Narrative:

I was training a developmental on local control; there was training being conducted on radar east. My developmental departed a helicopter southbound that would remain close to the airport for some time; he switched the helicopter; I recommended that we keep the helicopter on our frequency due to the traffic we had in the pattern and several departures so we could exchange traffic. I coordinated with radar to switch the helicopter back to us. The developmental had cessna 152 in left traffic for runway 15; he elected to cross over midfield and enter a right downwind for runway 15 due to traffic. This is when we noticed that a cessna C180 was inbound but we were unsure what they were doing as there was nothing in the aircraft's arts scratch pad (one of many automation features overlooked regularly here). We noticed they were approaching the helicopter to the south. We 'reached out' to the C180 to see if they were on our frequency; they were not. We issued traffic to the helicopter but they did not have the C180 in sight; I elected to take over and issue a vector to the helicopter to the east. When the conflict was resolved; I called our supervisor on a non operational phone to ask if he could remind the training team on radar east to switch arrivals to us in a timely manner. At this time the C180 was approaching the airport and now becoming a conflict with the C152 who was now turning right downwind for runway 15. Again we reached out to the C180 and they were not on our frequency. This situation is not uncommon; arrival aircraft are switched to the tower often late and the local controller has just enough time to issue any pertinent traffic he/she might have; winds; and a landing clearance if applicable. I believe it is the safety culture here that promotes the radar controller to sequence all aircraft to the airport at all costs. I agree with this sentiment that the radar controller sets a sequence to the airport but this should not be at the expense of national airspace safety and efficiency. This philosophy is also reinforced because; the belief that the tower controller should not do anything except say clear to land and clear for takeoff. Aircraft are the closest to each other at and around the vicinity of an airport; this is to be expected. Naturally one would think that when aircraft are going to be in close proximity to each other traffic should be exchanged; and this should be done by one controller and both aircraft should be on the same frequency for the sake of situational awareness. By not meeting these concepts I feel that we are introducing an unnecessary risk. The fact is tower has a significantly better idea of what is/going to occur at and around the vicinity of the airport than the radar controller does. The aforementioned philosophies that are at the root of these situations also believe the tower should not have any delegated airspace or area of jurisdiction except for those aircraft in the traffic pattern. This is ridiculous. I very much recommend that local control be delegated airspace for not only pattern traffic but for all operations occurring in the proximity of the airport. The radar controller should not enter the local control delegated airspace without coordination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller described an unsafe event claiming the TRACON should release communications with inbound aircraft to the Tower earlier to avoid conflicts in/near the congested traffic pattern.

Narrative: I was training a Developmental on Local Control; there was training being conducted on RADAR East. My Developmental departed a helicopter southbound that would remain close to the airport for some time; he switched the helicopter; I recommended that we keep the helicopter on our frequency due to the traffic we had in the pattern and several departures so we could exchange traffic. I coordinated with RADAR to switch the helicopter back to us. The Developmental had Cessna 152 in left traffic for Runway 15; he elected to cross over midfield and enter a right downwind for Runway 15 due to traffic. This is when we noticed that a Cessna C180 was inbound but we were unsure what they were doing as there was nothing in the aircraft's arts scratch pad (one of many automation features overlooked regularly here). We noticed they were approaching the helicopter to the south. We 'reached out' to the C180 to see if they were on our frequency; they were not. We issued traffic to the helicopter but they did not have the C180 in sight; I elected to take over and issue a vector to the helicopter to the east. When the conflict was resolved; I called our Supervisor on a non operational phone to ask if he could remind the training team on RADAR east to switch arrivals to us in a timely manner. At this time the C180 was approaching the airport and now becoming a conflict with the C152 who was now turning right downwind for Runway 15. Again we reached out to the C180 and they were not on our frequency. This situation is not uncommon; arrival aircraft are switched to the Tower often late and the Local Controller has just enough time to issue any pertinent traffic he/she might have; winds; and a landing clearance if applicable. I believe it is the safety culture here that promotes the RADAR Controller to sequence all aircraft to the airport at all costs. I agree with this sentiment that the RADAR Controller sets a sequence to the airport but this should not be at the expense of national airspace safety and efficiency. This philosophy is also reinforced because; the belief that the Tower Controller should not do anything except say clear to land and clear for takeoff. Aircraft are the closest to each other at and around the vicinity of an airport; this is to be expected. Naturally one would think that when aircraft are going to be in close proximity to each other traffic should be exchanged; and this should be done by one controller and both aircraft should be on the same frequency for the sake of situational awareness. By not meeting these concepts I feel that we are introducing an unnecessary risk. The fact is Tower has a significantly better idea of what is/going to occur at and around the vicinity of the airport than the RADAR Controller does. The aforementioned philosophies that are at the root of these situations also believe the Tower should not have any delegated airspace or area of jurisdiction except for those aircraft in the traffic pattern. This is ridiculous. I very much recommend that Local Control be delegated airspace for not only pattern traffic but for all operations occurring in the proximity of the airport. The RADAR Controller should not enter the Local Control delegated airspace without coordination.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.