Narrative:

Air carrier X on final approach to runway 21 at prc reported a near midair collision with an small aircraft believed to be XXXX. Air carrier X was making left traffic to runway 21 while small aircraft was in the right hand training pattern for the same runway. I believe that the student pilot drifted into the flight path of the commuter from small aircraft's downwind leg. The pilot of small aircraft is reported to have been a student pilot on his/her first unsupervised solo. At the time air traffic was extremely heavy. Only 1 controller was working local. The controller on local control did attempt to meter the flow of traffic by holding aircraft outside of the air traffic area and by stopping the aircraft in the pattern from making touch and go lndgs. However, it appears due to poor pilot discipline some aircraft continued to make touch and goes in spite of having been cleared to land only. The aircraft instructed to remain outside of the air traffic area continued to call on the tower frequency and so disrupted the controllers train of thought and his ability to communicate with the aircraft in the traffic pattern. The lack of a BRITE radar in the tower cabin at prc ATC tower seriously degraded the ability of the local controller to provide the level of service that the flying public has come to expect, even from a VFR tower. The low # of total controllers at prc ATC tower is a major contributor to this incident. There should have been sufficient personnel available to have manned a local assist position, or spotter during this period of intense traffic. The crew of air carrier X phoned prc ATC tower and reported a near midair collision. FSDO should begin a series of actions to educate the flying public in the vicinity of prc ATC tower as to the limited ability of the VFR tower to assist them in maintaining sep with other aircraft. Lectures and/or letter to airmen stressing the principle of operation of a VFR tower such as that the VFR tower sequences arriving aircraft only and does not provide sep in the traffic pattern. That the PIC has the responsibility to see and be seen and to advise the tower if he is unable to comply with instructions issued to adjust flow of traffic. The appointment of the 'accident prevention counselor' with experience in the actual control of air traffic would be most helpful. At present the closest thing is a man with FSS experience only. The # of controllers at prc ATC tower should be increased to allow the staffing of an assistant local controller. The manning level ast prc ATC tower is below other level 2 VFR towers in spite of the fact that it is now the 54TH busiest terminal facility in the FAA. The absence of BRITE radar would indicate the need for additional personnel alone. In addition, a majority of the activity at love field is basic flight instruction. The vol of air traffic, piloted with very low time student pilots, greatly increases controller workload.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA DRIFTED ONTO FINAL APCH AND CAME IN CLOSE PROX TO A LNDG ACFT.

Narrative: ACR X ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 21 AT PRC RPTED A NMAC WITH AN SMA BELIEVED TO BE XXXX. ACR X WAS MAKING LEFT TFC TO RWY 21 WHILE SMA WAS IN THE RIGHT HAND TRNING PATTERN FOR THE SAME RWY. I BELIEVE THAT THE STUDENT PLT DRIFTED INTO THE FLT PATH OF THE COMMUTER FROM SMA'S DOWNWIND LEG. THE PLT OF SMA IS RPTED TO HAVE BEEN A STUDENT PLT ON HIS/HER FIRST UNSUPERVISED SOLO. AT THE TIME AIR TFC WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. ONLY 1 CTLR WAS WORKING LCL. THE CTLR ON LCL CTL DID ATTEMPT TO METER THE FLOW OF TFC BY HOLDING ACFT OUTSIDE OF THE ATA AND BY STOPPING THE ACFT IN THE PATTERN FROM MAKING TOUCH AND GO LNDGS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS DUE TO POOR PLT DISCIPLINE SOME ACFT CONTINUED TO MAKE TOUCH AND GOES IN SPITE OF HAVING BEEN CLRED TO LAND ONLY. THE ACFT INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE OF THE ATA CONTINUED TO CALL ON THE TWR FREQ AND SO DISRUPTED THE CTLRS TRAIN OF THOUGHT AND HIS ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN. THE LACK OF A BRITE RADAR IN THE TWR CABIN AT PRC ATC TWR SERIOUSLY DEGRADED THE ABILITY OF THE LCL CTLR TO PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF SVC THAT THE FLYING PUBLIC HAS COME TO EXPECT, EVEN FROM A VFR TWR. THE LOW # OF TOTAL CTLRS AT PRC ATC TWR IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS INCIDENT. THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO HAVE MANNED A LCL ASSIST POS, OR SPOTTER DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTENSE TFC. THE CREW OF ACR X PHONED PRC ATC TWR AND RPTED A NMAC. FSDO SHOULD BEGIN A SERIES OF ACTIONS TO EDUCATE THE FLYING PUBLIC IN THE VICINITY OF PRC ATC TWR AS TO THE LIMITED ABILITY OF THE VFR TWR TO ASSIST THEM IN MAINTAINING SEP WITH OTHER ACFT. LECTURES AND/OR LETTER TO AIRMEN STRESSING THE PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION OF A VFR TWR SUCH AS THAT THE VFR TWR SEQUENCES ARRIVING ACFT ONLY AND DOES NOT PROVIDE SEP IN THE TFC PATTERN. THAT THE PIC HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE AND BE SEEN AND TO ADVISE THE TWR IF HE IS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO ADJUST FLOW OF TFC. THE APPOINTMENT OF THE 'ACCIDENT PREVENTION COUNSELOR' WITH EXPERIENCE IN THE ACTUAL CTL OF AIR TFC WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL. AT PRESENT THE CLOSEST THING IS A MAN WITH FSS EXPERIENCE ONLY. THE # OF CTLRS AT PRC ATC TWR SHOULD BE INCREASED TO ALLOW THE STAFFING OF AN ASSISTANT LCL CTLR. THE MANNING LEVEL AST PRC ATC TWR IS BELOW OTHER LEVEL 2 VFR TWRS IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IT IS NOW THE 54TH BUSIEST TERMINAL FAC IN THE FAA. THE ABSENCE OF BRITE RADAR WOULD INDICATE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ALONE. IN ADDITION, A MAJORITY OF THE ACTIVITY AT LOVE FIELD IS BASIC FLT INSTRUCTION. THE VOL OF AIR TFC, PILOTED WITH VERY LOW TIME STUDENT PLTS, GREATLY INCREASES CTLR WORKLOAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.