Narrative:

Temperature was 57 dgs with light rain and wet runway. Anti-ice was not on at takeoff roll until airborne and before going into the clouds. Runway 36L was selected because of aircraft weight. After gear retraction airplane started shuddering. We checked engine instruments, including vibration indicator. All indications appeared normal. The vibration appeared as if it was a nose wheel tire spinning down. This continued until flap retraction and also continued during acceleration to around 230 KTS, but stopped reaching 250 KTS. Still concerned with vibration, captain selected level change and selected 210 KTS on the autoplt to check for possible reappearance of previous vibration. None was felt. Engine anti-ice was on all the time with ignition switches on. Several temperature inversions were seen in the range of 6 degrees C, 8 degrees C, 10.5 degrees C, 11 degrees C and 3 degrees C. At higher altitude hardly any ice formed. Captain and I talked about vibration earlier and continued checking engine gauges. We passed rdu and around 40 NM nne of rdu a loud explosion occurred followed by severe aircraft vibration. Instruments were hard to read, so captain retarded both throttles after disconnecting autothrottles and autoplt. We noticed #1 engine oil quantity going down and oil pressure higher than normal. Suspecting #1 engine the bad engine captain increased power on the #2 engine. Slight vibration still occurred with #1 at idle, but #2 was running fine and developing normal readings. Captain instructed me to shut down #1 engine. Captain called for engine fire and severe damage checklist, descent and approach single engine checklist. After shutdown I started APU and captain opened the fuel xfeed. Captain declared an emergency and started turn back towards rdu. We squawked 7700. Captain told cabin attendant we lost an engine and were diverting to rdu and to prepare the cabin for emergency landing and that she had 15-20 mins to landing. Captain informed me he would fly manually to rdu and talk on radio as he had a boom microphone which he found was quicker and more convenient to use. No relight was considered as N1 was 0 RPM, N2 was 18%, and the high compressor was seized/damaged in some way. We did not have any engine fire warning indication, so did not pull the engine fire handle on engine shutdown. Later a passenger reported smoke out the back of engine #1 at the time of the loud explosion. We wanted to land as soon as possible and WX was approximately same at all 3 airports, so rdu was still first choice (closest) for landing. WX for rdu was 500 overcast, 1 1/2 mi visibility with light rain and winds out of the northeast, 41 degrees F. ILS to runway 05L was chosen based on longest runway length. We went through the checklist 2 more times as a precaution. F/a's were prepared for emergency landing. Heavy weight landing was performed 116600# (maximum landing weight was 114000#).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ENGINE FAILURE AT CRUISE ALT DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE.

Narrative: TEMP WAS 57 DGS WITH LIGHT RAIN AND WET RWY. ANTI-ICE WAS NOT ON AT TKOF ROLL UNTIL AIRBORNE AND BEFORE GOING INTO THE CLOUDS. RWY 36L WAS SELECTED BECAUSE OF ACFT WEIGHT. AFTER GEAR RETRACTION AIRPLANE STARTED SHUDDERING. WE CHKED ENG INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING VIBRATION INDICATOR. ALL INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL. THE VIBRATION APPEARED AS IF IT WAS A NOSE WHEEL TIRE SPINNING DOWN. THIS CONTINUED UNTIL FLAP RETRACTION AND ALSO CONTINUED DURING ACCELERATION TO AROUND 230 KTS, BUT STOPPED REACHING 250 KTS. STILL CONCERNED WITH VIBRATION, CAPT SELECTED LEVEL CHANGE AND SELECTED 210 KTS ON THE AUTOPLT TO CHK FOR POSSIBLE REAPPEARANCE OF PREVIOUS VIBRATION. NONE WAS FELT. ENG ANTI-ICE WAS ON ALL THE TIME WITH IGNITION SWITCHES ON. SEVERAL TEMP INVERSIONS WERE SEEN IN THE RANGE OF 6 DEGS C, 8 DEGS C, 10.5 DEGS C, 11 DEGS C AND 3 DEGS C. AT HIGHER ALT HARDLY ANY ICE FORMED. CAPT AND I TALKED ABOUT VIBRATION EARLIER AND CONTINUED CHKING ENG GAUGES. WE PASSED RDU AND AROUND 40 NM NNE OF RDU A LOUD EXPLOSION OCCURRED FOLLOWED BY SEVERE ACFT VIBRATION. INSTRUMENTS WERE HARD TO READ, SO CAPT RETARDED BOTH THROTTLES AFTER DISCONNECTING AUTOTHROTTLES AND AUTOPLT. WE NOTICED #1 ENG OIL QUANTITY GOING DOWN AND OIL PRESSURE HIGHER THAN NORMAL. SUSPECTING #1 ENG THE BAD ENG CAPT INCREASED PWR ON THE #2 ENG. SLIGHT VIBRATION STILL OCCURRED WITH #1 AT IDLE, BUT #2 WAS RUNNING FINE AND DEVELOPING NORMAL READINGS. CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO SHUT DOWN #1 ENG. CAPT CALLED FOR ENG FIRE AND SEVERE DAMAGE CHKLIST, DSCNT AND APCH SINGLE ENG CHKLIST. AFTER SHUTDOWN I STARTED APU AND CAPT OPENED THE FUEL XFEED. CAPT DECLARED AN EMER AND STARTED TURN BACK TOWARDS RDU. WE SQUAWKED 7700. CAPT TOLD CAB WE LOST AN ENG AND WERE DIVERTING TO RDU AND TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR EMER LNDG AND THAT SHE HAD 15-20 MINS TO LNDG. CAPT INFORMED ME HE WOULD FLY MANUALLY TO RDU AND TALK ON RADIO AS HE HAD A BOOM MIC WHICH HE FOUND WAS QUICKER AND MORE CONVENIENT TO USE. NO RELIGHT WAS CONSIDERED AS N1 WAS 0 RPM, N2 WAS 18%, AND THE HIGH COMPRESSOR WAS SEIZED/DAMAGED IN SOME WAY. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY ENG FIRE WARNING INDICATION, SO DID NOT PULL THE ENG FIRE HANDLE ON ENG SHUTDOWN. LATER A PAX RPTED SMOKE OUT THE BACK OF ENG #1 AT THE TIME OF THE LOUD EXPLOSION. WE WANTED TO LAND ASAP AND WX WAS APPROX SAME AT ALL 3 ARPTS, SO RDU WAS STILL FIRST CHOICE (CLOSEST) FOR LNDG. WX FOR RDU WAS 500 OVCST, 1 1/2 MI VISIBILITY WITH LIGHT RAIN AND WINDS OUT OF THE NE, 41 DEGS F. ILS TO RWY 05L WAS CHOSEN BASED ON LONGEST RWY LENGTH. WE WENT THROUGH THE CHKLIST 2 MORE TIMES AS A PRECAUTION. F/A'S WERE PREPARED FOR EMER LNDG. HVY WT LNDG WAS PERFORMED 116600# (MAX LNDG WT WAS 114000#).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.