Narrative:

In cruise at FL300; mach .82 on a westerly random route over the north atlantic the aircraft suddenly lost all pressure and most of the fluid in the number 1 hydraulic system. [We] complied with the QRH procedures for the level 1 situation. [We] initiated immediate contact and coordination with maintenance control and dispatcher over ACARS. Planned emergency diversion options if any further degradation of hydraulic systems occurred. [We] changed alternate to [another airport] due to better weather; better familiarity and longer runways. Maintenance control and dispatcher provided excellent assistance from time of occurrence through an uneventful landing at destination. All agencies and personnel necessary for our safe recovery were proactively briefed and prepared for our arrival by our dispatcher. (Weather at our arrival was a 500 to 1;000 ft ceiling with visibility at 2-3 NM; light to moderate blowing snow with about a 10-15 KT left quartering headwind. Further plans were set to have us clear the runway with a right turn onto the hi-speed taxiway (if able) and secure the aircraft for tow by maintenance from that point. Rest of flight from point of occurrence to arrival was uneventful. Arrival and approach plans and procedures were briefed by first officer and thoroughly discussed by crew. RNAV was flown with a change by center to require crossing a fix at 10;000 ft and 250 KTS instead of the RNAV's charted range of 10;000 to 16;000 and a 290 KT or less speed restriction. With the tailwind in descent and the late communication by center of this much more restrictive requirement; we had to make the descent from FL340 to 10;000 with full speed brakes deployed during the entire arrival. Center needs to communicate these restrictive changes to the RNAV much earlier in the arrival process. On initial contact with approach an emergency was declared with the appropriate fuel/persons on board information and direction to controller for priority/handling to an extended final ILS. APU was peremptorily started on the downwind leg to prepare aircraft for tow-in after landing and to remove that issue as a possible distraction in the after landing process. On extended final; slats were extended with careful observation of the hydraulic systems and the brake pressure systems. Flaps and slats were a little slow to fully deploy until our airspeed slowed to 180 KTS though pressures in the two good hydraulic systems indicated normal thru-out the landing phase. A normal flaps 35 approach and landing was smoothly executed by the first officer with continuous monitoring of the hydraulic systems and brake systems by the captain and relief pilot. Aoa speed cue monitored by captain in HUD. Runway visually acquired at about 3 NM with light blowing snow. The number 2 thrust reverser was deferred which hampered somewhat our deceleration; but aircraft was slowed to less than 15 KTS with 3;000 ft remaining. Runway appeared reflectively wet; but no snow accumulation noted. During landing roll number 1 brake pressure dropped initially and then recovered after we slowed. Cleared runway and set parking brake. [We were] advised by emergency personnel that hydraulic fluid was pooling under the number 1 engine. Airport safety vehicle escorted maintenance and tug to aircraft. Maintenance pinned gear with the spare gear pins (handed to them thru first officer window). After tug was confirmed secured to aircraft all engines were shutdown. Tow to gate was uneventful (still blocked in early)!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD11 Captain experiences a number one hydraulic system failure over the North Atlantic. After coordination with Dispatch and Maintenance Control flight continues to destination for an uneventful landing with a tow to the gate.

Narrative: In cruise at FL300; Mach .82 on a westerly random route over the North Atlantic the aircraft suddenly lost all pressure and most of the fluid in the Number 1 Hydraulic System. [We] complied with the QRH procedures for the Level 1 situation. [We] initiated immediate contact and coordination with Maintenance Control and Dispatcher over ACARS. Planned emergency diversion options if any further degradation of hydraulic systems occurred. [We] changed alternate to [another airport] due to better weather; better familiarity and longer runways. Maintenance Control and Dispatcher provided excellent assistance from time of occurrence through an uneventful landing at destination. All agencies and personnel necessary for our safe recovery were proactively briefed and prepared for our arrival by our Dispatcher. (Weather at our arrival was a 500 to 1;000 FT ceiling with visibility at 2-3 NM; light to moderate blowing snow with about a 10-15 KT left quartering headwind. Further plans were set to have us clear the runway with a right turn onto the hi-speed taxiway (if able) and secure the aircraft for tow by Maintenance from that point. Rest of flight from point of occurrence to arrival was uneventful. Arrival and approach plans and procedures were briefed by First Officer and thoroughly discussed by crew. RNAV was flown with a change by Center to require crossing a fix at 10;000 FT and 250 KTS instead of the RNAV's charted range of 10;000 to 16;000 and a 290 KT or less speed restriction. With the tailwind in descent and the late communication by Center of this much more restrictive requirement; we had to make the descent from FL340 to 10;000 with full speed brakes deployed during the entire arrival. Center needs to communicate these restrictive changes to the RNAV much earlier in the arrival process. On initial contact with Approach an emergency was declared with the appropriate fuel/persons on board information and direction to Controller for priority/handling to an extended final ILS. APU was peremptorily started on the downwind leg to prepare aircraft for tow-in after landing and to remove that issue as a possible distraction in the after landing process. On extended final; slats were extended with careful observation of the hydraulic systems and the brake pressure systems. Flaps and slats were a little slow to fully deploy until our airspeed slowed to 180 KTS though pressures in the two good hydraulic systems indicated normal thru-out the landing phase. A normal flaps 35 approach and landing was smoothly executed by the First Officer with continuous monitoring of the hydraulic systems and brake systems by the Captain and Relief Pilot. AOA speed cue monitored by Captain in HUD. Runway visually acquired at about 3 NM with light blowing snow. The Number 2 thrust reverser was deferred which hampered somewhat our deceleration; but aircraft was slowed to less than 15 KTS with 3;000 FT remaining. Runway appeared reflectively wet; but no snow accumulation noted. During landing roll Number 1 brake pressure dropped initially and then recovered after we slowed. Cleared runway and set parking brake. [We were] advised by emergency personnel that hydraulic fluid was pooling under the Number 1 Engine. Airport safety vehicle escorted Maintenance and tug to aircraft. Maintenance pinned gear with the spare gear pins (handed to them thru First Officer window). After tug was confirmed secured to aircraft all engines were shutdown. Tow to gate was uneventful (still blocked in early)!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.