Narrative:

Requested type I and iv deice using standard phraseology. In compliance with deice local procedures and acknowledgement from ice man we deiced with engines off; APU running pushed back from gate. I stressed the importance of avoiding the APU inlet area. Ice man acknowledged. Upon completion ice man reported we were clear of all contaminants and they used extra type iv due to the precipitation level. Ice man reported full body type I; tactile check complete and applied full body type iv. We observed a heavy application of type iv on the nose and radome of the aircraft. I thought wings and tail only for type iv but in a recent company email; statements were made that deice is properly trained and compliance is mandatory as long as we use proper phraseology; which we used; and we accepted the deice and departed. Shortly after takeoff we observed the odor and subsequent 'smoke' from excessive deice fluid from the vents in the cockpit. This odor quickly disappeared and we continued flight. It was my opinion that the 'full body' type iv sheared off the fuselage on takeoff and entered the APU inlet and we were safe to continue. Approximately 40 minutes into flight received an EFIS comp mon caution message with an associated IAS flag on both airspeed indicators. Airspeed indicated a deviation of 10 to 12 KTS with the right indicating within 5 KTS of the standby. We complied with QRH; and reviewed the procedure for the loss of an air data computer; message disappeared after several minutes. Message reappeared after a short period of time with a subsequent deviation of airspeed. We complied with QRH again. Left airspeed dropped to 160 KTS at an aircraft speed of 300; gear horn sounded; we transferred control of the aircraft to the first officer and complied with an air data computer 1 fail QRH. Received a 'mach trim' caution; 'ob ground spoiler' caution; 'spoileron' status; 'flight spoiler' status messages; 'GPWS fail' status as well as a master caution light that we were unable to extinguish. All of this occurred at TOD at FL250. We were receiving ATIS; in range; landing data while attempting to inform dispatch and get assistance from maintenance. We were also concerned with landing fuel; at that time landing fuel indicated 1;900 pounds. Also; at the TOD we once again sensed an odor and subsequent light smoke of type iv in the ventilation system. During the process of receiving and prioritizing these multiple failures; reading and complying with multiple QRH procedures; attempting to accept an irritating flashing caution light in my face; and smelling smoky deice fluid and knowing my time is running out on fuel; I misread the mach trim QRH and missed the 'end' statement at the bottom of the page. There was no flow to follow if the mach trim did not engage; which it did not and I unknowingly followed to the fine print of the following page which started with 'mach trim'. I unknowingly followed the QRH for another item which led me to landing at flaps 20. I contacted dispatch for landing performance for flaps 20 and dispatch replied with 3;300 ft with no explanation; which made no sense to us; but we were running out of fuel. We ran the numbers for the long runway; had declared the emergency; were receiving help and vectors from approach. I wanted to run the QRH one more time for the resulting flap 20 landing decision but fuel remaining was a huge concern to me. We felt we needed fuel for a go around and potential further contingencies. We decided it was best to land the aircraft. After discussion with maintenance control they informed me that mach trim disengages with air data computer fail QRH; but also the mach trim did not re-engage. They stated the QRH should state that; and he has passed that upstairs because it has trapped pilots numerous times but nothing has been done about it because 'all the pilots know about it'. This was the first time in 9 years that I touched the dusty mach transducers. They also informed me that maintenance found the pitot static system wasfilled with deice fluid.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 flight crew experiences an apparent ADC #1 failure in flight and associated secondary failures. An error is made using the QRH procedure and this along with paltry information; low fuel; and poor communication with Maintenance Control cause much apprehension in the crew. Maintenance discovers that deice fluid in the pitot system caused the ADC to malfunction.

Narrative: Requested Type I and IV deice using STANDARD phraseology. In compliance with deice local procedures and acknowledgement from Ice Man we deiced with engines off; APU running pushed back from gate. I stressed the importance of avoiding the APU inlet area. Ice Man acknowledged. Upon completion Ice Man reported we were clear of all contaminants and they used extra Type IV due to the precipitation level. Ice Man reported Full Body Type I; tactile check complete and applied Full Body Type IV. We observed a heavy application of Type IV on the nose and radome of the aircraft. I thought wings and tail only for Type IV but in a recent Company email; statements were made that Deice is properly trained and compliance is mandatory as long as we use proper phraseology; which we used; and we accepted the Deice and departed. Shortly after takeoff we observed the odor and subsequent 'smoke' from excessive deice fluid from the vents in the cockpit. This odor quickly disappeared and we continued flight. It was my opinion that the 'Full Body' Type IV sheared off the fuselage on takeoff and entered the APU inlet and we were safe to continue. Approximately 40 minutes into flight received an EFIS COMP MON Caution message with an associated IAS flag on both airspeed indicators. Airspeed indicated a deviation of 10 to 12 KTS with the right indicating within 5 KTS of the standby. We complied with QRH; and reviewed the procedure for the loss of an ADC; message disappeared after several minutes. Message reappeared after a short period of time with a subsequent deviation of airspeed. We complied with QRH again. Left airspeed dropped to 160 KTS at an aircraft speed of 300; gear horn sounded; we transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer and complied with an ADC 1 fail QRH. Received a 'MACH TRIM' Caution; 'OB GROUND SPOILER' Caution; 'SPOILERON' Status; 'FLIGHT SPOILER' Status messages; 'GPWS FAIL' Status as well as a Master Caution light that we were unable to extinguish. All of this occurred at TOD at FL250. We were receiving ATIS; In range; landing data while attempting to inform Dispatch and get assistance from Maintenance. We were also concerned with landing fuel; at that time landing fuel indicated 1;900 LBS. Also; at the TOD we once again sensed an odor and subsequent light smoke of Type IV in the ventilation system. During the process of receiving and prioritizing these multiple failures; reading and complying with multiple QRH procedures; attempting to accept an irritating flashing Caution light in my face; and smelling smoky deice fluid and knowing my time is running out on fuel; I misread the MACH TRIM QRH and missed the 'END' statement at the bottom of the page. There was no flow to follow if the Mach Trim did not engage; which it did not and I unknowingly followed to the fine print of the following page which started with 'Mach Trim'. I unknowingly followed the QRH for another item which led me to landing at flaps 20. I contacted Dispatch for landing performance for flaps 20 and Dispatch replied with 3;300 FT with no explanation; which made no sense to us; but we were running out of fuel. We ran the numbers for the long runway; had declared the emergency; were receiving help and vectors from Approach. I wanted to run the QRH one more time for the resulting flap 20 landing decision but fuel remaining was a huge concern to me. We felt we needed fuel for a go around and potential further contingencies. We decided it was best to land the aircraft. After discussion with Maintenance Control they informed me that MACH Trim disengages with ADC Fail QRH; but also the Mach Trim did not re-engage. They stated the QRH should state that; and he has passed that upstairs because it has trapped pilots numerous times but nothing has been done about it because 'All the pilots know about it'. This was the first time in 9 years that I touched the dusty Mach Transducers. They also informed me that Maintenance found the Pitot Static System wasfilled with deice fluid.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.