37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1069843 |
Time | |
Date | 201302 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Speed All Types Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
The event began during the takeoff roll. The captain was the pilot flying and advanced the thrust levers normally. As the aircraft began accelerating; his charts binder became unstable [in its] bracket and began to fall rearward due to accelerating forces. While trying to handle the control yoke; thrust levers and generally control the aircraft during the takeoff; he attempted to catch the binder and place it back on the bracket. During this time we accelerated through 80 knots and shortly thereafter through rotation speed. The captain did rotate after the 'V1; rotate' call; but his binder was still not settled. We were assigned [a] departure...and made the initial turn to a heading of 039 and then 060 passing 500 feet. Still trying to get the binder back on the bracket; the captain engaged the autopilot with LNAV. Now past the 500 foot; 060 heading turn; the next instruction is to turn left heading 290 reaching 4 DME.... With the LNAV engaged; the aircraft began correcting to the right. At the same time ATC gave us a left turn to heading 220 as the captain was still trying to right his book and operate the autopilot. Throughout the ordeal the captain had become increasingly agitated. I had a hard time understanding the heading assigned by ATC due to the captain's struggle and initially read back 020; but promptly corrected to heading 220 by confirming with ATC. At that point; ATC requested we keep the turn tight to the left. Having received that instruction the captain grabbed his binder and forcefully threw it behind him; then grabbed the yoke and rapidly rolled the aircraft to the left; pulling back on the yoke and for a second to a second and a half; the stick shaker activated. The captain quickly recovered and shallowed out his initial corrections. The remainder of the flight was uneventful....I have had similar incidents happen to me on takeoff; whether it's the checklist or my binder falling; I let it go because flying the aircraft is my first priority as the pilot flying. The pm should have the same information out and available if I need to ask anything or correct me if need be. There are two of us for a reason and that is to back each other up. If the captain had just let his binder go or maybe even transferred controls for a moment if so distracted; I doubt any of this would have happened. The captain failed to prioritize his workload during this event. Here again we see how something small can be the beginning of a chain that leads to an undesired aircraft state.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An EMB-145 First Officer reported that the Captain; distracted by a publication binder that came loose from its bracket on takeoff; became agitated and over controlled the aircraft on the departure resulting a momentary stick shaker.
Narrative: The event began during the takeoff roll. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and advanced the thrust levers normally. As the aircraft began accelerating; his charts binder became unstable [in its] bracket and began to fall rearward due to accelerating forces. While trying to handle the control yoke; thrust levers and generally control the aircraft during the takeoff; he attempted to catch the binder and place it back on the bracket. During this time we accelerated through 80 knots and shortly thereafter through rotation speed. The Captain did rotate after the 'V1; Rotate' call; but his binder was still not settled. We were assigned [a] departure...and made the initial turn to a heading of 039 and then 060 passing 500 feet. Still trying to get the binder back on the bracket; the Captain engaged the autopilot with LNAV. Now past the 500 foot; 060 heading turn; the next instruction is to turn left heading 290 reaching 4 DME.... With the LNAV engaged; the aircraft began correcting to the right. At the same time ATC gave us a left turn to heading 220 as the Captain was still trying to right his book and operate the autopilot. Throughout the ordeal the Captain had become increasingly agitated. I had a hard time understanding the heading assigned by ATC due to the Captain's struggle and initially read back 020; but promptly corrected to heading 220 by confirming with ATC. At that point; ATC requested we keep the turn tight to the left. Having received that instruction the Captain grabbed his binder and forcefully threw it behind him; then grabbed the yoke and rapidly rolled the aircraft to the left; pulling back on the yoke and for a second to a second and a half; the stick shaker activated. The Captain quickly recovered and shallowed out his initial corrections. The remainder of the flight was uneventful....I have had similar incidents happen to me on takeoff; whether it's the checklist or my binder falling; I let it go because flying the aircraft is my first priority as the pilot flying. The PM should have the same information out and available if I need to ask anything or correct me if need be. There are two of us for a reason and that is to back each other up. If the Captain had just let his binder go or maybe even transferred controls for a moment if so distracted; I doubt any of this would have happened. The Captain failed to prioritize his workload during this event. Here again we see how something small can be the beginning of a chain that leads to an undesired aircraft state.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.