Narrative:

This was the first leg of the first day of a three-day trip. Although I knew the first officer; this was the first time we flew together. We pushed back and started engines and completed the before taxi check. The first officer called for taxi and ground control gave us our instructions as; 'taxi runway 31C via taxiway tango; echo; cross 31R; hold short of 31C use left lane out.' my first officer read the clearance back then I repeated the clearance to my first officer. Then; my first officer rogered my read back to him and I said; 'clear left.' my first officer said; 'clear right;' and I started up my taxi line; the same taxi line the push back crew left us on. The next part is unclear and I would like to hear the tapes; but I think the ground controller and another company jet stepped on each other. We hear part of our call sign and I stopped the aircraft. That is when we heard this from the ground controller; 'since your company did not do what I asked him to; hold your position and pass behind company to your gate.' my first officer and I looked at each other and realized that he wanted us out of the alley on the opposite lane. There was no confusion on our part during the initial taxi clearance. My first officer did not try to convince me nor did I try to convince him; we heard it wrong. We were under the impression based on the way the ground controller handed out the clearance that we were to join T cross 31R use the far left lane at the junction and hold short of 31C; plain and simple; an uncomplicated clearance. As I remember it; there were just two company jets moving on the field. No lineup for departure; deicing; or ramp congestion. It was a slow afternoon. We did not see or hear the other company jet during our pushback or engine start. This is probably because I was coordinating with the push back crew and monitoring the engine start while my first officer was starting the engines.I can think of at least five better ways to communicate the ground controller's instructions:1. 'Use left lane out of the alley; taxi runway 31C via taxiway tango; echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C.'2 'use left lane out of the alley. Company inbound to gate X; taxi runway 31C via taxiway tango; echo; cross 31R; and hold short of 31C.'3. Company inbound to gate X use left lane out of the alley; taxi runway 31C via taxiway tango; echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C.4. 'Company flight number; taxi runway 31C via taxiway tango; echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C; use left lane out of the alley.'5. Taxi runway 31C via taxiway tango; echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C; use left lane out of the alley. Company inbound to gate X.'now; it was obvious to us that once we saw the company jet; we had misunderstood the ground controller's instructions. Instead of letting his pride and ego get in the way and making the unprofessional radio call that he made; the ground controller could have handled the situation much differently and much more professionally. I can think of at least four ways to communicate the correction; but the controller chose to use a demeaning and unprofessional radio call to publicly berate us; the crew. Listen to the tape and you will hear what we heard; an immature; unprofessional radio transmission. A radio call that he cannot get back; one that now put the first officer and I in the very bad position of second guessing and conjecture. This is not the position I want to be in just minutes from takeoff roll with 137 people onboard. Try as we could to put the immature radio call behind us (compartmentalize); I still think about how unprofessional it was even as I write this almost 24 hours later. There has been a lot of negative information published recently about pilots using poor ATC communication and technique. I suggest the FAA look into its own technique and clean it up! The last thing this captain wants to do is have an accident. I am no cowboy; I am not in a hurry; and I listen carefully to all instruction given to me by ATC and if clarification is needed I ask for it. Do I make mistakes? Sure I do but I handle them professionally. I am not sure what this ground controller thought we were doing but it was clear from his immature; unprofessional radio call he thought we were not doing our job. I suggest he ride along with me so he can see what goes on in a complex air transport class aircraft during push back and engine start with two radios; two intercoms; and a PA. This ATC ground controller has one field he is master of; I have 65 fields I have to be master of and I do not appreciate his lack of professionalism to me! That is over 65 ground control; tower and approach/departure controllers each with their own take on how things should run at their airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The anatomy of a communications breakdown in interpreting a taxi clearance from ATC by an air carrier flight crew.

Narrative: This was the first leg of the first day of a three-day trip. Although I knew the First Officer; this was the first time we flew together. We pushed back and started engines and completed the Before Taxi Check. The First Officer called for taxi and Ground Control gave us our instructions as; 'taxi Runway 31C via Taxiway Tango; Echo; cross 31R; hold short of 31C use left lane out.' My First Officer read the clearance back then I repeated the clearance to my First Officer. Then; my First Officer rogered my read back to him and I said; 'clear left.' My First Officer said; 'clear right;' and I started up my taxi line; the same taxi line the push back crew left us on. The next part is unclear and I would like to hear the tapes; but I think the Ground Controller and another Company jet stepped on each other. We hear part of our call sign and I stopped the aircraft. That is when we heard this from the Ground Controller; 'since your Company did not do what I asked him to; hold your position and pass behind company to your gate.' My First Officer and I looked at each other and realized that he wanted us out of the alley on the opposite lane. There was no confusion on our part during the initial taxi clearance. My First Officer did not try to convince me nor did I try to convince him; we heard it wrong. We were under the impression based on the way the Ground Controller handed out the clearance that we were to join T cross 31R use the far left lane at the junction and hold short of 31C; plain and simple; an uncomplicated clearance. As I remember it; there were just two Company jets moving on the field. No lineup for departure; deicing; or ramp congestion. It was a slow afternoon. We did not see or hear the other Company jet during our pushback or engine start. This is probably because I was coordinating with the push back crew and monitoring the engine start while my First Officer was starting the engines.I can think of at least five better ways to communicate the Ground Controller's instructions:1. 'Use left lane out of the alley; taxi Runway 31C via Taxiway Tango; Echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C.'2 'Use left lane out of the alley. Company inbound to gate X; taxi Runway 31C via Taxiway Tango; Echo; cross 31R; and hold short of 31C.'3. Company inbound to gate X use left lane out of the alley; taxi Runway 31C via Taxiway Tango; Echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C.4. 'Company Flight Number; taxi Runway 31C via Taxiway Tango; Echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C; use left lane out of the alley.'5. Taxi Runway 31C via Taxiway Tango; Echo; cross 31R hold short of 31C; use left lane out of the alley. Company inbound to gate X.'Now; it was obvious to us that once we saw the Company jet; we had misunderstood the Ground Controller's instructions. Instead of letting his pride and ego get in the way and making the unprofessional radio call that he made; the Ground Controller could have handled the situation much differently and much more professionally. I can think of at least four ways to communicate the correction; but the Controller chose to use a demeaning and unprofessional radio call to publicly berate us; the crew. Listen to the tape and you will hear what we heard; an immature; unprofessional radio transmission. A radio call that he cannot get back; one that now put the First Officer and I in the very bad position of second guessing and conjecture. This is not the position I want to be in just minutes from takeoff roll with 137 people onboard. Try as we could to put the immature radio call behind us (compartmentalize); I still think about how unprofessional it was even as I write this almost 24 hours later. There has been a lot of negative information published recently about pilots using poor ATC communication and technique. I suggest the FAA look into its own technique and clean it up! The last thing this Captain wants to do is have an accident. I am no cowboy; I am not in a hurry; and I listen carefully to all instruction given to me by ATC and if clarification is needed I ask for it. Do I make mistakes? Sure I do but I handle them professionally. I am not sure what this Ground Controller thought we were doing but it was clear from his immature; unprofessional radio call he thought we were not doing our job. I suggest he ride along with me so he can see what goes on in a complex air transport class aircraft during push back and engine start with two radios; two intercoms; and a PA. This ATC Ground Controller has one field he is master of; I have 65 fields I have to be master of and I do not appreciate his lack of professionalism to me! That is over 65 Ground Control; Tower and Approach/Departure Controllers each with their own take on how things should run at their airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.