Narrative:

We were being vectored for the ILS 33L at bwi. I was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot not flying. After I was established on the localizer at 2;000 ft and cleared for the approach; I observed that I had red flags on the glide slope. And; I had no glide slope indications. I told the captain I had no glide slope. I did not hear his response. The tower frequency was busy and; with the continuous RF radio noise in my headset; what he said I did not hear. I again said I had no glide slope indication and; as I was approaching grafe; the final approach fix; I said I was going to revert to localizer only minimums and complete the approach as the localizer 33L approach. Past grafe I started a descent to the localizer minimums. The tower called and said they had a low altitude alert on us. The captain told them we were at 600 ft MSL. At that point; the captain said that he was taking control of the aircraft. I said; 'you have the controls.' the captain completed the approach and landing using his instruments as well as the glide slope; which was working on his side. I was not aware that he had a glide slope indication until that point. The landing and completion of the flight was uneventful. When I noted my loss of glide slope; I should have checked the captain's glide slope to see if he had any glide slope indications. If I had known that he had a glide slope indication; I would have transferred control of the aircraft to the captain at that point. There was a breakdown in communications at that point. A contributing factor was the constant RF noise in my headset from the radios. I had mentioned it several times during our two legs on the aircraft. It was loud enough to make hearing ATC communications difficult several times. If I was to experience this event again; with the same conditions; a go-around/missed approach would probably be the best course of action. Without the assurance that both pilots were absolutely seeing the same thing and verbally agreeing to the next course of action; a go-around would be a good course of action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier First Officer's ILS glide slope failed during final approach but the Captain did not hear his failure declaration but after ATC called low altitude alert the Captain assumed control and landed.

Narrative: We were being vectored for the ILS 33L at BWI. I was the pilot flying and the Captain was the pilot not flying. After I was established on the Localizer at 2;000 FT and cleared for the approach; I observed that I had red flags on the glide slope. And; I had no glide slope indications. I told the Captain I had no glide slope. I did not hear his response. The Tower frequency was busy and; with the continuous RF radio noise in my headset; what he said I did not hear. I again said I had no glide slope indication and; as I was approaching GRAFE; the final approach fix; I said I was going to revert to Localizer only minimums and complete the approach as the Localizer 33L approach. Past GRAFE I started a descent to the Localizer minimums. The Tower called and said they had a low altitude alert on us. The Captain told them we were at 600 FT MSL. At that point; the Captain said that he was taking control of the aircraft. I said; 'You have the controls.' The Captain completed the approach and landing using his instruments as well as the glide slope; which was working on his side. I was not aware that he had a glide slope indication until that point. The landing and completion of the flight was uneventful. When I noted my loss of glide slope; I should have checked the Captain's glide slope to see if he had any glide slope indications. If I had known that he had a glide slope indication; I would have transferred control of the aircraft to the Captain at that point. There was a breakdown in communications at that point. A contributing factor was the constant RF noise in my headset from the radios. I had mentioned it several times during our two legs on the aircraft. It was loud enough to make hearing ATC communications difficult several times. If I was to experience this event again; with the same conditions; a go-around/missed approach would probably be the best course of action. Without the assurance that both pilots were absolutely seeing the same thing and verbally agreeing to the next course of action; a go-around would be a good course of action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.