Narrative:

While completing the after-takeoff flow/checklist; the first officer noticed that the number 1 aux pump advisory light remained on. After completing the fuel-out call; the first officer brought the aux light to my attention. We cycled the aux pump switch on and off. We toggled the fuel transfer switch briefly and tested the advisory lights. The light remained on. The number 1 fuel quantity also indicated 200 pounds less than the number 2 quantity. This was peculiar because we had made a short two-engine taxi and had both verified takeoff fuel. I remember the takeoff quantities being about equal at 2550/2600 or 5100 total. We discussed the possibility and consequences of a fuel leak. I tested the fuel quantity indicators. Both tested to the full indications before returning to the split indications. We consulted the non-normal low fuel level checklist. I noted the fuel quantity of 2250 and 2500; while fuel flow was indicating equal. The aux pump advisory light finally self-extinguished. The first officer directed the flight attendant to discretely walk through the cabin for a check of leaks. I checked on with approach and advised them that we may soon be declaring an emergency. The first officer called operations to let them know we would have a maintenance issue (fuel gauge) on arrival. The flight attendant reported back to the first officer that she smelled fuel. Following the checklist we shut down the number 1 engine. At this time the FMS projected us about 15 minutes from destination. I declared an emergency with approach. We completed the engine failure in-flight and single engine descent-approach checklists. The first officer re-called the flight attendant and station. Because we were now taking vectors for the ILS; we decided not to try calling dispatch using the satcom. The approach and landing were uneventful. Although I had briefed against using prop discing/reverse in the roll-out; I did try a power lever position just aft of the idle gate once the nose-wheel was on the runway. Directional control was good so I used slight discing on the number 2 engine and toe brakes to slow and exit the runway. I set the parking brake and made a PA announcement. The first officer completed the single engine after landing checklist. The arff personnel found no evidence of leaks or damage. Ground cleared us to the gate. The aircraft would not move at single engine idle power. I checked the parking brake was off and applied 20% torque. I cycled the parking brake on then off. After applying nearly 60% torque; the aircraft broke free straight ahead. Normal power in the discing range was now all that was required for taxi. I checked the toe brakes and the aircraft stopped but with a shuddering/pulsing. At slow (walking) speed no shudder or pulse occurred. I parked at the terminal using this slower speed. Unsure of whether it was required after an engine shutdown; I pulled the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker and notified dispatch. With maintenance control I noted three discrepancies in the logbook; fuel leak/shutdown; sticking brakes; and cvr circuit breaker pulled. With a contract mechanic we were unable to replicate the fuel indications during a ground run up. The pulsing/shuddering braking was still occurring during our taxi test. The aircraft did not 'stick' requiring unusual power again. Approximately 2 hours after returning to the gate following this taxi test; a company mechanic arrived with brake parts. Before starting the engines again to isolate which brake might be sticking; I noticed the p-brake/accumulator pressure was at 2;100 psi. This triggered my memory of earlier before start checks where the accumulator had indicated 2;500 and 2;800 respectively. These were slightly lower than the normal 2;900-3;000 psi. I mentioned the accumulator pressure to the mechanic. Dispatch now swapped our crew with the arriving crew. The other crew conducted another taxi test as we boarded passengers.I do not know the causes of these events. Although the fom directs unsure crews to pull the cvr circuit breaker; maintenance/dispatch was surprised and confused when I advised them of the cvr deactivation. I expected them to advise me to push the breaker back in if it was not required. Instead we opened another discrepancy in the logbook. I should have been clearer that I had pulled the circuit breaker to preserve data. Flight/maintenance control seemed to believe that I had intentionally broken or deactivated a system. The perspectives seemed different. Perhaps we both need more information on how to handle the cvr after events not specifically listed by the NTSB. We should have called dispatch even briefly to let them know of our condition. The first officer informed the station with a request to notify dispatch. According to the station agent; dispatch is not one of the first phone calls directed during an inbound emergency. The station made calls in the order of the station manuals. Dispatch was one of the last parties to know of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC 8-300 flight crew believes they have a fuel leak in the left engine and elects to shut it down before continuing to destination. The combination of an aux fuel pump light that failed to extinguish when the pumps are turned off; uneven fuel consumption and a possible fuel odor in the cabin lead the crew to this conclusion.

Narrative: While completing the after-takeoff flow/checklist; the First Officer noticed that the Number 1 Aux pump advisory light remained on. After completing the fuel-out call; the First Officer brought the Aux light to my attention. We cycled the Aux pump switch on and off. We toggled the fuel transfer switch briefly and tested the advisory lights. The light remained on. The Number 1 fuel quantity also indicated 200 LBS less than the Number 2 quantity. This was peculiar because we had made a short two-engine taxi and had both verified takeoff fuel. I remember the takeoff quantities being about equal at 2550/2600 or 5100 total. We discussed the possibility and consequences of a fuel leak. I tested the fuel quantity indicators. Both tested to the full indications before returning to the split indications. We consulted the non-normal Low Fuel Level checklist. I noted the fuel quantity of 2250 and 2500; while fuel flow was indicating equal. The aux pump advisory light finally self-extinguished. The First Officer directed the Flight Attendant to discretely walk through the cabin for a check of leaks. I checked on with Approach and advised them that we may soon be declaring an emergency. The First Officer called operations to let them know we would have a maintenance issue (fuel gauge) on arrival. The Flight Attendant reported back to the First Officer that she smelled fuel. Following the checklist we shut down the Number 1 engine. At this time the FMS projected us about 15 minutes from destination. I declared an emergency with Approach. We completed the Engine Failure In-flight and Single Engine Descent-Approach Checklists. The First Officer re-called the Flight Attendant and Station. Because we were now taking vectors for the ILS; we decided not to try calling Dispatch using the SATCOM. The approach and landing were uneventful. Although I had briefed against using prop discing/reverse in the roll-out; I did try a power lever position just aft of the idle gate once the nose-wheel was on the runway. Directional control was good so I used slight discing on the Number 2 engine and toe brakes to slow and exit the runway. I set the parking brake and made a PA announcement. The First Officer completed the Single Engine After Landing Checklist. The ARFF personnel found no evidence of leaks or damage. Ground cleared us to the gate. The aircraft would not move at single engine idle power. I checked the parking brake was off and applied 20% torque. I cycled the parking brake on then off. After applying nearly 60% torque; the aircraft broke free straight ahead. Normal power in the discing range was now all that was required for taxi. I checked the toe brakes and the aircraft stopped but with a shuddering/pulsing. At slow (walking) speed no shudder or pulse occurred. I parked at the terminal using this slower speed. Unsure of whether it was required after an engine shutdown; I pulled the Cockpit Voice Recorder circuit breaker and notified Dispatch. With Maintenance control I noted three discrepancies in the logbook; Fuel Leak/Shutdown; Sticking Brakes; and CVR CB pulled. With a Contract Mechanic we were unable to replicate the fuel indications during a ground run up. The pulsing/shuddering braking was still occurring during our taxi test. The aircraft did not 'stick' requiring unusual power again. Approximately 2 hours after returning to the gate following this taxi test; a Company Mechanic arrived with brake parts. Before starting the engines again to isolate which brake might be sticking; I noticed the P-Brake/Accumulator pressure was at 2;100 PSI. This triggered my memory of earlier before start checks where the accumulator had indicated 2;500 and 2;800 respectively. These were slightly lower than the normal 2;900-3;000 PSI. I mentioned the accumulator pressure to the Mechanic. Dispatch now swapped our crew with the arriving crew. The other crew conducted another taxi test as we boarded passengers.I do not know the causes of these events. Although the FOM directs unsure crews to pull the CVR circuit breaker; Maintenance/Dispatch was surprised and confused when I advised them of the CVR deactivation. I expected them to advise me to push the breaker back in if it was not required. Instead we opened another discrepancy in the logbook. I should have been clearer that I had pulled the CB to preserve data. Flight/Maintenance Control seemed to believe that I had intentionally broken or deactivated a system. The perspectives seemed different. Perhaps we both need more information on how to handle the CVR after events not specifically listed by the NTSB. We should have called Dispatch even briefly to let them know of our condition. The First Officer informed the station with a request to notify Dispatch. According to the Station Agent; Dispatch is not one of the first phone calls directed during an inbound emergency. The Station made calls in the order of the station manuals. Dispatch was one of the last parties to know of the situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.