Narrative:

Flight was on approach to abq when dispatch noted that they had likely flown a missed approach. Scattered and fast moving -tsra cells and bldu had moved into abq and it was within reason that windshear or microburst activity might have been the cause. Once dispatch became aware that the flight had rejected the first approach; attempts were made to contact the flight to ascertain reason and intent. Unfortunately; the only response came about 20 minutes later on ACARS with the crew saying 'lnding abq'. The flight landed on the second try. Only after the flight was in the gate did the crew have time to communicate that they had experienced severe turbulence on the first attempt. That information was relayed by the crew to ATC but not dispatch. There were no PIREPS for severe turbulence at the time and no SIGMET or fpg boxes were in effect for abq. The one PIREP close to abq before the flight rejected the approach was: abq ua/ov ABQ100037/tm XA00/FL200/tp E170/tb mod; well east of abq and for a regional jet at FL200. There were no injuries to crew or passengers. During the time between the first and second landing attempt; dispatch had set up alternate options with fuel burn to tus; ama; and elp and had also run burn and options for offline diversion to roswell; NM. When the flight landed and ACARS showed 6.5 on the ground; dispatcher realized that the release should have been amended for either a closer alternate (original release had far 3.5 and alternate lbb burn 3.6) or deleting the alternate (neither metar or taf ever showed less than 3 SM or a ceiling less than 020). This information had been calculated but not sent up to the crew due to the dynamically changing operational conditions and the lack of response as to intent from the crew. Dispatch also was anticipating a diversion due to the weather; fuel state; and the position of the aircraft at the time instead of the crew electing to initiate a second landing attempt into abq.better communication from the crew as to the reason for conducting a missed approach. It's understandable that a go around is a busy time for the flight crew but information that's critical to dispatch decision making needs to be timely and accurate. Dispatch had abq radios up and was standing by on ACARS. From the dispatch end; an assumption was made that the flight would elect to divert rather than continue back to abq. That may have caused a thought process that did not include amending the release. Dispatchers need to be open to all options; to know the consequences of those options; and to be well versed in implementing any actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew and the Dispatcher involved report a go-around at ABQ due to severe turbulence on approach to Runway 26. The crew continues on a westerly heading to avoid the weather and eventually requests direct to their alternate; but does not proceed as cleared continuing to discuss options. ATC questions the crew; but by this time flights are getting in and the crew elects to land at ABQ and does so safely.

Narrative: Flight was on approach to ABQ when Dispatch noted that they had likely flown a missed approach. Scattered and fast moving -TSRA cells and BLDU had moved into ABQ and it was within reason that windshear or microburst activity might have been the cause. Once Dispatch became aware that the flight had rejected the first approach; attempts were made to contact the flight to ascertain reason and intent. Unfortunately; the only response came about 20 minutes later on ACARS with the crew saying 'LNDING ABQ'. The flight landed on the second try. Only after the flight was in the gate did the crew have time to communicate that they had experienced severe turbulence on the first attempt. That information was relayed by the crew to ATC but not Dispatch. There were no PIREPS for severe turbulence at the time and no SIGMET or FPG boxes were in effect for ABQ. The one PIREP close to ABQ before the flight rejected the approach was: ABQ UA/OV ABQ100037/TM XA00/FL200/TP E170/TB MOD; well east of ABQ and for a regional jet at FL200. There were no injuries to crew or passengers. During the time between the first and second landing attempt; Dispatch had set up alternate options with fuel burn to TUS; AMA; and ELP and had also run burn and options for offline diversion to Roswell; NM. When the flight landed and ACARS showed 6.5 on the ground; Dispatcher realized that the release should have been amended for either a closer alternate (original release had FAR 3.5 and alternate LBB burn 3.6) or deleting the alternate (neither METAR or TAF ever showed less than 3 SM or a ceiling less than 020). This information had been calculated but not sent up to the crew due to the dynamically changing operational conditions and the lack of response as to intent from the crew. Dispatch also was anticipating a diversion due to the weather; fuel state; and the position of the aircraft at the time instead of the crew electing to initiate a second landing attempt into ABQ.Better communication from the crew as to the reason for conducting a missed approach. It's understandable that a go around is a busy time for the flight crew but information that's critical to Dispatch decision making needs to be timely and accurate. Dispatch had ABQ radios up and was standing by on ACARS. From the Dispatch end; an assumption was made that the flight would elect to divert rather than continue back to ABQ. That may have caused a thought process that did not include amending the release. Dispatchers need to be open to all options; to know the consequences of those options; and to be well versed in implementing any actions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.