Narrative:

West operation in atl. Special movement activities adding an element of non-standard procedures around the room as an added distraction. Reduced supervisory coverage in the room also adding additional problems. Air carrier X departed runway 26L atl on the dawgs RNAV departure. Air carrier Y departed runway 27R on nuggt RNAV departure. These departures intersect at mpass. Appropriate lateral separation must be applied. In this case it was not. As with prior events; these departures converge after the 27R departure passes cpark. I believe it was an operational error by atl tower since both aircraft had been radar identified; and visual separation was not being properly applied. I was working dr-south at the time with very light traffic. Air carrier Y didn't call dr-north until approximately cpark waypoint. The controller on dr-north immediately assigned a heading to the air carrier Y to apply some type of separation and applied visual separation between the aircraft. This isn't a new problem. It is my opinion that the tower has a problem of 'one hand not knowing what the other is doing' in regards to this (the north and south side tower positions don't directly coordinate); and that there is little if any understanding of how the RNAV departure procedures work more than 2 miles off the departure end on the runway; so 'out of sight; out of mind' applies in this error. . 1- also; it is my understanding that the controllers working the departure runways have no access to radar displays in the tower. There is one display for two positions; and typically the arrival side of the airport 'trumps' the wants and needs on the departure side of the airport. This problem must be addressed by atl tower natca and management. 2- evidently the last time two aircraft got too close; the training the tower received wasn't good enough. I again state my request that an actual A80 controller (not a staff specialist that isn't proficient in the operation) provide a briefing to all personnel at atl tower on what happens on the departure side of the airport. While these two aircraft weren't in a position to collide; it proves that dumb luck saved the day again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A80 Controller described a conflict event involving two Air Carrier departures off Runways 27L/R; the reporter cites concerns regarding the lack of coordination within the Tower.

Narrative: West operation in ATL. Special movement activities adding an element of non-standard procedures around the room as an added distraction. Reduced supervisory coverage in the room also adding additional problems. Air Carrier X departed Runway 26L ATL on the DAWGS RNAV departure. Air Carrier Y departed Runway 27R on NUGGT RNAV departure. These departures intersect at MPASS. Appropriate lateral separation must be applied. In this case it was not. As with prior events; these departures converge after the 27R departure passes CPARK. I believe it was an operational error by ATL Tower since both aircraft had been RADAR identified; and visual separation was not being properly applied. I was working DR-S at the time with very light traffic. Air Carrier Y didn't call DR-N until approximately CPARK waypoint. The Controller on DR-N immediately assigned a heading to the Air Carrier Y to apply some type of separation and applied visual separation between the aircraft. This isn't a new problem. It is my opinion that the Tower has a problem of 'one hand not knowing what the other is doing' in regards to this (the north and south side tower positions don't directly coordinate); and that there is little if any understanding of how the RNAV departure procedures work more than 2 miles off the departure end on the runway; so 'out of sight; out of mind' applies in this error. . 1- Also; it is my understanding that the controllers working the departure runways have no access to RADAR displays in the Tower. There is one display for two positions; and typically the arrival side of the airport 'trumps' the wants and needs on the departure side of the airport. This problem must be addressed by ATL Tower NATCA and Management. 2- Evidently the last time two aircraft got too close; the training the Tower received wasn't good enough. I again state my request that an actual A80 Controller (NOT a staff specialist that isn't proficient in the operation) provide a briefing to ALL PERSONNEL at ATL Tower on what happens on the departure side of the airport. While these two aircraft weren't in a position to collide; it proves that dumb luck saved the day again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.