Narrative:

The flight began as any flight would normally. I met my first officer on time and said hello. We discussed the fuel load which was generous. We discussed the MEL of an inoperative fuel number 1 gauge; thus requiring us to operate in manual. Both of us had done this procedure recently and felt comfortable with the procedure. Normal preflight procedures were followed. The fuel was checked and verified. The MEL page was printed and in our possession on the pedestal. After closing the door and receiving final weight and balance paperwork I called for the below the line checklist which [was] accomplished. We began our pushback and started engines. We had a start malfunction which left us in a position blocking many taxiing aircraft. We called ramp and were moved to [another location]. During this time we called maintenance who directed another start attempt. This start was normal. We were then cleared to taxi with a wheels-up time in about five minutes. There was ample time for an unrushed taxi to the runway; but a few issues still remained. We had an engine alert reminder which we thought was from the previous malfunction. We cycled through and reviewed the consequences and status pages to look for anything unaddressed. None were noted. However we noted that the APU was still running after ample time for it to have shut down. It had been selected to shut down on the after start checklist. Two more attempts were made to shut it down and it did then shut down. Then the engine reminder went away at this time. All indications were now normal so we continued to taxi and had a normal takeoff. Climbing thru 15;000 ft; number 2 engine rolled back and we received a confirm engine out prompt. We ran the engine fire or severe damage checklist and returned for an uneventful landing. I flew the plane throughout the event. First officer ran the checklists and loaded the FMC as needed. It seemed to me that we simply had the bad luck of losing an engine on climbout followed by a successful return. Once on the ground we began to review what had happened. First officer began to doubt if he had completed the before start checklist as well as the after takeoff checklist; both of which had items pertaining to fuel pumps being turned on. I was hand flying the aircraft during the climbout phase. I questioned the checklist failure because I thought we would have noticed the pump switch lights being illuminated and perhaps other warnings. Plus the engine ran normally on takeoff which is the highest fuel demand.the lighting conditions in the cockpit were very bright due to afternoon sun; haze; glare and the wearing of sunglasses. Perhaps these lights were overlooked. I don't know. If not for first officer's doubts; I would simply think we had an engine failure. As it is; upon reflection; we might have missed those items on the before start checklist. Perhaps we will know after maintenance does their research. If the cause of this engine failure was in fact pilot error; I know of two pilots who will not make that mistake again. The question is how do we impart our learning experience to the rest of the crew force. I hope others who read this report will get a heads up. Perhaps enough will be said that it will become like the pitot covers which are now checked and rechecked on every flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC-10 flight crew reported they lost an engine after takeoff that they feel was probably due to failure to complete checklist and mismanaged fuel pumps.

Narrative: The flight began as any flight would normally. I met my First Officer on time and said hello. We discussed the fuel load which was generous. We discussed the MEL of an inoperative fuel number 1 gauge; thus requiring us to operate in Manual. Both of us had done this procedure recently and felt comfortable with the procedure. Normal preflight procedures were followed. The fuel was checked and verified. The MEL page was printed and in our possession on the pedestal. After closing the door and receiving final weight and balance paperwork I called for the Below The Line Checklist which [was] accomplished. We began our pushback and started engines. We had a start malfunction which left us in a position blocking many taxiing aircraft. We called ramp and were moved to [another location]. During this time we called Maintenance who directed another start attempt. This start was normal. We were then cleared to taxi with a wheels-up time in about five minutes. There was ample time for an unrushed taxi to the runway; but a few issues still remained. We had an ENG alert reminder which we thought was from the previous malfunction. We cycled through and reviewed the Consequences and Status pages to look for anything unaddressed. None were noted. However we noted that the APU was still running after ample time for it to have shut down. It had been selected to shut down on the After Start Checklist. Two more attempts were made to shut it down and it did then shut down. Then the ENG reminder went away at this time. All indications were now normal so we continued to taxi and had a normal takeoff. Climbing thru 15;000 FT; Number 2 Engine rolled back and we received a confirm engine out prompt. We ran the Engine Fire or Severe Damage Checklist and returned for an uneventful landing. I flew the plane throughout the event. First Officer ran the checklists and loaded the FMC as needed. It seemed to me that we simply had the bad luck of losing an engine on climbout followed by a successful return. Once on the ground we began to review what had happened. First Officer began to doubt if he had completed the Before Start Checklist as well as the After Takeoff Checklist; both of which had items pertaining to fuel pumps being turned on. I was hand flying the aircraft during the climbout phase. I questioned the checklist failure because I thought we would have noticed the pump switch lights being illuminated and perhaps other warnings. Plus the engine ran normally on takeoff which is the highest fuel demand.The lighting conditions in the cockpit were very bright due to afternoon sun; haze; glare and the wearing of sunglasses. Perhaps these lights were overlooked. I don't know. If not for First Officer's doubts; I would simply think we had an engine failure. As it is; upon reflection; we might have missed those items on the Before Start Checklist. Perhaps we will know after Maintenance does their research. If the cause of this engine failure was in fact pilot error; I know of two pilots who will not make that mistake again. The question is how do we impart our learning experience to the rest of the crew force. I hope others who read this report will get a heads up. Perhaps enough will be said that it will become like the pitot covers which are now checked and rechecked on every flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.