37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1051114 |
Time | |
Date | 201211 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50 Flight Crew Total 15000 Flight Crew Type 8000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue |
Narrative:
Second leg of the day; only had 50 minutes between flights. Tried to check radar and weather; use the rest room; and get to the gate for departure. Time was short and we were rushed. There was weather west of iad when I did papers. The forecast was for some gusty surface winds and precipitation around the washington area for our arrival. There was a forecast for light turbulence between 320 and 380 en route for which we were given 800 pounds of extra fuel for altitude flexibility. We were also given 800 extra pounds of fuel for possible delays due to surface winds at ZZZ. When I signed the release I added another 1;500 pounds of fuel. That made us fat with about 9;500 pounds. Our filed altitude was 370. The forecast didn't really look that bad. The winds were 15 to 20 KTS with gusts; conditions that we see often and deal with routinely. We knew that rides were bumpy; mostly light chop and found that rides were slightly better lower so we flew to ZZZ at FL330. On my introductory PA to the passenger while at the gate I told them that there would be some turbulence as we got closer to the arrival area. I also briefed the flight attendants that they should be prepared to have everything cleaned up and to be able to sit down early as it would be bumpy when we got closer to the arrival area. I also briefed them that I would let them know over the PA so the passengers would know they would be sitting down. The first half of the flight was uneventful with a fairly good ride. As we got closer to ZZZ the ride started to deteriorate while descending on the arrival. The seat belt sign was on and I made a PA and told the flight attendants they should clean up and take their seats for the remainder of the flight. Just after we switched frequencies; but before I checked in; I over heard ATC reporting numerous PIREPS of plus 30 KTS at 2;000 ft on final. When I checked in I reported moderate chop and ATC gave us a descent to 6;000 ft. ATIS was 160/7KT with 10SM visibility which we had gotten en route. The next ATIS was a special 33019g26kt with 10 miles visibility. There was a wind shear advisory in this ATIS. We were never told directly by tower of winds higher then +/-10 on final. A few minutes later I reported moderate chop then came back and said it was more like turbulence. ATC then gave us 5;000 ft. I asked approach if he was painting a cell right where we were because we were really in bad turbulence. He said 'ma'am; I'm painting cells everywhere.' we were getting kicked around pretty badly. We were being vectored downwind for the ILS 1C at ZZZ. Our onboard radar was painting solid green with very little yellow; no red and one small streak of magenta which we didn't get near. It was painting the same the entire time no matter what our tilt; range or position was. We couldn't stay out of the cells because we weren't painting any. We were getting a really turbulent ride as if we were in a cell the entire time. ATC vectored us south of the airport about 15 to 20 miles (can't remember exactly how far south it was). The entire time we were really getting kicked around. We were finding it increasingly difficult to hold as and altitude. As we were given an easterly heading on a base leg we went through some mod/severe turbulence. Then ATC gave us a heading to intercept the localizer for 1C. It was pretty close and we went slightly over the course when intercepting due to more really bad turbulence. I then asked to be given a heading out of there and to abandon the approach. ATC said 'maintain your heading and descend to 2;000 ft you have traffic just off your right.' I said we may as well continue on the approach in that case and ATC said ok. I again asked if he was painting cells on the localizer from our position; to the runway. He said he was painting light to moderate precipitation and had plus 10 KTS the entire way down final. Then we went though some severe turbulence and I said to approach that 'we need to get out of here; we are having a really hard time holding altitude and airspeed.' we were at around 4;000 ft at that point. While I was keying the mike we went from just above vls to vmax+10 to 30 KTS. We were losing altitude with full thrust on what seemed like a downburst then to an overspeed and climbing. This is when we oversped the flaps by somewhere between 10 and 30 KTS. The overspeed warning was blaring in the background when I was asking to abort the approach. It was really hard to tell exactly how much we had over sped because the plane was jumping around so much it was hard to see the instrument panel. The autopilot and autothrottles were on then and the first officer had to disengage them to gain control of the aircraft. It seemed like we were getting way more then a +/-30 KT shear. ATC gave us a block altitude then came right back and said we could have any altitude we wanted. Then the controller said he was declaring us an emergency aircraft. We asked for 10;000 ft and the fastest way out of the weather. We climbed to 10;000 ft on a 190 heading and were out of the weather in about 5 to 7 minutes. As we were leaving the area we over heard other aircraft reporting moderate/severe turbulence. We told ATC we wanted to go to our alternate and got vectors there. I informed our dispatcher we were headed for our alternate. He acknowledged. I informed the passengers via PA that we were diverting. At about 37 miles from the field the controller said they just closed our alternate due to fog? That seemed wrong because it was too windy for fog. The field was closed just the same and I again informed the dispatcher that we were now going to divert further north. We had about 7;000 pounds of fuel. The dispatcher wanted us to go to our origional alternate because they had fuel and our other alternate didn't. He also said that our alternate was open. We switched ATC controllers and the new one said that our alternate was open but they were getting ready to close because of winds and weather; which made more sense. We made an informed decision; ATC information; fuel reserves; field conditions and crew assessment; to continue on to go further north and be done. Had we changed our plan and turned back to our alternate to find it closed due to the weather our fuel would have become dangerously low and the weather may have gotten to another alternate making that more difficult to get into making our options far more limited. So; off we went for an uneventful approach and landing. I never had to divert my attention away from flying the airplane to worry about fuel remaining. Fuel remaining was 5;000 pounds. Things that were good; our training seemed to prepare us pretty well for this situation. We aborted the approach well prior to getting to low on the approach; it was a timely decision. The flight attendants and passengers were warned and seated well in advance therefore there were no injuries. The first officer was pilot flying and he utilized the autopilot and autothrottles till they were unable to handle the shears then he hand recovered. My fuel onboard was excellent. I had enough to abort the approach; fly to my alternate and when that was closed I still had enough to continue to a farther alternate without the additional stress of worrying if I had enough fuel. I added 1;500 pounds and landed with 5;000. Things that could have been better: would have liked more support from dispatch in that we would have appreciated a heads up as to the recent pilot reports of wind shear and the rapidly changing weather on the arrival; approach and at the airport. More support and clearer messages from dispatch concerning our divert. When you are in a situation such as this; the last thing you want to be doing is ACARS'ing with your head in the box instead of flying the plane. It should be; and is; a valuable tool and not be a distraction. Better weather reporting from our weather service. They need to have full screen radar like intellicast for us aging pilots. I routinely use intellicast at home before leaving on a trip. It's more user friendly and I don't have to sign in before using it. When I have so few minutes between flights and have to change planes and change terminals; every minute counts. We never got any wind shear warnings because we were at 4;000 ft and had very little; almost no magenta on radar because there was very little moisture associated with the weather. I feel that my communication with ATC could have been clearer and more direct for example I should have said 'aborting the approach; we need a climb and heading for the fastest way out of the weather.' I did say all these things but not in one sentence. I should have said them in one sentence more directly and forcefully. I let ATC know that we were in moderate turbulence earlier several times; and that we were having a hard time holding altitude and airspeed. That we had oversped but I never said the word 'severe' turbulence. I know ATC knew it was bad but I still should have said the word severe. I should have been more direct and clear about our situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An air carrier aircraft encountered severe turbulence on approach; executed a missed approach and diverted to a distant alternate.
Narrative: Second leg of the day; only had 50 minutes between flights. Tried to check radar and weather; use the rest room; and get to the gate for departure. Time was short and we were rushed. There was weather west of IAD when I did papers. The forecast was for some gusty surface winds and precipitation around the Washington area for our arrival. There was a forecast for light turbulence between 320 and 380 en route for which we were given 800 LBS of extra fuel for altitude flexibility. We were also given 800 extra LBS of fuel for possible delays due to surface winds at ZZZ. When I signed the release I added another 1;500 LBS of fuel. That made us FAT with about 9;500 LBS. Our filed altitude was 370. The forecast didn't really look that bad. The winds were 15 to 20 KTS with gusts; conditions that we see often and deal with routinely. We knew that rides were bumpy; mostly light chop and found that rides were slightly better lower so we flew to ZZZ at FL330. On my introductory PA to the passenger while at the gate I told them that there would be some turbulence as we got closer to the arrival area. I also briefed the flight attendants that they should be prepared to have everything cleaned up and to be able to sit down early as it would be bumpy when we got closer to the arrival area. I also briefed them that I would let them know over the PA so the passengers would know they would be sitting down. The first half of the flight was uneventful with a fairly good ride. As we got closer to ZZZ the ride started to deteriorate while descending on the ARRIVAL. The seat belt sign was on and I made a PA and told the flight attendants they should clean up and take their seats for the remainder of the flight. Just after we switched frequencies; but before I checked in; I over heard ATC reporting numerous PIREPS of plus 30 KTS at 2;000 FT on final. When I checked in I reported moderate chop and ATC gave us a descent to 6;000 FT. ATIS was 160/7KT with 10SM visibility which we had gotten en route. The next ATIS was a special 33019G26KT with 10 miles visibility. There was a wind shear advisory in this ATIS. We were never told directly by Tower of winds higher then +/-10 on final. A few minutes later I reported moderate chop then came back and said it was more like turbulence. ATC then gave us 5;000 FT. I asked Approach if he was painting a cell right where we were because we were really in bad turbulence. He said 'Ma'am; I'm painting cells everywhere.' We were getting kicked around pretty badly. We were being vectored downwind for the ILS 1C at ZZZ. Our onboard radar was painting solid green with very little yellow; no red and one small streak of magenta which we didn't get near. It was painting the same the entire time no matter what our tilt; range or position was. We couldn't stay out of the cells because we weren't painting any. We were getting a really turbulent ride as if we were in a cell the entire time. ATC vectored us south of the airport about 15 to 20 miles (can't remember exactly how far south it was). The entire time we were really getting kicked around. We were finding it increasingly difficult to hold AS and ALT. As we were given an easterly heading on a base leg we went through some mod/severe turbulence. Then ATC gave us a heading to intercept the LOC for 1C. It was pretty close and we went slightly over the course when intercepting due to more really bad turbulence. I then asked to be given a heading out of there and to abandon the approach. ATC said 'maintain your heading and descend to 2;000 FT you have traffic just off your right.' I said we may as well continue on the approach in that case and ATC said OK. I again asked if he was painting cells on the LOC from our position; to the runway. He said he was painting light to moderate precipitation and had plus 10 KTS the entire way down final. Then we went though some severe turbulence and I said to Approach that 'we need to get out of here; we are having a really hard time holding altitude and airspeed.' We were at around 4;000 FT at that point. While I was keying the mike we went from just above Vls to Vmax+10 to 30 KTS. We were losing altitude with full thrust on what seemed like a downburst then to an overspeed and climbing. This is when we oversped the flaps by somewhere between 10 and 30 KTS. The overspeed warning was blaring in the background when I was asking to abort the approach. It was really hard to tell exactly how much we had over sped because the plane was jumping around so much it was hard to see the instrument panel. The autopilot and autothrottles were on then and the First Officer had to disengage them to gain control of the aircraft. It seemed like we were getting way more then a +/-30 KT shear. ATC gave us a block altitude then came right back and said we could have any altitude we wanted. Then the Controller said he was declaring us an emergency aircraft. We asked for 10;000 FT and the fastest way out of the weather. We climbed to 10;000 FT on a 190 heading and were out of the weather in about 5 to 7 minutes. As we were leaving the area we over heard other aircraft reporting moderate/severe turbulence. We told ATC we wanted to go to our alternate and got vectors there. I informed our Dispatcher we were headed for our alternate. He acknowledged. I informed the passengers via PA that we were diverting. At about 37 miles from the field the Controller said they just closed our alternate due to fog? That seemed wrong because it was too windy for fog. The field was closed just the same and I again informed the Dispatcher that we were now going to divert further north. We had about 7;000 LBS of fuel. The Dispatcher wanted us to go to our origional alternate because they had fuel and our other alternate didn't. He also said that our alternate was open. We switched ATC controllers and the new one said that our alternate was open but they were getting ready to close because of winds and weather; which made more sense. We made an informed decision; ATC information; fuel reserves; field conditions and crew assessment; to continue on to go further north and be done. Had we changed our plan and turned back to our alternate to find it closed due to the weather our fuel would have become dangerously low and the weather may have gotten to another alternate making that more difficult to get into making our options far more limited. So; off we went for an uneventful approach and landing. I never had to divert my attention away from flying the airplane to worry about fuel remaining. Fuel remaining was 5;000 LBS. Things that were good; our training seemed to prepare us pretty well for this situation. We aborted the approach well prior to getting to low on the approach; it was a timely decision. The flight attendants and passengers were warned and seated well in advance therefore there were no injuries. The First Officer was pilot flying and he utilized the autopilot and autothrottles till they were unable to handle the shears then he hand recovered. My fuel onboard was excellent. I had enough to abort the approach; fly to my alternate and when that was closed I still had enough to continue to a farther alternate without the additional stress of worrying if I had enough fuel. I added 1;500 LBS and landed with 5;000. Things that could have been better: Would have liked more support from Dispatch in that we would have appreciated a heads up as to the recent pilot reports of wind shear and the rapidly changing weather on the arrival; approach and at the airport. More support and clearer messages from Dispatch concerning our divert. When you are in a situation such as this; the last thing you want to be doing is ACARS'ing with your head in the box instead of flying the plane. It should be; and is; a valuable tool and not be a distraction. Better weather reporting from our weather service. They need to have full screen radar like Intellicast for us aging pilots. I routinely use Intellicast at home before leaving on a trip. It's more user friendly and I don't have to sign in before using it. When I have so few minutes between flights and have to change planes and change terminals; every minute counts. We never got any wind shear warnings because we were at 4;000 FT and had very little; almost no magenta on radar because there was very little moisture associated with the weather. I feel that my communication with ATC could have been clearer and more direct for example I should have said 'aborting the approach; we need a climb and heading for the fastest way out of the weather.' I did say all these things but not in one sentence. I should have said them in one sentence more directly and forcefully. I let ATC know that we were in moderate turbulence earlier several times; and that we were having a hard time holding altitude and airspeed. That we had oversped but I never said the word 'severe' turbulence. I know ATC knew it was bad but I still should have said the word severe. I should have been more direct and clear about our situation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.