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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1091184 |
Time | |
Date | 201305 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ORD.Airport |
State Reference | IL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown Ground Incursion Taxiway |
Narrative:
The day began with a pre-dawn show. We arrived at our first stop; ord; on time and; while the captain did the walk around; I ran to get breakfast and print paperwork but was unable to do so because the computers were down. I called our dispatcher to get the information for a handwritten release and pulled up the paperwork on my ipad as well. Because of this delay; we were rushed to get the flight out and pushed back two minutes late. When we called for taxi; we were cleared to 22L via B and D which was as briefed. As we started moving we were told to hold short of B for four aircraft to pass; then to continue our taxi to 22L. Before we pulled on to taxiway D we were told to switch to tower. As soon as I switched we were given a clearance to line up and wait 22L; which was unusually quick. The captain asked me to run the taxi checklist and then finish the ACARS message he had started to write to explain why we were out late. Before we got to the 28R pad we were cleared for takeoff on 22L as I was rushing to finish the ACARS message and start my before takeoff flow. In the meantime the captain was confused because there were numerous aircraft holding in the 28R pad due to flow times and his airport diagram was folded where he couldn't see the [relative location] of the two runways. He then turned and began heading to takeoff of 28R. I looked up and saw that he had misidentified the runways and told him that 22L was further to the left and that this was 28R. The tower also became confused and inquired as to the way we were getting to the runway but then said 'ok; I see you are going to pull in front of that flight instead of going behind them.' I confirmed this was the plan and then went heads down again to finish the message and continue my flow. As I sent the ACARS message I looked up again and saw that we were now headed towards taxiway [Y]5 to get on to 22L. I pointed out that 22L is to the left and pointed in that direction. Believing that the captain was now aware of where we were going; I continued my flow and didn't realize that we had; in fact; continued down [Y]5. As we crossed the hold short lines the tower tells us to stop as we had made the wrong turn. He gave us a new clearance to continue onto 22L and back taxi to full length and; once we get there; we were cleared for takeoff. We complied and continued the flight without further problems.contributing factors were: waking up early and being tired; when the paperwork wouldn't print which delayed us and caused us to rush; congested airport traffic; the captain's unfamiliarity with a complicated airport; poor diagramming and identification of runways 28R and 22L; and a high workload. When situational awareness was lost we should have stopped the aircraft and figured out exactly what we were doing. Instead we tried to correct it on the fly and never regained the situational awareness. This caused an incursion that could have been prevented. I will try to calm myself down and not rush as much. If I become overwhelmed or confused I will announce this to the captain and we can slow down or stop if necessary. Because I believe that my trying to multi-task and do something that was not required at the time was a contributing factor. I will try to prioritize what needs to be done and will advise the captain of my status so that he is aware of what I am doing. I will also try to better communicate with the captain about what I see is happening that differs from our clearance instead of assuming he knows what he is doing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Multiple distractions; fatigue and administrative equipment breakdowns contributed to the flight crew of a CRJ-700 losing situational awareness during taxi for takeoff at ORD.
Narrative: The day began with a pre-dawn show. We arrived at our first stop; ORD; on time and; while the Captain did the walk around; I ran to get breakfast and print paperwork but was unable to do so because the computers were down. I called our Dispatcher to get the information for a handwritten release and pulled up the paperwork on my iPad as well. Because of this delay; we were rushed to get the flight out and pushed back two minutes late. When we called for taxi; we were cleared to 22L via B and D which was as briefed. As we started moving we were told to hold short of B for four aircraft to pass; then to continue our taxi to 22L. Before we pulled on to Taxiway D we were told to switch to Tower. As soon as I switched we were given a clearance to line up and wait 22L; which was unusually quick. The Captain asked me to run the Taxi Checklist and then finish the ACARS message he had started to write to explain why we were out late. Before we got to the 28R pad we were cleared for takeoff on 22L as I was rushing to finish the ACARS message and start my before takeoff flow. In the meantime the Captain was confused because there were numerous aircraft holding in the 28R pad due to flow times and his airport diagram was folded where he couldn't see the [relative location] of the two runways. He then turned and began heading to takeoff of 28R. I looked up and saw that he had misidentified the runways and told him that 22L was further to the left and that this was 28R. The Tower also became confused and inquired as to the way we were getting to the runway but then said 'OK; I see you are going to pull in front of that flight instead of going behind them.' I confirmed this was the plan and then went heads down again to finish the message and continue my flow. As I sent the ACARS message I looked up again and saw that we were now headed towards Taxiway [Y]5 to get on to 22L. I pointed out that 22L is to the left and pointed in that direction. Believing that the Captain was now aware of where we were going; I continued my flow and didn't realize that we had; in fact; continued down [Y]5. As we crossed the hold short lines the Tower tells us to stop as we had made the wrong turn. He gave us a new clearance to continue onto 22L and back taxi to full length and; once we get there; we were cleared for takeoff. We complied and continued the flight without further problems.Contributing factors were: Waking up early and being tired; when the paperwork wouldn't print which delayed us and caused us to rush; congested airport traffic; the Captain's unfamiliarity with a complicated airport; poor diagramming and identification of runways 28R and 22L; and a high workload. When situational awareness was lost we should have stopped the aircraft and figured out exactly what we were doing. Instead we tried to correct it on the fly and never regained the situational awareness. This caused an incursion that could have been prevented. I will try to calm myself down and not rush as much. If I become overwhelmed or confused I will announce this to the Captain and we can slow down or stop if necessary. Because I believe that my trying to multi-task and do something that was not required at the time was a contributing factor. I will try to prioritize what needs to be done and will advise the Captain of my status so that he is aware of what I am doing. I will also try to better communicate with the Captain about what I see is happening that differs from our clearance instead of assuming he knows what he is doing.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.