Narrative:

Night landing at dca, VMC-VFR. Runways in use: 36, 33, 3. Cleared to land on runway 36. After landing rollout, turned off on runway 33 and then south on first taxiway to ramp area. Advised to phone tower from operations. Tower supervisor was upset with my turnoff on runway 33. Said controller training was in progress. Said I was not authority/authorized to use runway 33 for turnoff. Trnee had cleared a light aircraft for takeoff on runway 33 shortly after our T/D, figuring we would already have rolled through the intersection of the 2 runways. Factors: weren't advised training in progress. Weren't advised of intent to use runway 33 for takeoff. None of us recall hearing takeoff clearance given to other aircraft. May have heard it and subconsciously dismissed it, assuming that clearance was for takeoff on runway 3, whose intersection with runway 36 is at the landing end of runway and already behind us. T/D and initial rollout is a very critical phase and I believe we are probably primed to receive communications only meant for us which are triggered by our flight call sign. Conclusions: potential accident hazard and a very poor procedure. I consider the intersection of the 2 runways to be my (and only my) area of operation unless prior arrangements have been made, such as to hold short. Should have been advised of plan to use runway 33 for takeoff and told not use runway 33 as a turnoff. Can only imagine consequences if we had an emergency requiring a stop on the runway at that intersection, such as blown tires, fire, etc. No one should have been cleared to use that intersection or runway until I had cleared both areas. Reflecting back, I probably didn't use my best judgement by turning off on runway 33, but given the time span it took to clear runway 33 from the intersection of my landing runway 36 (5-10 seconds at the most), I believe the student and instrument controllers did not use good judgement either when they cleared the other aircraft for takeoff, especially when I wasn't aware of their intended operation. I don't know what the rules or guidelines are for controllers which cover this situation, but if this is an acceptable and approved mode of operation and control, pilots should be made aware of it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG ACFT TURNED OFF ON AN INTERSECTING ACTIVE RWY. ATCT HAD CLEARED ANOTHER ACFT FOR TKOF ON THAT INTERSECTING RWY.

Narrative: NIGHT LNDG AT DCA, VMC-VFR. RWYS IN USE: 36, 33, 3. CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 36. AFTER LNDG ROLLOUT, TURNED OFF ON RWY 33 AND THEN S ON FIRST TXWY TO RAMP AREA. ADVISED TO PHONE TWR FROM OPS. TWR SUPVR WAS UPSET WITH MY TURNOFF ON RWY 33. SAID CTLR TRNING WAS IN PROGRESS. SAID I WAS NOT AUTH TO USE RWY 33 FOR TURNOFF. TRNEE HAD CLRED A LIGHT ACFT FOR TKOF ON RWY 33 SHORTLY AFTER OUR T/D, FIGURING WE WOULD ALREADY HAVE ROLLED THROUGH THE INTXN OF THE 2 RWYS. FACTORS: WEREN'T ADVISED TRNING IN PROGRESS. WEREN'T ADVISED OF INTENT TO USE RWY 33 FOR TKOF. NONE OF US RECALL HEARING TKOF CLRNC GIVEN TO OTHER ACFT. MAY HAVE HEARD IT AND SUBCONSCIOUSLY DISMISSED IT, ASSUMING THAT CLRNC WAS FOR TKOF ON RWY 3, WHOSE INTXN WITH RWY 36 IS AT THE LNDG END OF RWY AND ALREADY BEHIND US. T/D AND INITIAL ROLLOUT IS A VERY CRITICAL PHASE AND I BELIEVE WE ARE PROBABLY PRIMED TO RECEIVE COMS ONLY MEANT FOR US WHICH ARE TRIGGERED BY OUR FLT CALL SIGN. CONCLUSIONS: POTENTIAL ACCIDENT HAZARD AND A VERY POOR PROC. I CONSIDER THE INTXN OF THE 2 RWYS TO BE MY (AND ONLY MY) AREA OF OPERATION UNLESS PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE, SUCH AS TO HOLD SHORT. SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF PLAN TO USE RWY 33 FOR TKOF AND TOLD NOT USE RWY 33 AS A TURNOFF. CAN ONLY IMAGINE CONSEQUENCES IF WE HAD AN EMER REQUIRING A STOP ON THE RWY AT THAT INTXN, SUCH AS BLOWN TIRES, FIRE, ETC. NO ONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLRED TO USE THAT INTXN OR RWY UNTIL I HAD CLRED BOTH AREAS. REFLECTING BACK, I PROBABLY DIDN'T USE MY BEST JUDGEMENT BY TURNING OFF ON RWY 33, BUT GIVEN THE TIME SPAN IT TOOK TO CLR RWY 33 FROM THE INTXN OF MY LNDG RWY 36 (5-10 SECS AT THE MOST), I BELIEVE THE STUDENT AND INSTR CTLRS DID NOT USE GOOD JUDGEMENT EITHER WHEN THEY CLRED THE OTHER ACFT FOR TKOF, ESPECIALLY WHEN I WASN'T AWARE OF THEIR INTENDED OPERATION. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE RULES OR GUIDELINES ARE FOR CTLRS WHICH COVER THIS SITUATION, BUT IF THIS IS AN ACCEPTABLE AND APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION AND CTL, PLTS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.