Narrative:

I was captain of a commercial flight from pit to charlottesville, va, with 14 passenger and a crew of 2. I had a first officer who was relatively inexperienced in this aircraft (less than 100 hours). Conditions before takeoff were IFR. Visibility was 3/4-1 mi in snow. The ceiling was 400-500'. The temperature was 31-32 degrees. During preflight the aircraft was checked for snow accumulation and ice on the wings. Any visible ice was removed by hand. The snow was of the type that appeared to blow off and not stick. About 15 mins elapsed between preflight and actual takeoff. During this time, it was snowing so I periodically checked for accumulation of the snow on the wings. The snow did not appear to be adhering to the wings. No ice accumulation was observed. On clearance for takeoff from runway 28L, I began a normal takeoff roll. Everything appeared to be normal through rotation. After rotation, the dg appeared to indicate a turn to the left. Following retraction of the gear and flaps, I concentrated on maintaining my assigned heading of 280 degrees, but despite attempting to bank the aircraft to the right in order to correct the apparent left turn, the dg still indicated a turn to the left--ie, the dg did not appear to respond to my control inputs. The heading was about 260 degrees at this time. During this period of time the aircraft controls were heavy and the aircraft did not appear to be reacting to the control inputs being made. We entered the clouds almost immediately. During this time I was having difficulty maintaining direction. I shut off the landing/recognition lights and strobes and I concentrated on controling the aircraft. Apparently, ATC instructed us turn left to 210 degrees and this was repeated by the first officer. Notwithstanding that instruction, I was unable to control the aircraft's direction and therefore concentrated on gaining altitude. At this time, I said to the first officer that 'something doesn't feel right.' we had been cleared to 4000'. We were subsequently cleared to turn left to 150 degrees and climb to 5000'. During this period, I never felt that I had control of the aircraft and began to distrust both the dg and my attitude indicator. Because the first officer's attitude indicator looked more normal, I at one point attempted to cage my attitude indicator. During the next few mins, control of the aircraft was essentially lost. I declared an emergency. Numerous times I requested information from ATC concerning out altitude and I continuously attempted to regain control of the aircraft. During this time there were major fluctuations in airspeed and vertical speed. During this period the first officer shouted numerous directions and he also attempted to move the flight controls and power levers west/O communicating his intentions to me. Because of his instructions and attempts to control the aircraft, I assumed he would be able to control the aircraft. I therefore released control of the aircraft and asked him to take the controls. He refused and then stopped attempting to control the aircraft. I then reattempted to control the aircraft and then was able to establish a steady state climb. I broke out of the clouds at approximately 8000'. After checking the engine and flight instruments, and being satisfied that everything now appeared to be normal, we continued our flight to charlottesville. I believe that this incident was caused by vertigo which may have been precipitated by an actual instrument error, or perhaps a small amount of ice on the wings, or existing WX conditions or all of these factors. In any event, these conditions apparently induced severe vertigo. This problem was exacerbated by an inability of the first officer to help me control the aircraft during this condition or to effectively indicate that he could and would take control of the aircraft during this time. His attempts to control the aircraft west/O telling me his intentions may have made my efforts to overcome the effects of vertigo that much more difficult. I suggest that all crew training include specific instruction with respect to crew coordination in the event that the PF the aircraft is receiving erroneous instrument indications, is suffering from vertigo or has another problem which can be corrected or assisted by his crewman. At the conclusion of the flight the aircraft was checked for and found to be undamaged. There were no injuries to any passenger or crew members. At the time of this report, not all information has been accumulated with respect to this incident, but I am reporting what is known to me at this time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF IN IMC THE REPORTER APPARENTLY EXPERIENCED VERTIGO CAUSING A PERIOD OF AT LEAST PARTIAL LOSS OF ACFT CONTROL.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT OF A COMMERCIAL FLT FROM PIT TO CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA, WITH 14 PAX AND A CREW OF 2. I HAD A F/O WHO WAS RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED IN THIS ACFT (LESS THAN 100 HRS). CONDITIONS BEFORE TKOF WERE IFR. VISIBILITY WAS 3/4-1 MI IN SNOW. THE CEILING WAS 400-500'. THE TEMP WAS 31-32 DEGS. DURING PREFLT THE ACFT WAS CHKED FOR SNOW ACCUMULATION AND ICE ON THE WINGS. ANY VISIBLE ICE WAS REMOVED BY HAND. THE SNOW WAS OF THE TYPE THAT APPEARED TO BLOW OFF AND NOT STICK. ABOUT 15 MINS ELAPSED BTWN PREFLT AND ACTUAL TKOF. DURING THIS TIME, IT WAS SNOWING SO I PERIODICALLY CHKED FOR ACCUMULATION OF THE SNOW ON THE WINGS. THE SNOW DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ADHERING TO THE WINGS. NO ICE ACCUMULATION WAS OBSERVED. ON CLRNC FOR TKOF FROM RWY 28L, I BEGAN A NORMAL TKOF ROLL. EVERYTHING APPEARED TO BE NORMAL THROUGH ROTATION. AFTER ROTATION, THE DG APPEARED TO INDICATE A TURN TO THE LEFT. FOLLOWING RETRACTION OF THE GEAR AND FLAPS, I CONCENTRATED ON MAINTAINING MY ASSIGNED HDG OF 280 DEGS, BUT DESPITE ATTEMPTING TO BANK THE ACFT TO THE RIGHT IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE APPARENT LEFT TURN, THE DG STILL INDICATED A TURN TO THE LEFT--IE, THE DG DID NOT APPEAR TO RESPOND TO MY CONTROL INPUTS. THE HDG WAS ABOUT 260 DEGS AT THIS TIME. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME THE ACFT CONTROLS WERE HEAVY AND THE ACFT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE REACTING TO THE CONTROL INPUTS BEING MADE. WE ENTERED THE CLOUDS ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. DURING THIS TIME I WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING DIRECTION. I SHUT OFF THE LNDG/RECOGNITION LIGHTS AND STROBES AND I CONCENTRATED ON CTLING THE ACFT. APPARENTLY, ATC INSTRUCTED US TURN LEFT TO 210 DEGS AND THIS WAS REPEATED BY THE F/O. NOTWITHSTANDING THAT INSTRUCTION, I WAS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE ACFT'S DIRECTION AND THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON GAINING ALT. AT THIS TIME, I SAID TO THE F/O THAT 'SOMETHING DOESN'T FEEL RIGHT.' WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 4000'. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED TO TURN LEFT TO 150 DEGS AND CLB TO 5000'. DURING THIS PERIOD, I NEVER FELT THAT I HAD CONTROL OF THE ACFT AND BEGAN TO DISTRUST BOTH THE DG AND MY ATTITUDE INDICATOR. BECAUSE THE F/O'S ATTITUDE INDICATOR LOOKED MORE NORMAL, I AT ONE POINT ATTEMPTED TO CAGE MY ATTITUDE INDICATOR. DURING THE NEXT FEW MINS, CONTROL OF THE ACFT WAS ESSENTIALLY LOST. I DECLARED AN EMER. NUMEROUS TIMES I REQUESTED INFO FROM ATC CONCERNING OUT ALT AND I CONTINUOUSLY ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE ACFT. DURING THIS TIME THERE WERE MAJOR FLUCTUATIONS IN AIRSPD AND VERT SPD. DURING THIS PERIOD THE F/O SHOUTED NUMEROUS DIRECTIONS AND HE ALSO ATTEMPTED TO MOVE THE FLT CONTROLS AND PWR LEVERS W/O COMMUNICATING HIS INTENTIONS TO ME. BECAUSE OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE ACFT, I ASSUMED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE ACFT. I THEREFORE RELEASED CONTROL OF THE ACFT AND ASKED HIM TO TAKE THE CONTROLS. HE REFUSED AND THEN STOPPED ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL THE ACFT. I THEN REATTEMPTED TO CONTROL THE ACFT AND THEN WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH A STEADY STATE CLB. I BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT APPROX 8000'. AFTER CHKING THE ENG AND FLT INSTRUMENTS, AND BEING SATISFIED THAT EVERYTHING NOW APPEARED TO BE NORMAL, WE CONTINUED OUR FLT TO CHARLOTTESVILLE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY VERTIGO WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PRECIPITATED BY AN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT ERROR, OR PERHAPS A SMALL AMOUNT OF ICE ON THE WINGS, OR EXISTING WX CONDITIONS OR ALL OF THESE FACTORS. IN ANY EVENT, THESE CONDITIONS APPARENTLY INDUCED SEVERE VERTIGO. THIS PROB WAS EXACERBATED BY AN INABILITY OF THE F/O TO HELP ME CONTROL THE ACFT DURING THIS CONDITION OR TO EFFECTIVELY INDICATE THAT HE COULD AND WOULD TAKE CONTROL OF THE ACFT DURING THIS TIME. HIS ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE ACFT W/O TELLING ME HIS INTENTIONS MAY HAVE MADE MY EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE EFFECTS OF VERTIGO THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. I SUGGEST THAT ALL CREW TRNING INCLUDE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO CREW COORD IN THE EVENT THAT THE PF THE ACFT IS RECEIVING ERRONEOUS INSTRUMENT INDICATIONS, IS SUFFERING FROM VERTIGO OR HAS ANOTHER PROB WHICH CAN BE CORRECTED OR ASSISTED BY HIS CREWMAN. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT THE ACFT WAS CHKED FOR AND FOUND TO BE UNDAMAGED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANY PAX OR CREW MEMBERS. AT THE TIME OF THIS RPT, NOT ALL INFO HAS BEEN ACCUMULATED WITH RESPECT TO THIS INCIDENT, BUT I AM RPTING WHAT IS KNOWN TO ME AT THIS TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.