Narrative:

While performing fire bottle job card; referencing aircraft maintenance manual 26-21-00-700; it was discovered that the fire bottle cartridges were installed in the incorrect locations allowing the left engine bottle 'a' to be discharged to the right engine and the right engine bottle 'a' to be discharged to the left engine in the event of an engine fire. This bottle had been installed on the aircraft [in this configuration] for several years. To compound the issue; the wiring on the aircraft has sufficient slack to allow the [electrical] connectors to be installed incorrectly and the maintenance manual task to replace the bottles and cartridges is not clear enough to prevent incorrect assembly. The aircraft is assembled in a manner in which cross-connection of the electrical connectors for the 'a' and 'B' engine fire bottles is possible. In an absolute worst case scenario; if both bottles are affected; neither engine would have fire protection with extreme risk for loss of life. I would suggest that embraer generate a service bulletin to shorten the length of the connectors to prevent incorrect installation; and re-write the maintenance procedure to emphasize the correct installation of the connectors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Maintenance Supervisor reports an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) discovered that the left and right engine fire bottle cartridges had been installed at incorrect locations; allowing the left engine bottle 'A' to be discharged to the right engine and the right engine bottle 'A' to be discharged to the left engine in the event of an engine fire. The ERJ-170 had been flying for several years in that configuration.

Narrative: While performing Fire Bottle Job Card; referencing Aircraft Maintenance Manual 26-21-00-700; it was discovered that the fire bottle cartridges were installed in the incorrect locations allowing the left engine bottle 'A' to be discharged to the right engine and the right engine bottle 'A' to be discharged to the left engine in the event of an engine fire. This bottle had been installed on the aircraft [in this configuration] for several years. To compound the issue; the wiring on the aircraft has sufficient slack to allow the [electrical] connectors to be installed incorrectly and the Maintenance Manual Task to replace the bottles and cartridges is not clear enough to prevent incorrect assembly. The aircraft is assembled in a manner in which cross-connection of the electrical connectors for the 'A' and 'B' engine fire bottles is possible. In an absolute worst case scenario; if both bottles are affected; neither engine would have fire protection with extreme risk for loss of life. I would suggest that Embraer generate a Service Bulletin to shorten the length of the connectors to prevent incorrect installation; and re-write the Maintenance Procedure to emphasize the correct installation of the connectors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.