Narrative:

Arrived at the gate at ZZZ with the flight delayed and four mechanics in the cockpit. Much debate as to what was going on; but what I got from the discussion; the plan was to reset a malfunctioning #1 yaw dampening system and then run an engine at the gate to test the yaw dampening system. This required resetting both flight augmentation computers (facs); as I knew from 10+ years A320 experience; having flown the A320 in both seats as well as having been an instructor on the A320/319 for 3.5 years. The mechanic running the test failed to reset the facs correctly; mentioning to me 'I can't get #2 facility to disengage.' he believed this because the facility-2 'off' light on the overhead panel was not coming on with the switch; I could see the switch was working properly as the ECAM was showing the #2 facility off and the switch was working correctly. The mechanic was being distracted because the 'off' light in the switch [was] not coming on; which is a common anomaly on the A320 overhead panel; usually fixed with a series of light finger taps on the switch. I could tell my presence in the cockpit was not making anyone comfortable; so I departed and let the mechanics do what they had planned. Being unable to reset the facs; the yaw dampener fault never cleared and the engine run was cancelled. Before the mechanics left I offered to reset the facs and doing so properly; the yaw dampener problem was cleared and the ECAM status page was 'normal'. At this point the mechanic said he had only had a three week course on the A320 and did not know the airplane well. Now with a 'normal' status page I asked why we could not test the yaw dampener system now; the mechanic said 'ok; let me talk to my supervisor.' he left for about 20 minutes and when he returned; he said 'ok; we are all set; I am going to defer #1 yaw dampener.' I was a bit miffed as the original plan was to clear the fault and then test the system; but since they did not know how to clear the fault the test was aborted; now the fault was gone; why not test? Why did we have to [make] 'inoperative' (inop) a system that was currently not broken without even testing it? The mechanic could not verbalize to me why we were doing this; only that the decision to defer had been made to avoid more problems with the #1 yaw dampener. Given the progressive delay and having flown A320s in the past with a yaw dampener systems deferred; and in the interest of getting the passengers to destination; I agreed to fly the aircraft with the #1 yaw dampener system deferred. I was on a phone call with dispatch and maintenance control while the mechanic was carrying out the procedures to defer the #1 yaw dampener. When the mechanic left; I noticed he had shut off the #1 facility; put collars around the #1 facility circuit breakers (C/B) and put colored stickers on the #1 facility switch. Looking at the new maintenance release coming over the printer; it indicted that the #1 yaw dampener was deferred but made no mention of the #1 facility being differed or it's circuit breakers being pulled and collared. I realized that the mechanic had clearly not performed the appropriate procedure to defer the #1 yaw dampener and had instead inoped a perfectly good facility; while leaving the suspected #1 yaw dampener active and then issuing me a maintenance release for the aircraft that stated the #1 yaw dampener was deferred and had been deactivated. In summary: 1). System that was to be deactivated was not deactivated (#1 yaw dampener). 2). Perfectly good system (#1 facility) was incorrectly deactivated. 3). Maintenance release issued for the flight stated that the #1 yaw dampener had been deferred.4). Mechanic tasked with 'fixing' the problem admitted to me he had only had a three week training program on the A320 and in my opinion (imo) clearly demonstrated a lack of systems knowledge to be performing maintenance procedures on the A320/319 series aircraft. After a series of phone calls with maintenance control; dispatch and the duty manager the #1 yaw dampener was eventually deferred correctly and a correct maintenance release was issued. We departed ZZZ after an approximate three hour delay and had an uneventful flight to ZZZ1. I will say in my 18+ years at air carrier X; I have never experienced anything remotely this disorganized or troubling in terms of getting appropriate maintenance performed and correct maintenance documented. The only thing that stopped an aircraft from flying with 100+ people on board; after having incorrect maintenance actions being performed with an illegal maintenance release issued was me. In this case; a combination of luck and A320 experience allowed me to catch this significant error before it impacted the safety of my passengers and crew or triggered certificate action by the FAA. But 'luck' should not come into play in a business as serious and potentially deadly as transporting people in airplanes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot reports that in all the years he has flown for his air carrier; he has never experienced anything remotely as disorganized or troubling in terms of getting appropriate maintenance performed and correct maintenance documented on their merged air carrier's A319/320 aircraft. Lack of maintenance experience and training was apparent at certain Stations.

Narrative: Arrived at the gate at ZZZ with the flight delayed and four mechanics in the cockpit. Much debate as to what was going on; but what I got from the discussion; the plan was to reset a malfunctioning #1 Yaw Dampening System and then run an engine at the gate to test the Yaw Dampening System. This required resetting both Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs); as I knew from 10+ years A320 experience; having flown the A320 in both seats as well as having been an Instructor on the A320/319 for 3.5 years. The Mechanic running the test failed to reset the FACs correctly; mentioning to me 'I can't get #2 FAC to disengage.' He believed this because the FAC-2 'Off' light on the Overhead Panel was not coming on with the switch; I could see the switch was working properly as the ECAM was showing the #2 FAC OFF and the switch was working correctly. The Mechanic was being distracted because the 'OFF' light in the switch [was] not coming on; which is a common anomaly on the A320 Overhead Panel; usually fixed with a series of light finger taps on the switch. I could tell my presence in the cockpit was not making anyone comfortable; so I departed and let the mechanics do what they had planned. Being unable to reset the FACs; the Yaw Dampener Fault never cleared and the engine run was cancelled. Before the mechanics left I offered to reset the FACs and doing so properly; the Yaw Dampener problem was cleared and the ECAM Status page was 'NORMAL'. At this point the Mechanic said he had only had a three week course on the A320 and did not know the airplane well. Now with a 'NORMAL' status page I asked why we could not test the Yaw Dampener system now; the Mechanic said 'OK; let me talk to my Supervisor.' He left for about 20 minutes and when he returned; he said 'OK; we are all set; I am going to defer #1 Yaw Dampener.' I was a bit miffed as the original plan was to clear the fault and then test the system; but since they did not know how to clear the fault the test was aborted; now the fault was gone; why not test? Why did we have to [make] 'Inoperative' (Inop) a system that was currently not broken without even testing it? The Mechanic could not verbalize to me why we were doing this; only that the decision to defer had been made to avoid more problems with the #1 Yaw Dampener. Given the progressive delay and having flown A320s in the past with a Yaw Dampener Systems deferred; and in the interest of getting the passengers to destination; I agreed to fly the aircraft with the #1 Yaw Dampener System deferred. I was on a phone call with Dispatch and Maintenance Control while the Mechanic was carrying out the procedures to defer the #1 Yaw Dampener. When the Mechanic left; I noticed he had shut off the #1 FAC; put collars around the #1 FAC Circuit Breakers (C/B) and put colored stickers on the #1 FAC Switch. Looking at the new Maintenance Release coming over the printer; it indicted that the #1 Yaw Dampener was deferred but made no mention of the #1 FAC being differed or it's circuit breakers being pulled and collared. I realized that the Mechanic had clearly not performed the appropriate procedure to defer the #1 Yaw Dampener and had instead inoped a perfectly good FAC; while leaving the suspected #1 Yaw Dampener active and then issuing me a Maintenance Release for the aircraft that stated the #1 Yaw Dampener was deferred and had been deactivated. In summary: 1). System that was to be deactivated was not deactivated (#1 Yaw Dampener). 2). Perfectly good system (#1 FAC) was incorrectly deactivated. 3). Maintenance Release issued for the flight stated that the #1 Yaw Dampener had been deferred.4). Mechanic tasked with 'fixing' the problem admitted to me he had only had a three week training program on the A320 and In My Opinion (IMO) clearly demonstrated a lack of systems knowledge to be performing maintenance procedures on the A320/319 series aircraft. After a series of phone calls with Maintenance Control; Dispatch and the Duty Manager the #1 Yaw Dampener was eventually deferred correctly and a correct Maintenance Release was issued. We departed ZZZ after an approximate three hour delay and had an uneventful flight to ZZZ1. I will say in my 18+ years at Air Carrier X; I have never experienced anything remotely this disorganized or troubling in terms of getting appropriate maintenance performed and correct maintenance documented. The only thing that stopped an aircraft from flying with 100+ people on board; after having incorrect maintenance actions being performed with an illegal Maintenance Release issued was me. In this case; a combination of luck and A320 experience allowed me to catch this significant error before it impacted the safety of my passengers and crew or triggered certificate action by the FAA. But 'luck' should not come into play in a business as serious and potentially deadly as transporting people in airplanes.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.