Narrative:

IFR flight plan to tik, proceeding as cleared from norfolk 290 degree right 79 DME to montebello 130 degree right direct montebello. Navigation was being accomplished using TACAN, DME and omega. Approximately 30 NM east of montebello the omega shifted showing our position to be well south of desired track. (Checks on the omega showed it to be functioning properly.) DME was somewhat erratic and our heading indicator (HSI) had developed problems requiring manual synchronization with the standby compass every couple of mins. It appeared at the time the omega was correct so we made a correction back to the northeast to get back on course. Shortly after turning and before having an opportunity to call ZDC to verify positioning we received a call from center chastising us for such a radical correction which could have jeopardized flight safety. It was a large correction (approximately 60 degrees), but we felt being well south of course was also unsafe and in the interest of safety tried to re-position our aircraft where it was supposed to be (according to our navaids). Center never verified our position so I cannot say exactly how far south we were due to our NAVAID problems. We complied with the vectors we received to montebello and advised center of our problems. By this time we were overhead montebello and made a turn to track outbnd on the 288 degree right (J24). The HSI problems continued as we began the outboard track. In the cockpit we were trying to keep the HSI synchronized and began discussing divert options so as to effect repairs. After starting outbnd center called again asking about our heading. At the time it was 271 degrees, which was correcting us to a desired outbnd radial track of 288 degrees (according to our equipment). Center indicated we were south of track and made some comment about our charts and navigation which leads me to believe he may have misunderstood our heading call of 271 degrees to mean outbnd on the 271 degree right (J42). At the time of the call we were correcting the HSI, working on the omega, and had begun a small correction back towards the north (we showed ourselves very close to on course). Shortly after we were handed off to ZID with the comment, 'I will advise ZID of your navigation problems.' as we continued our track toward tinker AFB we had to constantly synchronize the HSI, but no further navigation problems occurred. I am submitting this report mainly in the interest of flight safety and to identify possible controller training deficiencies and perhaps a general lack of understanding of some of the antiquated navigation equipment still in use on older military aircraft. With the problems we were having, at time our primary heading source became the standby (wet) compass. We do not have the state of the art and redundant navigation systems found on most commercial aircraft the controllers deal with the majority of the time. I felt the controller should have contacted us sooner inbound to montebello upon noticing our aircraft not proceeding inbound directly on the 130 degree right. And once we discussed our NAVAID problems with him I feel the controller should have assisted us more with vectoring while we were working out the problems in the aircraft rather than lecture us on flight safety, telling us to disregard our omega and making a flippant comment about our charts and navigation abilities. When deviations occur and when the controllers are informed of those problems, they should concentrate on assisting the aircraft while the aircrew deals with their malfunctions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MTR DEVIATED FROM CLRNC ROUTE DUE OMEGA AND HSI PROBLEMS.

Narrative: IFR FLT PLAN TO TIK, PROCEEDING AS CLRED FROM NORFOLK 290 DEG R 79 DME TO MONTEBELLO 130 DEG R DIRECT MONTEBELLO. NAV WAS BEING ACCOMPLISHED USING TACAN, DME AND OMEGA. APPROX 30 NM E OF MONTEBELLO THE OMEGA SHIFTED SHOWING OUR POS TO BE WELL S OF DESIRED TRACK. (CHKS ON THE OMEGA SHOWED IT TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY.) DME WAS SOMEWHAT ERRATIC AND OUR HDG INDICATOR (HSI) HAD DEVELOPED PROBS REQUIRING MANUAL SYNCHRONIZATION WITH THE STANDBY COMPASS EVERY COUPLE OF MINS. IT APPEARED AT THE TIME THE OMEGA WAS CORRECT SO WE MADE A CORRECTION BACK TO THE NE TO GET BACK ON COURSE. SHORTLY AFTER TURNING AND BEFORE HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO CALL ZDC TO VERIFY POSITIONING WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM CENTER CHASTISING US FOR SUCH A RADICAL CORRECTION WHICH COULD HAVE JEOPARDIZED FLT SAFETY. IT WAS A LARGE CORRECTION (APPROX 60 DEGS), BUT WE FELT BEING WELL S OF COURSE WAS ALSO UNSAFE AND IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY TRIED TO RE-POS OUR ACFT WHERE IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE (ACCORDING TO OUR NAVAIDS). CENTER NEVER VERIFIED OUR POS SO I CANNOT SAY EXACTLY HOW FAR S WE WERE DUE TO OUR NAVAID PROBS. WE COMPLIED WITH THE VECTORS WE RECEIVED TO MONTEBELLO AND ADVISED CENTER OF OUR PROBS. BY THIS TIME WE WERE OVERHEAD MONTEBELLO AND MADE A TURN TO TRACK OUTBND ON THE 288 DEG R (J24). THE HSI PROBS CONTINUED AS WE BEGAN THE OUTBOARD TRACK. IN THE COCKPIT WE WERE TRYING TO KEEP THE HSI SYNCHRONIZED AND BEGAN DISCUSSING DIVERT OPTIONS SO AS TO EFFECT REPAIRS. AFTER STARTING OUTBND CENTER CALLED AGAIN ASKING ABOUT OUR HDG. AT THE TIME IT WAS 271 DEGS, WHICH WAS CORRECTING US TO A DESIRED OUTBND RADIAL TRACK OF 288 DEGS (ACCORDING TO OUR EQUIP). CENTER INDICATED WE WERE S OF TRACK AND MADE SOME COMMENT ABOUT OUR CHARTS AND NAV WHICH LEADS ME TO BELIEVE HE MAY HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD OUR HDG CALL OF 271 DEGS TO MEAN OUTBND ON THE 271 DEG R (J42). AT THE TIME OF THE CALL WE WERE CORRECTING THE HSI, WORKING ON THE OMEGA, AND HAD BEGUN A SMALL CORRECTION BACK TOWARDS THE N (WE SHOWED OURSELVES VERY CLOSE TO ON COURSE). SHORTLY AFTER WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ZID WITH THE COMMENT, 'I WILL ADVISE ZID OF YOUR NAV PROBS.' AS WE CONTINUED OUR TRACK TOWARD TINKER AFB WE HAD TO CONSTANTLY SYNCHRONIZE THE HSI, BUT NO FURTHER NAV PROBS OCCURRED. I AM SUBMITTING THIS RPT MAINLY IN THE INTEREST OF FLT SAFETY AND TO IDENT POSSIBLE CTLR TRNING DEFICIENCIES AND PERHAPS A GENERAL LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF SOME OF THE ANTIQUATED NAV EQUIP STILL IN USE ON OLDER MIL ACFT. WITH THE PROBS WE WERE HAVING, AT TIME OUR PRIMARY HDG SOURCE BECAME THE STANDBY (WET) COMPASS. WE DO NOT HAVE THE STATE OF THE ART AND REDUNDANT NAVIGATION SYSTEMS FOUND ON MOST COMMERCIAL ACFT THE CTLRS DEAL WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME. I FELT THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED US SOONER INBND TO MONTEBELLO UPON NOTICING OUR ACFT NOT PROCEEDING INBND DIRECTLY ON THE 130 DEG R. AND ONCE WE DISCUSSED OUR NAVAID PROBS WITH HIM I FEEL THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE ASSISTED US MORE WITH VECTORING WHILE WE WERE WORKING OUT THE PROBS IN THE ACFT RATHER THAN LECTURE US ON FLT SAFETY, TELLING US TO DISREGARD OUR OMEGA AND MAKING A FLIPPANT COMMENT ABOUT OUR CHARTS AND NAV ABILITIES. WHEN DEVIATIONS OCCUR AND WHEN THE CTLRS ARE INFORMED OF THOSE PROBS, THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON ASSISTING THE ACFT WHILE THE AIRCREW DEALS WITH THEIR MALFUNCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.