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Emb-145XR crew had two sequential aborts at about 40 knots because of EICAS caution of 'rudder SYS1 inoperative'. On the first abort the crew consulted the qrc and QRH; and then consulted maintenance for guidance on procedures and log book entries. After the second takeoff attempt with the same warnings at about 40 knots; the crew decided to return to the gate and was issued another airplane.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1088361 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201305 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Takeoff |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Rudder Control System |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
We pushed back and taxied without a problem. We were in line for departure waiting for the tailwind to be within limits. When the winds subsided tower resumed departures; and we were then cleared for takeoff. I (captain) said 'set thrust' the first officer said 'thrust set.' at about 40 knots we got a EICAS caution: rudder SYS1 inoperative. I (ca) say 'abort abort' and run the memory items. The first officer makes PA 'remain seated...' first officer notified tower and we taxied clear the runway on S4. We ran the applicable qrc/QRH. Then I (ca) called maintenance. Maintenance instructed us on the applicable reset(s) and logbook items for the system at fault. After such time we re-sequenced in line for another departure. Again; cleared for takeoff; 'set thrust/thrust set' 40 knots. Same EICAS caution: rudder system 1 inoperative. We did exactly as above but this time decided it best to return to the gate for further maintenance inspection. Dispatch did an aircraft swap and we continued on to our destination. Some of the threats encountered were having a tailwind; flaps 18 takeoff.we performed the aborted takeoff and ran the appropriate checklists as trained by our training department. If something like this were to happen again I think it would be prudent to hold the brakes and do a short run up to see if we would get the same message.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB-145XR crew had two sequential aborts at about 40 knots because of EICAS Caution of 'Rudder SYS1 INOP'. On the first abort the crew consulted the QRC and QRH; and then consulted Maintenance for guidance on procedures and log book entries. After the second takeoff attempt with the same warnings at about 40 knots; the crew decided to return to the gate and was issued another airplane.
Narrative: We pushed back and taxied without a problem. We were in line for departure waiting for the tailwind to be within limits. When the winds subsided Tower resumed departures; and we were then cleared for takeoff. I (Captain) said 'set thrust' the FO said 'thrust set.' At about 40 knots we got a EICAS Caution: Rudder SYS1 INOP. I (CA) say 'Abort Abort' and run the memory items. The FO makes PA 'Remain seated...' FO notified Tower and we taxied clear the runway on S4. We ran the applicable QRC/QRH. Then I (CA) called Maintenance. Maintenance instructed us on the applicable reset(s) and logbook items for the system at fault. After such time we re-sequenced in line for another departure. Again; cleared for takeoff; 'Set Thrust/Thrust set' 40 knots. Same EICAS Caution: Rudder SYS 1 INOP. We did exactly as above but this time decided it best to return to the gate for further Maintenance inspection. Dispatch did an aircraft swap and we continued on to our destination. Some of the threats encountered were having a tailwind; Flaps 18 takeoff.We performed the aborted takeoff and ran the appropriate checklists as trained by our training department. If something like this were to happen again I think it would be prudent to hold the brakes and do a short run up to see if we would get the same message.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.