Narrative:

While on a vector to intercept the runway xxr localizer; with airspeed around 220 KTS; I call for flaps 1 and then flaps 5. Subsequently; I noted we had both a split flap and a flap disagreement. In addition; the flaps indicated less than flaps 1 degrees. I immediately began to assess the situation; noting our limited fuel state of 5;900 pounds; the short runway length; and our current flight control problem. I looked at the overhead panel and noted that all the flight control led lights were green and we had no hydraulic lights on. Everything on the overhead panel appeared normal. I directed the first officer to advise ATC of our situation and requested vectors to work our problem.due to our limited fuel state and the short runway; we did not have time to remain in our filed destination's area and troubleshoot the problem. We needed to be decisive. We needed to proceed to a suitable alternate. I advised the first officer that I would fly the aircraft and run the radios while he troubleshoots the problem and ran the appropriate emergency checklist. I advised ATC that we were declaring an emergency and requesting vectors to a nearby class B airport. The controller immediately requested our fuel and passengers on board; and subsequently gave us a discrete frequency.while the first officer was accomplishing the appropriate emergency checklist; I was setting up for the ILS runway xx approach. I have flown and worked with first officer on a number of occasions. He is the consummate professional; who is poised when exposed to pressure situations. There was a good division of the workload; so I focused on the aviating; navigating; and communicating while the first officer focused on running the emergency checklist. I attempted to follow along while he ran the appropriate emergency checklist; but due to the dynamics in both the cockpit and surrounding area (i.e.; communications and coordination with ATC; tower; arff; aviating; navigating and running normal and emergency checklist); I may have (and understandably so) missed some of the items read by the first officer on the emergency checklist. I remember asking the first officer twice to clarify the approach speed. ATC vectored our aircraft in a box pattern while we completed our checklist and prepared the aircraft; cabin crew; and passengers for landing. The flight attendants received their emergency briefing (i.e.;test information) and subsequently I briefed the passengers and reassured them that everything was going to be ok. Turning final; the first officer ran the radios and landing checklist; and I configured the aircraft early (i.e.; call for the gear once established on the localizer) and flew the approach at 180/185 KTS. We advised tower that in the event that we had to go-around that we would fly straight-out. Subsequently; we had a smooth and uneventful landing. After landing; airport rescue and fire fighters (arff) approached our aircraft and gave us an aircraft status reported that nothing unusual was noted. We proceeded to the gate and maintenance boarded our aircraft. As we discussed the event and flight control problem in detail; the mechanic revealed that there were 7 previous documented write-ups on the flight controls. FYI- I never noted any flight control write-ups in the aircraft logbook. Everyone worked well together and did a great job.I'm sure there were things that we could have done better; things that I may have overlooked. Maybe I could have accomplished a few things or items in a different sequence to provide a cleaner; smoother flow. However; from the aviation prospective; for the most part; I think we covered and accomplished what needed to be done to bring our valued passengers; crew; and aircraft to an uneventful and safe conclusion. Company mechanics are under a lot of pressure to get airplanes fixed and in the air. I recognize that aircraft systems and equipment are going to fail; and it may take several attempts to find and fix a mechanical malfunction. However; with 7 previous documented flight control write-ups; it is in my view that this aircraft should have been taken out of service and fixed well before this inflight no flap/no slat emergency landing occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 Flap Asymmetry Fault activated at flaps 1 selection so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted a nearby airport for an uneventful no flaps landing. The event was this aircraft's seventh such event.

Narrative: While on a vector to intercept the Runway XXR localizer; with airspeed around 220 KTS; I call for flaps 1 and then flaps 5. Subsequently; I noted we had both a split flap and a flap disagreement. In addition; the flaps indicated less than flaps 1 degrees. I immediately began to assess the situation; noting our limited fuel state of 5;900 LBS; the short runway length; and our current flight control problem. I looked at the overhead panel and noted that all the Flight Control LED lights were green and we had no hydraulic lights on. Everything on the overhead panel appeared normal. I directed the First Officer to advise ATC of our situation and requested vectors to work our problem.Due to our limited fuel state and the short runway; we did not have time to remain in our filed destination's area and troubleshoot the problem. We needed to be decisive. We needed to proceed to a suitable alternate. I advised the First Officer that I would fly the aircraft and run the radios while he troubleshoots the problem and ran the appropriate Emergency Checklist. I advised ATC that we were declaring an emergency and requesting vectors to a nearby Class B airport. The Controller immediately requested our fuel and passengers on board; and subsequently gave us a discrete frequency.While the First Officer was accomplishing the appropriate Emergency Checklist; I was setting up for the ILS Runway XX approach. I have flown and worked with First Officer on a number of occasions. He is the consummate professional; who is poised when exposed to pressure situations. There was a good division of the workload; so I focused on the aviating; navigating; and communicating while the First Officer focused on running the Emergency Checklist. I attempted to follow along while he ran the appropriate Emergency Checklist; but due to the dynamics in both the cockpit and surrounding area (i.e.; communications and coordination with ATC; Tower; ARFF; aviating; navigating and running normal and Emergency Checklist); I may have (and understandably so) missed some of the items read by the First Officer on the Emergency Checklist. I remember asking the First Officer twice to clarify the approach speed. ATC vectored our aircraft in a box pattern while we completed our checklist and prepared the aircraft; cabin crew; and passengers for landing. The flight attendants received their emergency briefing (i.e.;TEST information) and subsequently I briefed the passengers and reassured them that everything was going to be OK. Turning final; the First Officer ran the radios and Landing Checklist; and I configured the aircraft early (i.e.; call for the gear once established on the localizer) and flew the approach at 180/185 KTS. We advised Tower that in the event that we had to go-around that we would fly straight-out. Subsequently; we had a smooth and uneventful landing. After landing; Airport Rescue and Fire Fighters (ARFF) approached our aircraft and gave us an aircraft status reported that nothing unusual was noted. We proceeded to the gate and Maintenance boarded our aircraft. As we discussed the event and flight control problem in detail; the Mechanic revealed that there were 7 previous documented write-ups on the flight controls. FYI- I never noted any flight control write-ups in the aircraft logbook. Everyone worked well together and did a great job.I'm sure there were things that we could have done better; things that I may have overlooked. Maybe I could have accomplished a few things or items in a different sequence to provide a cleaner; smoother flow. However; from the aviation prospective; for the most part; I think we covered and accomplished what needed to be done to bring our valued passengers; crew; and aircraft to an uneventful and safe conclusion. Company mechanics are under a lot of pressure to get airplanes fixed and in the air. I recognize that aircraft systems and equipment are going to fail; and it may take several attempts to find and fix a mechanical malfunction. However; with 7 previous documented flight control write-ups; it is in my view that this aircraft should have been taken out of service and fixed well before this inflight no flap/no slat emergency landing occurred.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.