Narrative:

At V1/rotation; we felt vibration and heard a muffled bang. At first; I thought we might have blown tires; but the failure of the left engine became obvious as we lifted off. Then; in rapid succession; we received multiple; repeated calls from the ground and from flight attendants. First; taxiing aircraft reported that our left engine was on fire. Then; the tower called and repeated that our left engine was on fire. Meanwhile; below 1;000 ft; the cockpit chime was ringing repeatedly as the flight attendants attempted to call us. I heard the flight attendants on the interphone say something about smoke in the cabin and a call to get a halon fire extinguisher. These events all combined to significantly disrupt our normal after takeoff flow. Specifically; neither pilot called for or accomplished gear retraction or the after takeoff checklist. I took over the radio as the first officer began running the engine failure checklist. I asked the tower for an immediate return to the airport; and realized we should run the engine fire checklist instead; I called for that checklist. We secured the left engine; and even though there was no cockpit fire indication; I directed the first officer to discharge a fire bottle; since fire was reported from the ground and by the flight attendants.I attempted to engage the autopilot on crosswind; but after several seconds; it disengaged. I made no further attempts to engage it; since I felt troubleshooting would add to my distractions. Hand flying; however; significantly added to my workload. Soon; a jumpseating pilot (who had been riding in the cabin) came to the cockpit and assisted the first officer by reading checklists. I learned from him and the flight attendants that smoke in the cabin was transient; and there was no cabin fire. Our traffic pattern and final approach were very short; due to both the fire situation and nearby weather in the area. I made a PA to advise the passengers to remain seated after landing. I accomplished configuration changes myself. The first officer and jumpseater finished checklists at approximately 500 feet. We landed with autobrakes 4; and as we stopped; I made another PA for the passengers to remain seated while the fire crews inspected the aircraft. They reported no visible anomalies. The highest brake temperature indicated 4; so we elected to taxi to the gate; fire crews followed the aircraft. Passengers deplaned at the gate without further incident. The engine failure was recorded in the aircraft logbook; maintenance then removed the logbook from the aircraft. We completed the engine flameout or loss of thrust/inflight shutdown form and left it on the center console. We realized after the logbook was removed from the aircraft that the overweight landing had not been documented. I spoke with the maintenance coordinator over the telephone and provided him with the aircraft gross weight and approximate sink rate at touchdown. He informed me that he would set the aircraft up for an overweight landing inspection. I complied with the fom post-incident/irregularity checklist. I did not realize that I had missed the post-emergency checklist in the fom. Specifically; I was late notifying the dispatcher of the event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An engine failure at rotation; compounded by multiple and immediate calls from ATC; other aircraft and the flight attendants regarding a fire in the left engine and smoke in the cabin compounded the difficulties for the flight crew of a B757-200; yet a successful; albeit imperfect; synergistic chain of events followed to get all aboard safely back on the ground in short order.

Narrative: At V1/rotation; we felt vibration and heard a muffled bang. At first; I thought we might have blown tires; but the failure of the left engine became obvious as we lifted off. Then; in rapid succession; we received multiple; repeated calls from the ground and from flight attendants. First; taxiing aircraft reported that our left engine was on fire. Then; the Tower called and repeated that our left engine was on fire. Meanwhile; below 1;000 FT; the cockpit chime was ringing repeatedly as the flight attendants attempted to call us. I heard the flight attendants on the interphone say something about smoke in the cabin and a call to get a halon fire extinguisher. These events all combined to significantly disrupt our normal after takeoff flow. Specifically; neither pilot called for or accomplished gear retraction or the After Takeoff Checklist. I took over the radio as the First Officer began running the Engine Failure Checklist. I asked the Tower for an immediate return to the airport; and realized we should run the Engine Fire Checklist instead; I called for that checklist. We secured the left engine; and even though there was no cockpit fire indication; I directed the First Officer to discharge a fire bottle; since fire was reported from the ground and by the flight attendants.I attempted to engage the autopilot on crosswind; but after several seconds; it disengaged. I made no further attempts to engage it; since I felt troubleshooting would add to my distractions. Hand flying; however; significantly added to my workload. Soon; a jumpseating pilot (who had been riding in the cabin) came to the cockpit and assisted the First Officer by reading checklists. I learned from him and the flight attendants that smoke in the cabin was transient; and there was no cabin fire. Our traffic pattern and final approach were very short; due to both the fire situation and nearby weather in the area. I made a PA to advise the passengers to remain seated after landing. I accomplished configuration changes myself. The First Officer and jumpseater finished checklists at approximately 500 feet. We landed with autobrakes 4; and as we stopped; I made another PA for the passengers to remain seated while the fire crews inspected the aircraft. They reported no visible anomalies. The highest brake temperature indicated 4; so we elected to taxi to the gate; fire crews followed the aircraft. Passengers deplaned at the gate without further incident. The engine failure was recorded in the aircraft logbook; Maintenance then removed the logbook from the aircraft. We completed the Engine Flameout or Loss of Thrust/Inflight Shutdown form and left it on the center console. We realized after the logbook was removed from the aircraft that the overweight landing had not been documented. I spoke with the Maintenance Coordinator over the telephone and provided him with the aircraft gross weight and approximate sink rate at touchdown. He informed me that he would set the aircraft up for an overweight landing inspection. I complied with the FOM Post-Incident/Irregularity Checklist. I did not realize that I had missed the Post-Emergency Checklist in the FOM. Specifically; I was late notifying the Dispatcher of the event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.