Narrative:

An accident aircraft; had filed a flight plan. The aircraft's radar target disappeared and it had not been located; so its data block was handed off from facility to facility. I returned from a break approximately 10 minutes after it was handed to another sector. We were instructed to protect for its route into its destination. However; neither the controllers; nor management; seemed to have a clear idea of what was required. There was confusion over the width of airspace to protect and for how long it should be kept clear. Eventually a consensus was reached that we would protect 10 miles on either side of its route of flight; and in a 20 mile radius around the destination. Nobody seemed to have a reference for these numbers. Because the overdue aircraft had not been seen for several sectors; and there were no primary targets in the vicinity; word came down that we were to reduce the protected radius around the destination to 10 NM; and a few minutes later; were told to resume normal operations with caution. Nearly all of the controllers were uncomfortable with this. The low altitude controllers decided to not accept hand offs from the TRACON until they were clear of the 10 NM radius bubble. We were told that the TRACON had resumed normal operations themselves; so there was disagreement among both facilities on how to proceed. There was also confusion over the requirement to suspend all traffic for 30 minutes; and then resume traffic for the following 30 minutes with pilot concurrence; and no phraseology is listed on how to solicit such concurrence. There was also disagreement between center and TRACON over when the aircraft was due. Nobody wants to fail to protect for an aircraft that may be there; but on the other hand; over protection can cause significant impact to the NAS. The 20 NM radius; for example; would have shut down a major airport. During an actual emergency situation; we shouldn't be confused or arguing over what the correct procedures is to follow. Instructions in the 7110.65 on how to protect for overdue aircraft needs to be more clear. If we're hesitant to outline something specific; such as 10 NM on either side of the route of flight and a 20 NM radius around the destination; then it should specifically state who has the discretion to make the decision on what to protect (controller of the aircraft's sector; flm; etc). If this is not included in the .65 for security or other reasons; a specific reference to specific procedures in another document needs to be included. This way; there is no room for debate or confusion over what should be protected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller voiced concern regarding the confusion surrounding 'lost aircraft and/or aircraft accident' airspace protection requirements; noting clear and concise requirements are not available.

Narrative: An accident aircraft; had filed a flight plan. The aircraft's RADAR target disappeared and it had not been located; so its data block was handed off from facility to facility. I returned from a break approximately 10 minutes after it was handed to another sector. We were instructed to protect for its route into its destination. However; neither the controllers; nor management; seemed to have a clear idea of what was required. There was confusion over the width of airspace to protect and for how long it should be kept clear. Eventually a consensus was reached that we would protect 10 miles on either side of its route of flight; and in a 20 mile radius around the destination. Nobody seemed to have a reference for these numbers. Because the overdue aircraft had not been seen for several sectors; and there were no primary targets in the vicinity; word came down that we were to reduce the protected radius around the destination to 10 NM; and a few minutes later; were told to resume normal operations with caution. Nearly all of the controllers were uncomfortable with this. The low altitude controllers decided to not accept hand offs from the TRACON until they were clear of the 10 NM radius bubble. We were told that the TRACON had resumed normal operations themselves; so there was disagreement among both facilities on how to proceed. There was also confusion over the requirement to suspend all traffic for 30 minutes; and then resume traffic for the following 30 minutes with pilot concurrence; and no phraseology is listed on how to solicit such concurrence. There was also disagreement between Center and TRACON over when the aircraft was due. Nobody wants to fail to protect for an aircraft that may be there; but on the other hand; over protection can cause significant impact to the NAS. The 20 NM radius; for example; would have shut down a major airport. During an actual emergency situation; we shouldn't be confused or arguing over what the correct procedures is to follow. Instructions in the 7110.65 on how to protect for overdue aircraft needs to be more clear. If we're hesitant to outline something specific; such as 10 NM on either side of the route of flight and a 20 NM radius around the destination; then it should specifically state who has the discretion to make the decision on what to protect (controller of the aircraft's sector; FLM; etc). If this is not included in the .65 for security or other reasons; a specific reference to specific procedures in another document needs to be included. This way; there is no room for debate or confusion over what should be protected.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.