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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1069240 |
Time | |
Date | 201302 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ORD.Airport |
State Reference | IL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Aeroplane Flight Control |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250 Flight Crew Total 18000 Flight Crew Type 5000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Maintenance |
Narrative:
The flight control check (elevator) failed during the after start checklist and we returned to the gate where maintenance signed off the discrepancy as 'could not duplicate; ok to continue (paraphrased).' [during the subsequent] descent to we got a 'rudder ratio' EICAS message. After completing the QRH and MEL items we continued. During approach; when configuring from flaps 20 to 30 (all limit speeds were complied with) we experienced continuous airframe buffeting (not wind related). Other than the buffeting the aircraft and controls were all stable so the approach was continued to an uneventful landing. In the process of correcting this anomaly; I coordinated with both the duty flight manager and maintenance control. The duty flight manager that ultimately worked the problem with me had coincidentally been on my flight that day and had witnessed both discrepancies. Throughout the process he was the only stabilizing factor. I felt threatened and pressured; however; by calls from maintenance control and the domicile chief pilot's office. Maintenance control said that they did not know for certain what was causing the problem; but that they would deactivate a system and I could evaluate it on our return flight; essentially a test flight with passengers on board. When I refused he stated in a more tense tone that; 'our business is to move planes and people.' an assistant chief pilot called and accused me of making PA's that bad mouthed the company. That call devolved into a lecture about how I should not get sucked into the failed philosophies of a bankrupt airline where a [captain had the authority to] refuse an aircraft.although I felt threatened and pressured to fly an aircraft that I was not certain to be airworthy ('we don't know' is not an acceptable answer to an airworthiness question) I refused the aircraft until our duty day expired and the flight ultimately cancelled.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: After experiencing three distinct flight control issues on the previous flight; none of which were diagnosed or resolved by Maintenance; the Captain of a B767 refused to fly the subsequent flight despite pressure from Maintenance and Flight Operations managers to do so.
Narrative: The flight control check (elevator) failed during the After Start Checklist and we returned to the gate where Maintenance signed off the discrepancy as 'Could Not Duplicate; OK to continue (paraphrased).' [During the subsequent] descent to we got a 'RUDDER RATIO' EICAS message. After completing the QRH and MEL items we continued. During approach; when configuring from flaps 20 to 30 (all limit speeds were complied with) we experienced continuous airframe buffeting (not wind related). Other than the buffeting the aircraft and controls were all stable so the approach was continued to an uneventful landing. In the process of correcting this anomaly; I coordinated with both the Duty Flight Manager and Maintenance Control. The Duty Flight Manager that ultimately worked the problem with me had coincidentally been on my flight that day and had witnessed both discrepancies. Throughout the process he was the only stabilizing factor. I felt threatened and pressured; however; by calls from Maintenance Control and the domicile Chief Pilot's Office. Maintenance Control said that they did not know for certain what was causing the problem; but that they would deactivate a system and I could evaluate it on our return flight; essentially a test flight with passengers on board. When I refused he stated in a more tense tone that; 'Our business is to move planes and people.' An Assistant Chief Pilot called and accused me of making PA's that bad mouthed the company. That call devolved into a lecture about how I should not get sucked into the failed philosophies of a bankrupt airline where a [Captain had the authority to] refuse an aircraft.Although I felt threatened and pressured to fly an aircraft that I was not certain to be airworthy ('we don't know' is not an acceptable answer to an airworthiness question) I refused the aircraft until our duty day expired and the flight ultimately cancelled.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.