Narrative:

We were descending on the arrival into farmingdale. The weather at destination was 1/4 mile in fog which lowered to 1/8 in fog. Kennedy weather and islip weather were low as well. ATC began holding all traffic on the arrival. We were given holding instructions at one of the fixes with an efc of about 30 minutes; we were above 10;000 ft established in the hold and I was discussing the weather with the passenger; as well as options. While we were discussing his options ATC issued us a descent. I was still trying to formulate a plan and ATC seemed to be pushing us forward with no place to go. We had been asking ATC about weather at jfk in case we needed to divert. Previously there was confusion on ATC's part as a couple of controllers had issued us runway assignments for jfk. We had cleared it up and they knew we were going to frg. I had been off radio as I was talking to the passenger therefore my first officer informed me they were vectoring us for jfk and I queried as to our destination. He said we were going to jfk then vectors for the approach into farmingdale. I asked if the weather had improved and he stated it had lowered to 1/8 of a mile. We were descending throughout and ended up at 3;000 ft. We had previously asked ATC how the weather was at jfk in case we needed to divert and they were now concerned if we were diverting or not. Sometime during the descent between checking weather at frg; checking weather at isp (our alternate) checking weather at jfk; numerous frequency changes and instructions from ATC; coupled with the fact that the frequency was very congested and the rapid fire mannerisms of new york ATC; my first officer had inadvertently flipped the radio from primary to secondary and we were on new york center frequency instead of new york approach. Once we had our diversion squared away; my first officer was able to talk on the radio and we discovered we were off frequency. We quickly changed channels and were back with new york approach. They stated they had been trying to reach us for several minutes and were giving them quite the headache. We were given a phone number to call and the rest of the flight was uneventful. We called the manager after the fact and relayed these events to him which seemed to satisfy him. He admonished us to be more careful. The event was detected when the crew was able to square away the cockpit and take inventory of our situation. My first officer was able to talk on the radio and that's when we figured out we were on the wrong frequency. This problem was caused by task saturation/overload due to low ceilings and visibility which necessitated a last minute diversion. It was compounded by an overloaded approach controller who 'pushed' us forward before we had a plan to deal with the weather. I was going to use the holding time to figure out a plan; but we got pushed out of holding before one could be formulated. Once we were on our way to a below minimums airport we were behind the eight ball trying to figure out a plan. We tried to get ATC to give us a hold to figure it out and their reply was 'I have no place to hold you; go to jfk or divert somewhere else' (language not 100% correct). It was then we decided to continue to jfk. After the event we continued as normal making sure not miss an instruction or radio call. I think to prevent this occurrence in the future we should stay in the hold until we were sure of our plans. The numerous frequency changes to obtain weather at 3 different airports meant we should have paid more attention to the radio buttons we were pushing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL300 Captain reports being issued holding instructions by N90 during descent for FRG with weather below minimums at both FRG and the nearby alternate. The flight is cleared out of holding before a decision is made on where to go and an inadvertent frequency change resulted in much confusion. Flight eventually lands safely at JFK.

Narrative: We were descending on the arrival into Farmingdale. The weather at destination was 1/4 mile in fog which lowered to 1/8 in fog. Kennedy weather and Islip weather were low as well. ATC began holding all traffic on the arrival. We were given holding instructions at one OF the fixes with an EFC of about 30 minutes; we were above 10;000 FT established in the hold and I was discussing the weather with the passenger; as well as options. While we were discussing his options ATC issued us a descent. I was still trying to formulate a plan and ATC seemed to be pushing us forward with no place to go. We had been asking ATC about weather at JFK in case we needed to divert. Previously there was confusion on ATC's part as a couple of controllers had issued us runway assignments for JFK. We had cleared it up and they knew we were going to FRG. I had been off radio as I was talking to the passenger therefore my First Officer informed me they were vectoring us for JFK and I queried as to our destination. He said we were going to JFK then vectors for the approach into Farmingdale. I asked if the weather had improved and he stated it had lowered to 1/8 of a mile. We were descending throughout and ended up at 3;000 FT. We had previously asked ATC how the weather was at JFK in case we needed to divert and they were now concerned if we were diverting or not. Sometime during the descent between checking weather at FRG; checking weather at ISP (our alternate) checking weather at JFK; numerous frequency changes and instructions from ATC; coupled with the fact that the frequency was very congested and the rapid fire mannerisms of New York ATC; my First Officer had inadvertently flipped the radio from primary to secondary and we were on New York Center frequency instead of New York Approach. Once we had our diversion squared away; my First Officer was able to talk on the radio and we discovered we were off frequency. We quickly changed channels and were back with New York Approach. They stated they had been trying to reach us for several minutes and were giving them quite the headache. We were given a phone number to call and the rest of the flight was uneventful. We called the manager after the fact and relayed these events to him which seemed to satisfy him. He admonished us to be more careful. The event was detected when the crew was able to square away the cockpit and take inventory of our situation. My First Officer was able to talk on the radio and that's when we figured out we were on the wrong frequency. This problem was caused by task saturation/overload due to low ceilings and visibility which necessitated a last minute diversion. It was compounded by an overloaded Approach Controller who 'pushed' us forward before we had a plan to deal with the weather. I was going to use the holding time to figure out a plan; but we got pushed out of holding before one could be formulated. Once we were on our way to a below minimums airport we were behind the eight ball trying to figure out a plan. We tried to get ATC to give us a hold to figure it out and their reply was 'I have no place to hold you; go to JFK or divert somewhere else' (language not 100% correct). It was then we decided to continue to JFK. After the event we continued as normal making sure not miss an instruction or radio call. I think to prevent this occurrence in the future we should stay in the hold until we were sure of our plans. The numerous frequency changes to obtain weather at 3 different airports meant we should have paid more attention to the radio buttons we were pushing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.