Narrative:

Aircraft Y was climbed to FL210 above aircraft X at FL200 and given direct shv airport. Aircraft Y was then handed off to sector 30 monroe low. Aircraft X was being handed off to my sector (83) uim low from sector 30. When sector 30 took the hand off on the aircraft Y; I then switched the aircraft to sector 30 after ensuring there was no traffic call needed between the aircraft Y and aircraft X. Sector 30 has control for turns and lower on shreveport landers which aircraft Y was. Since aircraft X was on our mutual sector boundaries when sector 30 took the hand off on aircraft Y; I did not reference aircraft X to sector 30 in relation to the ait that sector 30 has control for turns and lower on shv landers. I continued to work additional traffic when I saw FL130 interim altitude put in aircraft Y's data block. At that time aircraft Y and aircraft X were lateral and approximately 3 NM separated. I immediately called sector 30 and asked if they were descending aircraft Y. I believe he said he was and I asked about aircraft X; during this call I had pvd'd aircraft X back on sector 30's scope. I don't believe he remembered aircraft X. I hung up and was going to turn aircraft X but there was such a huge speed difference and I knew the aircraft were both safe so I did not execute a turn. I don't believe we actually need this ait; especially for descent. Where sector 30 has control for turns and lower is still approximately 70 NM away from shv airport and well inside uim lows airspace. With the new 4th line coordination we have in effect in ZFW there really is no need for this ait. To prevent other incidents from occurring this should be looked at. Sector 30 having worked aircraft X did have the 'known' traffic for the aircraft Y however since this ait occurs 15 NM inside of uim lows airspace there is a chance that the known traffic will be mistakenly overlooked. Also; there could be a change of controllers and this known traffic could easily be overlooked in the briefing. Sector 30 is a large sector and most controllers have their mdm's set right at the limits required and no further out which could facilitate missing the limited data block if the traffic is dropped; or if not dropped it's feasible that the data block could be under the limits of the mdm. This situation has a high probability of occurring again.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZFW Controller described a conflict event listing the current AIT procedure as contributing to the event.

Narrative: Aircraft Y was climbed to FL210 above Aircraft X at FL200 and given direct SHV airport. Aircraft Y was then handed off to Sector 30 Monroe Low. Aircraft X was being handed off to my Sector (83) UIM Low from Sector 30. When Sector 30 took the hand off on the Aircraft Y; I then switched the aircraft to Sector 30 after ensuring there was no traffic call needed between the Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. Sector 30 has control for turns and lower on Shreveport landers which Aircraft Y was. Since Aircraft X was on our mutual sector boundaries when Sector 30 took the hand off on Aircraft Y; I did not reference Aircraft X to Sector 30 in relation to the AIT that Sector 30 has control for turns and lower on SHV landers. I continued to work additional traffic when I saw FL130 interim altitude put in Aircraft Y's data block. At that time Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were lateral and approximately 3 NM separated. I immediately called Sector 30 and asked if they were descending Aircraft Y. I believe he said he was and I asked about Aircraft X; during this call I had PVD'd Aircraft X back on Sector 30's scope. I don't believe he remembered Aircraft X. I hung up and was going to turn Aircraft X but there was such a huge speed difference and I knew the aircraft were both safe so I did not execute a turn. I don't believe we actually need this AIT; especially for descent. Where Sector 30 has control for turns and lower is still approximately 70 NM away from SHV Airport and well inside UIM Lows airspace. With the new 4th Line coordination we have in effect in ZFW there really is no need for this AIT. To prevent other incidents from occurring this should be looked at. Sector 30 having worked Aircraft X did have the 'known' traffic for the Aircraft Y however since this AIT occurs 15 NM inside of UIM Lows airspace there is a chance that the known traffic will be mistakenly overlooked. Also; there could be a change of controllers and this known traffic could easily be overlooked in the briefing. Sector 30 is a large sector and most controllers have their MDM's set right at the limits required and no further out which could facilitate missing the limited data block if the traffic is dropped; or if not dropped it's feasible that the data block could be under the limits of the MDM. This situation has a high probability of occurring again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.