Narrative:

A B767-300 on approach; [flight] crew received slat asym message on EICAS with accompanying leading edge light [illuminated]. Leading edge devices were locked-out. After trouble shooting in accordance with the fault isolation manual (fim); I determined proximity switch S281 was faulty. This event used up more than an hour. A replacement proximity switch was obtained from the fly along kit (fak) and temporarily installed to prove trouble shooting efforts came to the proper conclusion. Trouble shooting was accomplished in accordance with the fim 27-81-00 and in coordination with maintenance control. The switch was replaced in accordance with aircraft maintenance manual (amm) 27-88-01. According to the schematic wiring practices manual (swpm) 20-02-10; [proximity switch] S281 and its associated wiring are located within a flammable leakage zone. Also; I consider this as primary flight control wiring addressed in swpm 20-14-11. Swpm 20-30-00 states that all connections in a flammable leakage zone must be sealed. I had no splices or tooling available in the fak. I believed the raychem splice to be appropriate for this application. Also; the raychem splice was used in the original installation. I was able to procure the splices on the airfield. I was offered an automotive crimper and a hair dryer to complete the task. I declined. Tooling needed to be sourced elsewhere. I was able to source the crimper; but not a proper heat source.maintenance controller X instructed me to make the connection and the seals would be completed when the aircraft arrived. I asked him how he wanted it documented and he advised; 'you just did.' I covered the splices with adhesive tape and zip ties. Shortly thereafter; I went to the hotel where I had a bath; food and 2 hours of rest. I returned to the aircraft to complete my maintenance activity and discovered the same fault had returned. Upon opening the wing panel; I discovered the splices were exposed and shorted to each other. I needed a heat source to complete the seal. At this time I was on the telephone with troubleshooting engineer X. He instructed me to use a lighter. I refused; and he insisted that I do that. Engineer X told me; 'I do it all the time.' I went so far as to tell him I had an audience. He said; 'put your back to them!' at this point I used an open flame in the leading edge of the wing to complete the heat shrink of the seal [material].I felt strongly at the time that not doing so would cost me my job. I did it; sleep deprived and under extreme duress knowing that not doing so would be at the expense of my job. The director of maintenance (dom); called me into a meeting that resulted in my suspension. He told me that I should have explored the use of butt splices and that 'a flight technician has to be resourceful.' I have no authority to deviate from the aircraft maintenance manual (amm) or the general maintenance manual (gmm). I had no documentation to allow me to deviate from the steps that I took. I returned the aircraft to service in accordance with the documents available to me. In my meeting with the director of maintenance; there was no discussion of my method of sealing my splices. At this time I am suspended pending possible termination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about improper maintenance practices he was directed to follow under threat of losing his job; after a B767-300 aircraft arrived with a SLAT ASYM EICAS message and LEADING EDGE light illuminated.

Narrative: A B767-300 on approach; [flight] crew received SLAT ASYM message on EICAS with accompanying LEADING EDGE light [illuminated]. Leading Edge devices were locked-out. After trouble shooting in accordance with the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM); I determined Proximity Switch S281 was faulty. This event used up more than an hour. A replacement proximity switch was obtained from the Fly Along Kit (FAK) and temporarily installed to prove trouble shooting efforts came to the proper conclusion. Trouble shooting was accomplished in accordance with the FIM 27-81-00 and in coordination with Maintenance Control. The switch was replaced in accordance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 27-88-01. According to the Schematic Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM) 20-02-10; [Proximity Switch] S281 and its associated wiring are located within a flammable leakage zone. Also; I consider this as Primary Flight Control wiring addressed in SWPM 20-14-11. SWPM 20-30-00 states that all connections in a Flammable Leakage Zone must be sealed. I had no splices or tooling available in the FAK. I believed the Raychem splice to be appropriate for this application. Also; the Raychem splice was used in the original installation. I was able to procure the splices on the airfield. I was offered an automotive crimper and a hair dryer to complete the task. I declined. Tooling needed to be sourced elsewhere. I was able to source the crimper; but not a proper heat source.Maintenance Controller X instructed me to make the connection and the seals would be completed when the aircraft arrived. I asked him how he wanted it documented and he advised; 'You just did.' I covered the splices with adhesive tape and zip ties. Shortly thereafter; I went to the hotel where I had a bath; food and 2 hours of rest. I returned to the aircraft to complete my maintenance activity and discovered the same fault had returned. Upon opening the wing panel; I discovered the splices were exposed and shorted to each other. I needed a heat source to complete the seal. At this time I was on the telephone with Troubleshooting Engineer X. He instructed me to use a lighter. I refused; and he insisted that I do that. Engineer X told me; 'I do it all the time.' I went so far as to tell him I had an audience. He said; 'Put your back to them!' At this point I used an open flame in the leading edge of the wing to complete the heat shrink of the seal [material].I felt strongly at the time that not doing so would cost me my job. I did it; sleep deprived and under extreme duress knowing that not doing so would be at the expense of my job. The Director of Maintenance (DOM); called me into a meeting that resulted in my suspension. He told me that I should have explored the use of butt splices and that 'a Flight Technician has to be resourceful.' I have no authority to deviate from the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) or the General Maintenance Manual (GMM). I had no documentation to allow me to deviate from the steps that I took. I returned the aircraft to service in accordance with the documents available to me. In my meeting with the Director of Maintenance; there was no discussion of my method of sealing my splices. At this time I am suspended pending possible termination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.