Narrative:

Sector xx/yy was recently incorporated into another sector due to the unplanned long term radar outage at ZZZZ. Everyone that is current at the sector received 3-4 hours of training due to the change in procedures. Since the sector was no longer a radar sector; chapter 8 of the 7110.65 now applied. I split the sectors. Sector xx owns F310 and below. There were three aircraft arriving at ZZZZ; a hawker 800; an A319 and a B737. The controller working the sector put the hawker into the hold at 7000 ft and the A319 at 8000 ft. He then released a second A319 for departure at 6000 ft. The controller had difficulty getting the hawker out of the hold. I sat next to him to try to assist and I had a copy of the mbi that included the power point that was used for training for the relocation of sector xx/yy. He was trying to give a route clearance via the aps. I told him he needed to open a clearance window via the call sign in the airspace list. I also told him that he needed to have a fix prior to the hold fix. I asked him later why he didn't put that fix in and he told me that he thought that wasn't necessary anymore. Not being able to figure out how to get the aircraft out of the hold increased the workload to the point that the hawker was switched to tower frequency without being coordinated inbound. Several controllers were asked about the correct procedure to get out of the hold. Two of them said that holding at ZZZZ was such a problem; they no longer issued the hold. One of them told me that he just keeps backing up the aircraft's time. Finally; the controller was able to exit the hold by issuing a fix prior to the hold fix. There were so many different attempts in trying to exit the hold. When the hawker was finally out of the hold; the flight plan was removed; but then the data block popped up several minutes later and had to be removed again. I am not sure that proper separation was provided when the second A319 was given a climb out of 6000 ft. The training that was given for this change was not sufficient. Even though more practice was offered in the combined sectors system; it was not mandatory. We did have refresher training. I kept the power point as a reference; since it is done so infrequently. [We need] more detailed training and slot programs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Supervisor described an unsafe condition when a RADAR site was not operating and non-RADAR procedures were required; the reporter noting the controllers unfamiliarity with non-RADAR and lack of training.

Narrative: Sector XX/YY was recently incorporated into another sector due to the unplanned long term RADAR outage at ZZZZ. Everyone that is current at the sector received 3-4 hours of training due to the change in procedures. Since the sector was no longer a RADAR sector; Chapter 8 of the 7110.65 now applied. I split the sectors. Sector XX owns F310 and below. There were three aircraft arriving at ZZZZ; a Hawker 800; an A319 and a B737. The Controller working the sector put the Hawker into the hold at 7000 FT and the A319 at 8000 FT. He then released a second A319 for departure at 6000 FT. The Controller had difficulty getting the Hawker out of the hold. I sat next to him to try to assist and I had a copy of the MBI that included the power point that was used for training for the relocation of Sector XX/YY. He was trying to give a route clearance via the APS. I told him he needed to open a clearance window via the call sign in the airspace list. I also told him that he needed to have a fix prior to the hold fix. I asked him later why he didn't put that fix in and he told me that he thought that wasn't necessary anymore. Not being able to figure out how to get the aircraft out of the hold increased the workload to the point that the Hawker was switched to Tower frequency without being coordinated inbound. Several controllers were asked about the correct procedure to get out of the hold. Two of them said that holding at ZZZZ was such a problem; they no longer issued the hold. One of them told me that he just keeps backing up the aircraft's time. Finally; the Controller was able to exit the hold by issuing a fix prior to the hold fix. There were so many different attempts in trying to exit the hold. When the Hawker was finally out of the hold; the flight plan was removed; but then the data block popped up several minutes later and had to be removed again. I am not sure that proper separation was provided when the second A319 was given a climb out of 6000 FT. The training that was given for this change was not sufficient. Even though more practice was offered in the combined sectors system; it was not mandatory. We did have refresher training. I kept the power point as a reference; since it is done so infrequently. [We need] more detailed training and slot programs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.