Narrative:

Descent from FL200 to 12000', using FMC navigation and autoplt. Approximately 15000' entered tops, encountered moderate to severe turbulence, heavy rain. Almost simultaneously ATC cleared to cross 40 southwest lrp, at 12000'. Lrp not available immediately due not automatic select on VOR, off screen on CRT. Captain (PNF) scrambled to find the arwy chart to get the VOR frequency while I got engine anti-ice and ignition turned on. Then captain began adjusting radar to find out why we were getting heavy rain and turbulence. When DME finally locked on lrp, it read 31 NM (southwest of lrp). I deployed spoilers and turned off automatic thrust. Rain and turbulence worsened in descent. As we approached 12000', I observed airspeed decreasing. Not immediately realizing, due to concern about the extreme turbulence, that the autoplt was leveling the aircraft at 12000' west/O automatic thrust available, I disconnected the autoplt. The aircraft was trimmed nose down and continued descent below 12000'. The captain recognized the problem immediately and called out, 'altitude.' flew the aircraft back to 12000' and re-engaged autoplt. Minimum altitude approximately 11800'. Contributing factors: proficiency--I am junior on widebody transport X, have been mostly assigned for last 6 months as relief pilot (cruise only) or with restr captain. Consequently, flew 1 leg in oct, 2 in nov, 1 in dec, none in jan, 1 in feb, none in mar. This was only my sixth leg in 6 months. Crew shortage--I am in the middle of widebody transport Y transition training (completed FAA oral 3/29. Released from training due backed up simulator schedule). Due to crew shortage, sent out on widebody transport X trip during widebody transport Y trans training. ATC procedure--assignment of a crossing restriction only 10 NM from the crossing fix, using a NAVAID which is behind an aircraft using FMC equipment, imposed an excessive workload on the crew with too little time to set it up. Fatigue--I was extremely fatigued after being unable to sleep in the hotel in paris. Hotel is noisy during the day when crew is sleepy, stuffy at night. Company refuses ot change hotel. (I do not smoke or drink alcohol.) recommendations: the issue of proficiency of relief pilots on long range flts should be addressed. Captain's in the widebody transport X operation on our airline do not feel obligated to give legs to the relief pilot. Once having initiated transition training on new equipment, a pilot should not be required to operate a previously qualified equipment type west/O at least one simulator refresher period. Constant crew shortages are destroying pilot personal lives. I am beginning to believe that scheduled airline pilot staffing levels need to be addressed by the far's. This is a complex subject, but our pilot group is experiencing intense turmoil over the effects of crew shortages. ATC should avoid short range crossing restrictions. Controllers should be trained on operational characteristics of FMC aircraft (eg, navaids behind the aircraft are not readily accessible). Pilot working agreements do not provide adequate leverage to ensure that pilots are given suitable hotel accommodations. Unsuitable hotels are second only to crew shortages as the major problem in flight operations on our airline. Hotels are changed constantly to reduce costs, and many pilot are complaining about fatigue due to inadequate rest on layovers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB ALT OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT IN TURBULENT CONDITIONS.

Narrative: DSCNT FROM FL200 TO 12000', USING FMC NAV AND AUTOPLT. APPROX 15000' ENTERED TOPS, ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB, HEAVY RAIN. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY ATC CLRED TO CROSS 40 SW LRP, AT 12000'. LRP NOT AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY DUE NOT AUTO SELECT ON VOR, OFF SCREEN ON CRT. CAPT (PNF) SCRAMBLED TO FIND THE ARWY CHART TO GET THE VOR FREQ WHILE I GOT ENG ANTI-ICE AND IGNITION TURNED ON. THEN CAPT BEGAN ADJUSTING RADAR TO FIND OUT WHY WE WERE GETTING HEAVY RAIN AND TURB. WHEN DME FINALLY LOCKED ON LRP, IT READ 31 NM (SW OF LRP). I DEPLOYED SPOILERS AND TURNED OFF AUTO THRUST. RAIN AND TURB WORSENED IN DSCNT. AS WE APCHED 12000', I OBSERVED AIRSPD DECREASING. NOT IMMEDIATELY REALIZING, DUE TO CONCERN ABOUT THE EXTREME TURB, THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS LEVELING THE ACFT AT 12000' W/O AUTO THRUST AVAILABLE, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED NOSE DOWN AND CONTINUED DSCNT BELOW 12000'. THE CAPT RECOGNIZED THE PROB IMMEDIATELY AND CALLED OUT, 'ALT.' FLEW THE ACFT BACK TO 12000' AND RE-ENGAGED AUTOPLT. MINIMUM ALT APPROX 11800'. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: PROFICIENCY--I AM JUNIOR ON WDB X, HAVE BEEN MOSTLY ASSIGNED FOR LAST 6 MONTHS AS RELIEF PLT (CRUISE ONLY) OR WITH RESTR CAPT. CONSEQUENTLY, FLEW 1 LEG IN OCT, 2 IN NOV, 1 IN DEC, NONE IN JAN, 1 IN FEB, NONE IN MAR. THIS WAS ONLY MY SIXTH LEG IN 6 MONTHS. CREW SHORTAGE--I AM IN THE MIDDLE OF WDB Y TRANSITION TRNING (COMPLETED FAA ORAL 3/29. RELEASED FROM TRNING DUE BACKED UP SIMULATOR SCHEDULE). DUE TO CREW SHORTAGE, SENT OUT ON WDB X TRIP DURING WDB Y TRANS TRNING. ATC PROC--ASSIGNMENT OF A XING RESTRICTION ONLY 10 NM FROM THE XING FIX, USING A NAVAID WHICH IS BEHIND AN ACFT USING FMC EQUIP, IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE WORKLOAD ON THE CREW WITH TOO LITTLE TIME TO SET IT UP. FATIGUE--I WAS EXTREMELY FATIGUED AFTER BEING UNABLE TO SLEEP IN THE HOTEL IN PARIS. HOTEL IS NOISY DURING THE DAY WHEN CREW IS SLEEPY, STUFFY AT NIGHT. COMPANY REFUSES OT CHANGE HOTEL. (I DO NOT SMOKE OR DRINK ALCOHOL.) RECOMMENDATIONS: THE ISSUE OF PROFICIENCY OF RELIEF PLTS ON LONG RANGE FLTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. CAPT'S IN THE WDB X OPERATION ON OUR AIRLINE DO NOT FEEL OBLIGATED TO GIVE LEGS TO THE RELIEF PLT. ONCE HAVING INITIATED TRANSITION TRNING ON NEW EQUIP, A PLT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE A PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED EQUIP TYPE W/O AT LEAST ONE SIMULATOR REFRESHER PERIOD. CONSTANT CREW SHORTAGES ARE DESTROYING PLT PERSONAL LIVES. I AM BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THAT SCHEDULED AIRLINE PLT STAFFING LEVELS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE FAR'S. THIS IS A COMPLEX SUBJECT, BUT OUR PLT GROUP IS EXPERIENCING INTENSE TURMOIL OVER THE EFFECTS OF CREW SHORTAGES. ATC SHOULD AVOID SHORT RANGE XING RESTRICTIONS. CTLRS SHOULD BE TRAINED ON OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FMC ACFT (EG, NAVAIDS BEHIND THE ACFT ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE). PLT WORKING AGREEMENTS DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE LEVERAGE TO ENSURE THAT PLTS ARE GIVEN SUITABLE HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS. UNSUITABLE HOTELS ARE SECOND ONLY TO CREW SHORTAGES AS THE MAJOR PROB IN FLT OPS ON OUR AIRLINE. HOTELS ARE CHANGED CONSTANTLY TO REDUCE COSTS, AND MANY PLT ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT FATIGUE DUE TO INADEQUATE REST ON LAYOVERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.