Narrative:

This flight was to be the last of a week long assignment of flying; and incorporated a schedule revision which resulted in a shift from day into evening flying to night into day flying. This shift could have been a factor in our one procedural omission. After a deadhead in; followed by approximately two hours of wait time; the subject flight commenced. Upon initial arrival at the aircraft; weather was IFR; but deteriorated somewhat rapidly to low IFR upon pushback. I then suggested a takeoff alternate with this development; which we obtained. What followed was a very challenging duty period. Initial taxi out ultimately was a low RVR taxi; involving multiple sid/runway changes and high workload. The taxi out was exceptionally slow; with high vigilance for orientation; as well as other potential traffic. While we awaited sufficient takeoff minimums; a release revision for to fuel became necessary; followed by a required [60% 10 second] engine runup [ice]. Each was accomplished. Coordination was ongoing with dispatch and operations for numerous evolving matters. Ultimately; we returned to the ramp due to expired holdover time; and the concurrent need for fuel upload. Taxi back in was below to minimums; and took considerable time and care. Upon refueling; and a protracted de/anti ice process; weather improved to about 2 NM visibility; with no precipitation. The decision was made to return the fuel load to the original release fuel for various reasons.taxi out was much easier this time; with generally good visibility. We noticed a long line of aircraft waiting to takeoff; so we shut down one engine during taxi; to avert a release fuel issue re-emerging. Shortly before takeoff; we restarted the right engine utilizing crossbreed thrust from the left engine. At this point we were number one for takeoff; and given takeoff clearance. With the drastically improved weather; we failed to accomplish a second static runup prior to takeoff. In retrospect; I believe a component of this was the accomplishment of the second engine re-start right before takeoff; and the associated checklists thereafter....a seldom utilized practice. During the takeoff roll; and in the low speed regime; but near takeoff thrust; the left engine compressor stalled; requiring an aborted takeoff; and return to the ramp for maintenance action. We were subsequently told by maintenance that a valve or valves had coded as not sequencing properly; and that the engine had 'burped'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew describes a long morning which included deadheading into the trip two hours early; deicing; weather below minimums for takeoff; return to the gate for more fuel and more deicing; and ultimately a rejected takeoff due to a compressor stall.

Narrative: This flight was to be the last of a week long assignment of flying; and incorporated a schedule revision which resulted in a shift from day into evening flying to night into day flying. This shift could have been a factor in our one procedural omission. After a deadhead in; followed by approximately two hours of wait time; the subject flight commenced. Upon initial arrival at the aircraft; weather was IFR; but deteriorated somewhat rapidly to low IFR upon pushback. I then suggested a takeoff alternate with this development; which we obtained. What followed was a very challenging duty period. Initial taxi out ultimately was a low RVR taxi; involving multiple Sid/runway changes and high workload. The taxi out was exceptionally slow; with high vigilance for orientation; as well as other potential traffic. While we awaited sufficient takeoff minimums; a release revision for TO fuel became necessary; followed by a required [60% 10 second] engine runup [ice]. Each was accomplished. Coordination was ongoing with Dispatch and Operations for numerous evolving matters. Ultimately; we returned to the ramp due to expired holdover time; and the concurrent need for fuel upload. Taxi back in was below TO minimums; and took considerable time and care. Upon refueling; and a protracted de/anti ice process; weather improved to about 2 NM visibility; with no precipitation. The decision was made to return the fuel load to the original release fuel for various reasons.Taxi out was much easier this time; with generally good visibility. We noticed a long line of aircraft waiting to takeoff; so we shut down one engine during taxi; to avert a release fuel issue re-emerging. Shortly before takeoff; we restarted the right engine utilizing crossbreed thrust from the left engine. At this point we were number one for takeoff; and given takeoff clearance. With the drastically improved weather; we failed to accomplish a second static runup prior to takeoff. In retrospect; I believe a component of this was the accomplishment of the second engine re-start right before takeoff; and the associated checklists thereafter....a seldom utilized practice. During the takeoff roll; and in the low speed regime; but near takeoff thrust; the left engine compressor stalled; requiring an aborted takeoff; and return to the ramp for maintenance action. We were subsequently told by Maintenance that a valve or valves had coded as not sequencing properly; and that the engine had 'burped'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.