up with a 21' or 18412 pounds reading. This took up all of his attention as did it ours. He was worried about putting too much fuel on and everyone's attention was directed to and centered on this fact. It was still dark when we departed at XB05. 1 hour and 5 mins later the first fuel low pressure light came on for #2 tank. Suspicions were confirmed 2 mins later when a second fuel low pressure light came on for the same tank. We did the prudent thing and landed at slc. Upon arrival at the gate the #2 tank was found to have 2200 pounds in it. In retrospect I believe the cause of this misfueling to be multifaceted. The early hour, the 35 min delay and its associated mechanical problems, the agents wanting to get the trip off the gate, the fueler twice insisting that he had twice stuck the #2 tank and that it indicated 18412 pounds all added up to a state of general confusion and urgency. It appears that the error occurred on the fuel slip where the gallons to be added 2343 versus the gallons added from the truck meter of 1486 made a difference according to the fuel slip of 67 gals. However, the actual difference was 857 gals or 5742 pounds. The rest of the fuel slip added up perfectly, so away we went. I believe that this problem is built into the system. I was only able to unscramble it that evening when I got home and had access to a quiet study and a desk calculator. The hub and spoke system puts tremendous pressure on all concerned to keep the operation running and to get the trips out on time. The MEL allows the #2 tank to be stuck rather than metered and then gives us a fuel slip as a check. Obviously that check did not work in this case. Many errors made by many people under non standard and unusual conditions and as a result the system broke down. Supplemental information from acn 104946: callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: the fueler pulled the inboard drip stick on the #1 tank which is not very far outboard of the drip stick for the #2 tank. Then, converting that reading to pounds, he reset it to the inches he needed to get drip when required amount of fuel was added. Then when fuel was pumped on board he failed to get #2 fueling valve open and when fuel started dripping he thought fuel was added. Since same amount was to be added to all 3 tanks, he in effect read what was added to #1 tank as being added to #2. Air carrier has investigated and this same fueler has apparently made errors before.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUELING ERROR RESULTS IN LESS THAN NEEDED FUEL BEING ADDED AND FLT MADE PRECAUTIONARY LNDG AT DIVERSION ARPT.

Narrative: WE TOOK A 35 MIN DELAY. THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY WERE THE CAPT'S HDI INDICATED A 90 DEG LEFT BANK AND THE #2 FUEL GAUGE WAS INOP. WE ALSO HAD A PROB WITH AN EMER EXIT LIGHT. THE EMER EXIT LIGHT PROB WAS READILY CORRECTED AND THE CAPT'S GYRO WAS REPLACED. THEN THE FUELER CAME ON BOARD AND RPTED AN ERROR OF PUMPING ON AN ADDITIONAL 6000 LBS OF FUEL INTO THE #2 TANK AS MEASURED BY THE DRIP STICK. THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE MAX TKOF WT NOR THE MAX LNDG WT 9N AS A RESULT THE FUEL SLIP WAS CORRECTED TO SHOW A STICK READING OF 21' WHICH CORRESPONDED TO 18412 LBS OF FUEL IN THE #2 TANK. THE #2 TANK HAD MEASURED 12469# OF FUEL BY A DRIP STICK READING OF 14.8' PRIOR TO FUELING. TANKS 1 AND 3 INDICATED 6700 LBS EACH PRIOR TO FUELING. THIS WAS INCREASED TO 11926 LBS IN EACH TANK AFTER FUELING. CONFUSED? THE BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT ALL OF THIS ADDED UP TO 41612 LBS TOTAL AFTER FUELING. THE FUELER WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE ADDITIONAL 6000 LBS AND TWICE STATED THAT THE #2 FUEL GAUGE WAS INOP AND TO IGNORE IT AND THAT HE HAD TWICE STUCK THE #2 FUEL TANK AND BOTH TIMES CAME UP WITH A 21' OR 18412 LBS READING. THIS TOOK UP ALL OF HIS ATTN AS DID IT OURS. HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT PUTTING TOO MUCH FUEL ON AND EVERYONE'S ATTN WAS DIRECTED TO AND CENTERED ON THIS FACT. IT WAS STILL DARK WHEN WE DEPARTED AT XB05. 1 HR AND 5 MINS LATER THE FIRST FUEL LOW PRESSURE LIGHT CAME ON FOR #2 TANK. SUSPICIONS WERE CONFIRMED 2 MINS LATER WHEN A SECOND FUEL LOW PRESSURE LIGHT CAME ON FOR THE SAME TANK. WE DID THE PRUDENT THING AND LANDED AT SLC. UPON ARR AT THE GATE THE #2 TANK WAS FOUND TO HAVE 2200 LBS IN IT. IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE THE CAUSE OF THIS MISFUELING TO BE MULTIFACETED. THE EARLY HOUR, THE 35 MIN DELAY AND ITS ASSOCIATED MECHANICAL PROBS, THE AGENTS WANTING TO GET THE TRIP OFF THE GATE, THE FUELER TWICE INSISTING THAT HE HAD TWICE STUCK THE #2 TANK AND THAT IT INDICATED 18412 LBS ALL ADDED UP TO A STATE OF GENERAL CONFUSION AND URGENCY. IT APPEARS THAT THE ERROR OCCURRED ON THE FUEL SLIP WHERE THE GALLONS TO BE ADDED 2343 VERSUS THE GALLONS ADDED FROM THE TRUCK METER OF 1486 MADE A DIFFERENCE ACCORDING TO THE FUEL SLIP OF 67 GALS. HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL DIFFERENCE WAS 857 GALS OR 5742 LBS. THE REST OF THE FUEL SLIP ADDED UP PERFECTLY, SO AWAY WE WENT. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PROB IS BUILT INTO THE SYS. I WAS ONLY ABLE TO UNSCRAMBLE IT THAT EVENING WHEN I GOT HOME AND HAD ACCESS TO A QUIET STUDY AND A DESK CALCULATOR. THE HUB AND SPOKE SYS PUTS TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON ALL CONCERNED TO KEEP THE OPERATION RUNNING AND TO GET THE TRIPS OUT ON TIME. THE MEL ALLOWS THE #2 TANK TO BE STUCK RATHER THAN METERED AND THEN GIVES US A FUEL SLIP AS A CHK. OBVIOUSLY THAT CHK DID NOT WORK IN THIS CASE. MANY ERRORS MADE BY MANY PEOPLE UNDER NON STANDARD AND UNUSUAL CONDITIONS AND AS A RESULT THE SYS BROKE DOWN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 104946: CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE FUELER PULLED THE INBOARD DRIP STICK ON THE #1 TANK WHICH IS NOT VERY FAR OUTBOARD OF THE DRIP STICK FOR THE #2 TANK. THEN, CONVERTING THAT READING TO POUNDS, HE RESET IT TO THE INCHES HE NEEDED TO GET DRIP WHEN REQUIRED AMOUNT OF FUEL WAS ADDED. THEN WHEN FUEL WAS PUMPED ON BOARD HE FAILED TO GET #2 FUELING VALVE OPEN AND WHEN FUEL STARTED DRIPPING HE THOUGHT FUEL WAS ADDED. SINCE SAME AMOUNT WAS TO BE ADDED TO ALL 3 TANKS, HE IN EFFECT READ WHAT WAS ADDED TO #1 TANK AS BEING ADDED TO #2. ACR HAS INVESTIGATED AND THIS SAME FUELER HAS APPARENTLY MADE ERRORS BEFORE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.